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THE VANISHING OF JEAN BAUDRILLARD
The Vanishing of Jean Baudrillard examines
the question of Jean Baudrillard's desire for his
own disappearance as theorist. The thesis is an
evaluation of the philosophical significance of
his work. This is only possible by disengaging
his writing from the problematic of 'post-
modernism'. The category as applied to his work
serves to justify perceived frivolity and
aesthetic indulgence.
The age of post-modernity is understood to
herald a civilization of the image, or of
simulation. Baudrillard's analysis of the
simulacrum is often brought to bear as a
theoretical justification for this argument.
However for Baudrillard the simulacrum is not an
image. As he conceives it, the simulacrum has the
effect of undermining basic principles of reason
and causality. The simulacrum qua model has the
structure of anterior finality. Ultimately it
renders problematic traditional conceptions of
theory and its relation to the world.
The transformation of the question of
production provides the key to his work.
Production as the fundamental logic of political
economy and representation is superseded by the
process of reproduction and simulation. The scene
of the real and representation gives way to the
exacerbated representation of the obscenity of the
hyperreal - the absolute proximity of the more
real than real. The hyperreal is not the simple
destruction of causality or the production of ends
and values but their excess.
According to Baudrillard all critical
discourse is a function of the previous order of
representation. It only serves to sustain the
myth of the real and the values of subjectivity.
Through his elaboration of the processes of
seduction and the fatal strategy Baudrillard
attempts to access events which absorb the
subject, the real, value and all sense.
In this way the vanishing which Baudrillard
aspires to can be perceived, though not as a
project. His writing becomes the attempted
elucidation of an impossible event, without
reason, use or future. It is an event that cannot
be reconciled to any form of subjectivity.
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IINTRODUCTION
The work of Jean Baudrillard is one of the most
striking and original products of recent continental
philosophy. This already makes a claim to the nature
or status of his work. Although Baudrillard has gained
a certain notoriety in the field of cultural studies my
thesis attempts to show that there is an impulse in his
work that is fundamentally philosophical. Mike Gane
has recently accounted for the sociological import of
his work separate from the phenomenon of post-
modernism. 1 I also want to detach Baudrillard's
writings from the ambit of post-modernism, but in order
to argue its philosophical importance.
I will argue that the term post-modernism masks a
set of deep rooted questions and issues in
Baudrillard's work. These issues, such as the nature
of his conception of the simulacrum, escape the
seemingly unlimited range of its applicability. One
only has to browse through the daily newspapers to
apprise the variety of its objects - from politics to
literature, to film and TV. To use a soccer analogy,
another pre-eminent post-modern trope, the concept of
post-modernism is a utility player. If one is stuck
for an adjective to fill that critical position post-
modernism will plug the gap. It is only when
Baudrillard's work is detatched from the term that any
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reader can begin to see what is at stake in the
sometimes dramatic unfolding of his writings.
This dramatic unfolding concerns a range of
different but interconnected issues; the problem of
production and the utile; the function of the subject
in a logic of production; meaning as a function of this
utilitarian logic; modern media as a process of non-
communication; the phenomenon of the mass (as opposed
to the social) which absorbs all the emancipatory and
rational demands made of it; the eventual seduction of
the object; his attack on critical inquiry and
interpretation; and ultimately the formulation of his
fatal strategy.
It will become clear that Baudrillard's writing,
in its apparently diverse subject matter, can be
understood as the working through of the problem of
production. This problem at one level concerns the
question of value, teleology and ends. For Baudrillard
critical analysis and interpretation is utterly
compromised by its systematic affinity with the latter.
The issue of production appears in his early work in
his problematizing of ideological analyses of capital
and the form of the subject entailed by such analyses.
This subject is essentially the subject of humanism.
His theoretical anti-humanism is sustained and
transformed throughout his writings to the point where
III
he will eventually propose taking the side of the
object.
All I want to suggest here is that a reading of
Baudrillard's work as post-modernist cannot be
sustained. However he is not the only victim of this
simplification. All of those associated with the
equally general term of post-structuralism have at some
time or other suffered the same fate. Moreover on the
one hand negative accounts launched from such a
perspective often bear equal measures of commentary and
invective; from Douglas Kellner's increasingly
patronising account of Baudrillard's later work as his
'own little thought world', 2 to Christopher Norris'
characterisation of his work as the trickery of a
'post-modernist guru'. 3
 On the other hand commentators
such as Arthur Kroker completely and passionately
embrace the conceptual equivalence of Baudrillard and
post-modernism. According to Kroker:
Upon the rubble of the classical model of
sociology, Baudrillard is a quantum physicist of
the processed world of mass communications.4
This enthusiasm for Baudrillard is equally fervent
as the hostility his work sometimes arouses. I would
argue that any thinker who arouses such passion is
worthy of attention. In any case, it will also become
clear that Baudrillard, at a level that is neither
arbitrary nor premeditated, invites and courts
dissension. He wants to write theory that is an event
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in the world. An event without an origin or without a
future.
In what follows I will attempt to show, contrary
to the perception of Douglas Kellner, that there is a
coherence to Baudrillard's work. Or at least that
there is a continual redefinition and redescription of
the problems of production and subjectivity. These
issues are constantly transformed and displaced onto
different terrain, none of which are related in any
significant way to the issue of post-modernism. By the
end of the thesis I hope the reader will have
recognised the perverse logic which leads Baudrillard
to aspire to his disappearance as subject and theorist.
For this reason along with the growing list of epithets
applied to Baudrillard (Walt Disney and Hugh Hefner to
name but two) I would like to add another. According
to the account of disappearance given by Paul Virilio,
Baudrillard would be the Howard Hughes of recent
continental philosophy. Not because he is the victim
of a pathological affliction but because this
disappearance can unleash unforeseen forces on the
dimensions of time and the real:
...as Balzac has it, H all power will be secret or
will not be, since all visible strength is
threatened u ...all techniques meant to unleash
forces are techniques of disappearance (the
epileptic constitution of the great conquerors,
Alexandgr, Caeser, Hannibal, etc., is well
known).
VThough Baudrillard's work is often criticised for
not having anything to say about the 'real world', or
for misdiagnosing it, Baudrillard's writing as
disappearance is in the end an attempt to create an
event that evades both causal and rational
determination, and the production of reference and
meaning. In this way it will be a theory without
origin or future.
1CHAPTER ONE: A NAIVE HISTORY OF POST-
MODERNISM.
In the land of the blind the one-eyed man is king.
The reading and reception of Jean Baudrillard has
largely if not completely taken place through the grid
of what is variously called, 'post-modernism' or
`postmodernism'. This term, like its spelling, appears
in a variety of different forms. Insofar as the term
appears to indicate a particular relationship to the
term modernism, itself a highly problematic category or
periodisation, minor changes in the spelling can be
highly significant. Whereas `postmodernism' suggests a
homogenous well defined and limited area of its
functioning (the post is definitely an afterwards),
the hyphen in `post-modernism' defines both a joining
and division. Of course the hyphen is not heard and
unfortunately this neat method of categorising
perspectives on 'postmodernism/post-modernism' is of
little use.
However this lack of precision does indicate a
tendency to focus on general issues in the debate on
postmodernism/post-modernism. It is arguable that it
is a consequence of the debate largely taking place
within the English speaking world which does not have
the same concern with the prepositional that one finds
in German and French. I would argue that such concerns
are largely philosophical concerns and the debate on
2post-modernism has largely occurred on the fringes of
philosophy. Even so, debate on the nature of post-
modernity cites general shifts in philosophical debate
as evidence in support of post-modernism. In
considering the question of post-modernism one is
tempted by Richard Rorty's attitude towards traditional
philosophical speculations - that is, to change the
subject. With respect to the work of Jean Baudrillard
this is indeed highly desirable. The fundamental
features and developments in Baudrillard's work get
lost in the miasma that is the debate on 'post-
modernism'.
At best the notion of post-modernism is a slippery
beast, insistently inchoate. At worst it is
journalistic cliche, 'the temptation of a cheap
seduction'. Donald Kuspit casts a sceptical eye on the
remarkable phenomenon of the term:
The contradictory character of the term expands
its meaning; its inflationary character follows
from this contradictoriness. That is, the
inflation signals that the contradictoriness is
unresolvable - an idealistic over-expansion that
empties the term of material meaning. The only
historical reality "postmodernism" comes to signal
is that of its exaggerated significance for
theorists, which is one way of understanding how
it is that a term can become a signifier without
reference.1
It is arguable whether in this case 'signifier
without reference' is a gentle substitution for what
used to be called metaphysical speculation. There are
also echoes of Derrida's observation at the beginning
3of Of Grammatology concerning the inflation of
language. The relative success of the term does
indicate, despite itself, a change in the nature of
academic debate. This is worth bearing in mind for, as
I will show, Baudrillard is sensitive to this issue.
Paradoxically the term post-modernism while having
generated much debate is ultimately a conversation
stopper. It is the domination of the different by the
same - and to no purpose or guided by no other logic
than the conventions and topics it has generated for
itself. In philosophy for example, to consider
Barthes, Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, Deleuze
and Guattari as post-modern is to miss or ignore their
fundamental intellectual differences on a whole range
of basic philosophical issues. For this reason, to
take seriously the concept and debate of post-modernism
is to implicitly endorse a philosophical perspective.
Such a perspective sees the varied projects of recent
continental philosophy as homogenous and essentially
indifferent. For someone like Habermas this
indifferent reading serves his own philosophical
agenda. For those who have sympathy with the debates
in recent continental philosophy the reduction of
Derrida, Foucault and others to the phenomenon of post-
modernism does them no favours. 	 In short it is a
massive simplification.	 Baudrillard's writing has
suffered more than most in this respect.
4Despite these reservations I will attempt to
survey some of the least questionable accounts of post-
modernism for the term has provided the framework for
the reception of Baudrillard. Through the grid of
post-modernism his work is reduced to an ill-conceived
problematic of language - there is no reference, there
are only signifiers of signifiers. The list of works
currently available on the topic of 'postmodernism'
grows at an exponential rate. Most offer a gloss on
Baudrillard as a I postmodernist i without ceding any
analytic space or reading of what is fundamental to his
work; his account of the object and the disappearance
of the subject and theorist. In some respects
Baudrillard's work stands or falls on the success of
the latter. To the extent that he does not he could be
considered a post-modernist. For in the end the debate
on post-modernism excises the truly anti-humanist
schemas of recent continental philosophy.
In this opening chapter I will outline some of the
essential features of the debate on modernist and post-
modernist architecture for if post-modernism has any
authentic or indiginous origin it is to be found in
architecture. Yet this in itself is the source of
confusion in applying the term to philosophy.
Baudrillard would resist blanket architectural
analogies applied to his work. Particularly insofar as
unquestioningly assumes certain characterisations of
space - of interiority and exteriority. Nevertheless
5it is instructive to see the kind of analogies that are
imposed surreptitiously on philosophy from elsewhere.
Although of course this is to make too easy a
distinction between the two. Conceptualisations of
architectural space depend on a certain philosophical
schematization - of limits, of inside and outside.
With respect to the debate on architecture another
classical philosophical issue is at stake. That is,
the relationship between the particular and the
universal. This issue is played out in different ways.
In the end this is possibly the most instructive lesson
to be learned from looking at the area of architecture.
Various accounts are settled here and are indeed
reflected in the non-architectural debate on post-
modernism. Moreover, and it cannot be stressed enough,
its application to the work of Baudrillard is limited
to say the least.
I will draw upon the work of Charles Jencks and
David Harvey who are the most informed chroniclers of
post-modern geography, though both succumb to the curse
of debate on post-modernism when discussing it as a
cultural phenomena - generalization. What is
interesting in their work is the way it is also
informed by particular conceptions of the economic.
The difference between their accounts of this and
Baudrillard's will eventually be seen to be
significant.
6I will also focus specifically on two
philosophical accounts of post-modernism: those of
Richard Rorty and Jean-Francois Lyotard. If there is
some philosophical focus to the term post-modernism it
is to be found in Rorty and Lyotard. Again the
contrast with Baudrillard is informative. For in the
end both to a greater or lesser degree (Rorty and
Lyotard respectively) are engaged in an attempt to save
or redescribe the subject in the face of what they
ostensibly regard as positive anti-humanist forces.
With respect to this question of architecture
there are a range of different conditions which impose
themselves on modernist architecture. Though
apparently there is only one contributing to its
demise. In architecture the ambition of modernism
meets its apotheosis in its failure to meet the needs
of people in the late twentieth century. Dysfunctional
skyscraper slums and their demolition marked the end of
the cult of the modern or the new. In this respect the
demise of the functionalist aspect of architectural
modernism, and its untidy symbolic links with utopian
rationalist progress, was the first concrete symptom of
the decay of the project of modernism in general. Here
the referents of architectural modernism are understood
to be the coming of age of enlightenment reason in
modern science and technology, and consequently in
urban and social planning.	 There are however two
different moments to architectural modernism. It could
7be said that they are divided historically by the
second world war. Firstly, there was the corporatist
modernism of someone like Le Corbusier. Le Corbusier
equated planning with social order and rational order
with freedom. He describes the house as a machine for
living in. One can say that this kind of architecture
contributed to the cult and myth of the new. This in
effect is the period of heroic modernism. One cannot
overemphasise the purely aesthetic appeal of
functionalism. David Harvey cites the refusal of Le
Corbusier to allow blinds to be put into one of his
buildings and consequently the occupants `fry' in the
summer.
Therefore one can argue that the functionality and
rationality of architectural modernism clearly denotes
not only the zenith of engineering skills and technique
but is emblematic of a rational, scientific destiny of
mankind. This double-sided aspect of modernist
architecture meant that it could serve as a symbol of
different sets of interests.	 Hence the Nazis while
denouncing `bourgeois decadent modernism' felt
ideologically comfortable with the functional aspects
of modernist architecture to use it freely in the
construction of the concentration camps.
One can therefore identify three common features
of `heroic' architectural modernism;
81) rationality, functionality and order
2)	 because of its rationality it represented a
universal, necessary destiny of mankind.
3) this universal quality meant that modernism could
take its place within architectural tradition. Hence
the epithet of `high modernism'.
This last feature suggests that architectural
modernism has a paradoxical relation to its cultural
counterpart. So for example while glorying in the
machine age like the futurists and constructivists, its
attentiveness to its own place in tradition, even as
the `new' tradition, links it with the modernist
classicism of Eliot.
	
In short, `high modernism'
retains an aura:
A great epoch has begun.
	
There exists a new
spirit. Industry, overwhelming us like a flood
which rolls on towards its destined ends, has
furnished us with new tools adapted to this new
epoch, animated by a new spirit. 	 Economic law
inevitably governs our acts and our thoughts...We
must create the mass production spirit. The
spirit of constructing mass-production houses4
The spirit of living in mass-production houses...4
It is worth noting the wholly unfunctional tone
adopted by Le Corbusier in his celebration of the
machine, underlined by the semi-ontological status
given to its overwheming energy which `floods'
irrevocably over this new epoch.	 Frederic Jameson
points to the emblematic aspect of this reverence for
9the machine which is also a celebration of speed and
energy:
It is appropriate therefore to recall the
excitement of machinery in the preceding moment of
capital, the exhilaration of futurism most
notably, and of Marinetti's celebration of the
machine gun and the motor car. These are still
visible emblems, sculptural nodes of energy which
gave tangibility and figuration to the motive
energies of that earlier moment of modernization.
The prestige of these great streamlined shapes can
be measured by their metaphorical presence in Le
Corbusier's buildings, vast utopian structures
which ride like so many gigantic steamshipliners
Fon the urban scenery of an older fallen earth.
One could say therefore that architectural
modernism contains different impulses. Functionalism
and rationalization are its principles but these are
clearly paradigms of a new mythology.
Charles Jencks, while recognising the concrete
social effects of modernist architecture largely avoids
imputing direct economic motivations for modernism,
emphasizing instead its ideological and symbolic
functions. Because he undervalues the economic and its
literally 'flooding' energy he sees its dominant tone
as one of protestantism, not only in the functionalism
and that inspires it but also in its severity and
total lack of ornamentation. This lack of decoration
was in keeping with its functionalist pedagogy.
Modernist architecture according to Jencks is the:
universal, international style stemming from the
facts of new constructional means, adequate to a
new industrial society, and having as its goal the
10
transformation of society, both in its sense and
its social make-up.4
Before going any further it is worth noting that
despite my postulation that post-modernism has a clear
focus in the field of architecture, there is already
built into any analysis of modernism a set of
philosophical and historical positions. The re-
territorialisation of space is apparently both a
function of, and a necessary condition for the
development of capital. This is especially stark in
the case of the second wave of modernism.
Post World War II modernism reflects a different
set of circumstances. The massive destruction caused
by the war provided the perfect opportunity for the
kind of schemes and large scale planning fundamental to
the modernist project. There are three main features
of this development:
1) the rationalization of space;
2) standardization and regimentation;
3) suburbanization.
Each of these features clearly corresponds to the
functionalist element of modernism. They were also
pragmatic features of the economic response to post-war
reconstruction. The rationalization of space was a
function of the economic necessity for a mobile labour
force. Motorway development enabled easy circulation
1 1
of labour and goods. Standardization was possible due
to the achievements of Fordist mass-production which
came into its own during the war years.
Standardisation also responded to a post-war
egalitarianism. Suburbanisation was largely an
American principle according to Harvey, fulfilling the
demand for housing for the mass of returning 'G.I.s'.
In Britain planning policy set restrictions on town and
country development and the focus was on low cost, high
density dwellings:
Under the watchful eye and sometimes strong hand
of the state, procedures were devised to eliminate
slums, build modular housing, schools, hospitals,
factories, etc. through the adoption of the
industrialized construction systems and rational
planning procedures that modernist architects had
long proposed. And all this was framed again and
again in legislation, for the rationalization of
spatial patterns and of circulation systems so as
to promote equality (at least of opportunity),
social welfare and economic growth.
The economic form which produced this particular
organisation of space was corporatism which was of
course Le Corbusier's ideal (expressed in part in his
attraction towards Mussolini's Italy). The regulation
of space reflected the new regulation of the post-war
economy. Increased governmental regulation was a
direct response to the problem of how to produce
effective demand which was the source of the inter-war
depression. This rationalization then was largely a
function of the demands of Capital and the need to
reduce spatial barriers on the one hand and to provide
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easy access for labour. David Harvey accounts for this
process as follows:
The incentive to create the world market, to
reduce spatial barriers, and to annihilate space
through time is omnipresent, as is the incentive
to rationalize spatial organization into efficient
configurations of production (serial organization
of the detail division of labour, factory systems,
and assembly line, territorial division of labour
and agglomeration in large towns), and consumption
(household and domestic layout, community
organization, and residential differentiation,
collective consumption in cities).
In Marxist terms the point of this is to provide
the conditions for the acceleration of the turnover
time of capital and resolve the tendency towards the
overaccumulation of capital which produced the
depression. It is clear that this particular
organisation of space was not wholly successful.
Certainly the ethos of standardization reflected in the
practices of the assembly line for example and the
consequent deskilling of labour had an important
bearing on the demise of corporate or monopoly
capitalism.	 One can recognise therefore that
architectural modernism was a feature of a particular
post-war configuration of forces.
Post-Modernist architecture was produced in
conjunction with an entirely different set of economic
conditions. I have mentioned already the perceived
failure of modernism in terms of town planning and the
high density urban squalor it produced. Charles Jencks
cites the symbolic end of modernism (echoing in tone
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Virginia Woolf's declaration of the birth of modernism)
as on or about 3.32 p.m. on the 15th of July 1972.
This moment was the demolition of Le Corbusier's prize
winning Pruitt-Igoe housing complex in St. Louis, as
it was considered uninhabitable:
In 1972, many slab blocks of housing were
inentionally blown up at Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis.
By the mid 1970's, these explosions were becoming
quite a frequent method of dealing with the
failures of Modernist building methods: cheap
prefabrication, lack of personal 'defensible'
space and the alienating housing estate. The
'death' of Modern architecture and its ideology of
progress which offered technical solutions to
sociql problems was seen by everyone in a vivid
way.'
Jencks goes on to point out that the equivalent
death of cultural modernism cannot be shown with
similar exactitude. The 'spectacular' failure of
architectural modernism was therefore part of the decay
of a specific form and organisation of capital and had
severe social and geographical consequences.	 Its
demise was not the result of a cultural debate between
competing value systems. Jencks is careful in
apostrophising 'death' for as we shall see, post-
modernist architectural style retains certain features
of modernism.
The aesthetic of functionalism disappears,
replaced by an eclectic range of borrowed styles.
Moreover the decline of monopoly capitalism and its
mutation into a more flexible mode of capital
accumulation renders unnecessary the kind of large
14
scale planning schemes of modernism. This new
situation has various designations; Daniel Bell's
'post-industrial age'; Marshall McLuhan's `Global
Village'; Ernest Mandel's Late Capitalism; the
information age; or the `post-modern condition' in
which David Harvey recognises a shift in the mode of
production from fordism to flexible accumulation (the
consequence of which is space-time compression).
As with modernism there are a series of economic
factors	 which motivate	 the	 restructuring	 of
geographical space. Charles Jencks cites the
development of technology as a fundamental factor in
certain features of post-modern architecture. Firstly,
space and time are reduced through information
technology.	 This	 he	 suggests	 produces
internationalization and diversity in the variety of
styles adopted. Secondly, industrial development
allows for the mass production of `customised'
individual components:
The shifts are Kaleidoscopic and simultaneous -
that from mass production to segmented production;
from a relatively integrated mass-culture to many
fragmented taste cultures; from centralised
control in government and business to peripheral
decision making; from repetitive manufacture of
identical objects to he fast-changing manufacture
of varying objects...°
However outside the issue of technology the
economic factors are harder to assess because they are
more disparate and because classical forms of economic
15
organization are being replaced. It is with this shift
that schematization becomes more problematic and there
seem to be three main paradigms which are supposed to
account for this shift;
1) Economics. Structural transformation in capital
which I have shown can be read in the transformation in
architecture. The most ambitious and thorough account
is given by David Harvey who, as I have mentioned,
charts this shift as a move from Fordist organisation
to more flexible modes of capital accumulation. Other
people identify the change as one from monopoly
capitalism to multi-national capitalism.
2) Ideology. The assumption here is either a) nothing
has really changed in the way in which capital
functions (the position of some Marxists most notably
Alex Callinicos) 9
 and post-modernism is merely the new
ideology of capital, or b) economic development as the
prime mover is rejected and emphasis is given to
cultural and technological development. Here the post
in post-modernism signifies afterwards and what is
focussed on is a rejection of the cultural values of
high modernism.
3) This third paradigm is more complex. The key
figures are Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Deleuze.
What is at stake here are readings of the history of
western thought. Elements of this kind of thinking are
16
taken up by the culture critics of the second paradigm
but is identified as "post-structuralism". A better
epithet might be "Son of Structuralism" and because of
this move it is again located as historically recent
and an afterwards of an antecedent movement. This line
of approach is the basis for regarding post-modernism
as firstly and essentially an anti-enlightenment
movement. Critics of post-modernism such as Habermas
and Callinicos also cite these thinkers as being the
fundamental contributors to the irrationalist features
of post-modernism. Habermas conceives it as being a
conservative anti-modern movement:
On the basis of modernistic attitudes they justify
an irreconcilable antimodernism. They remove into
the sphere of the far-away and the archaic the
spontaneous powers of imagination, self-experience
and emotion. To instrumental reason they
juxtapose in Manichean fashion a principle only
accessible through evocation, be it the will to
power or sovereignty, Being or the Dyonisiac of
the poetical. In France this line leads from
Georges Bataille via Michel Foucault to Jacques
Derrida.10
In much debate on post-modernism what is proposed
is often a generalised hybridisation of all three
paradigms. Arthur Kroker and David Cook provide a good
example of this:
It is our general thesis that the postmodern scene
in fact begins in the fourth century with the
Augustinian subversion of embodied power, and that
everything since the Augustinian refusal has been
nothing but a fantastic and grisly implosion of
experience as Western culture itself runs under
the sign of passive and suicidal nihilism. Or was
it not perhaps, even before this, in the Lucretian
theory of the physical world that Serres calls the
simulacrum? Or was it later, in the abandonment
17
of reason in Kant's aesthetic liberalism of the
third critique?	 And what of late twentieth
century experience? Ours is a fin-de-millenium
consciousness which, existing at the end of
history in the tw ilight time of ultramodernism (of
technology)...."
Alex Callinicos' politically engaged polemics is
somewhat harsh in his description of Kroker's work as
'parlour nihilism'. However Kroker does pursue his
analysis with an uncommon zeal often sacrificing
conceptual clarity for rhetorical overkill.
Nevertheless in respect to post-modern architecture, it
does indeed contain a variety of impulses and elements
(though probably not Augustine). I have already noted
Jencks' observations concerning building technology.
If there has been less formal control of space by
capital it nevertheless has left its mark on urban
geography.	 Urban revitalization has replaced urban
renewal. This has sometimes appeared through property
speculation resulting in gentrification. The other
side of this coin is the fact that this can reduce the
severe demarcation of functional spaces through urban
zoning. In style as well as geography the new
sensibility is one of mixture and collage. Lack of an
overall planning scheme produces more segmented local
styles. Yet the sophistication of communications, "the
Global Village", it is argued, results in reference and
allusion to a variety of international styles such as
Scarlett Place in Baltimore. Hence post-modernism is
understood firstly to be eclectic, and secondly this
eclecticism is sometimes parodic.
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Stylistically, post-modern architecture maintains
(or borrows, depending on how you regard its
relationship to modernism) many of the features of
modernism. According to Jencks because of the element
of quotation, late modernism is often mistaken for
post-modernism. There are two crucial differences.
Firstly, late modernist architecture is still wedded to
the idea of the new. Secondly, like modernism it is
formalist in the sense that it is concerned with the
forms of its own specific art, attentive to its own
specific art practices. This is a traditional
definition of modernism stemming from Kant and
vigorously propounded by Clement Greenberg, the
guardian of modernist art.
Jencks suggests that this use and quotation of
styles in post-modernism is purely semantic reference.
The distinction Jencks makes here could be applied
across the range of post-modern cultural practices.
Furthermore, one can begin to see the difficulty in
categorising philosophers. If one wanted to categorise
the philosophers mentioned earlier on, it could be
argued that if any term is applicable it would be late-
modern given their disinterest in semantics. However
in respect to the notion of the new they would be post-
modern.
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One other important issue arises with regard to
the function of reference. Is the way in which
allusion and reference function in post-modernism less
destructive of aura than is often suggested? This
question is exemplary of one of the key problem areas
in debate on post-modernism. That is the notion of the
simulacra. The simulacra in the work of Baudrillard is
non-representational. 	 Yet discussion of the
characteristics of post-modernism equates simulacrum
with images which are the bearer of ideological
content. I will discuss this slippage in a later
chapter. I will merely note the use of the term, its
easy substitution for image, in this quote from David
Harvey debating the issue of decentralisation and
regionalism in post-modernity:
The assertion of any place-bound identity has to
rest at some point on the motivational power of
tradition. It is difficult, however, to maintain
any sense of historical continuity in the face of
all the flux and ephemerality of flexible
accumulation. The irony is that tradition is now
often preserved by being commodified and marketed
as such. The search for roots ends up at worst
being produced and ma;Aeted as an image, as a
simulacrum or pastiche."
For this reason I would argue that quotation,
allusion and pastiche, are entirely consistent with the
notion of aura which is a symbolic force of an image or
object. They depend on and play with an assumed aura.
One of the few people to see what is at stake in the
simulacrum is Richard Kearney who recognises its threat
to the concept of imagination, though he too seems to
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equate the simulacrum with the image. 13
 I will give a
more detailed account of the simulacrum in a later
chapter, in the meantime I would argue that this is
another indication of the often analytic laxity of the
post-modern debate.
In the end what is of crucial significance, no
matter how one attempts to set up a debate on the
issues of post-modernism, is its emergence as the
result of the perceived empirical and historical
failure of modernism. Judgement of modernist
architecture in the end is given on pragmatic grounds -
it did not work. Its universal functional style was
perceived to have failed to meet the needs of
particular individuals or communities. For this
reason, to use a architectural metaphor, recourse to
the analyses of philosophers who account for the
structural impossibility of the completion of the
western ratio is largely decorative, or ornamental.
This, I would argue, is exemplary of the debate on
post-modernism in general. Despite its harnessing of
various recent philosophers to its orbit, it ignores
their fundamental analyses of the structural flaws at
the core of western thought. The demise of certain
values in the west are understood as an empirical
event, and are even given a date by Jencks.
Bearing in mind what has been suggested about
post-modernism so far I will now turn to the two most
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prominent philosophers who have been sympathetic to the
notion of post-modernism - Jean-Francois Lyotard and
Richard Rorty. Rorty has accounted for himself as a
'post-modern bourgeois liberal'. Their respective
approaches and origins are quite different. Rorty is a
pragmatist who developed an interest in continental
philosophy while Lyotard is a continental philosopher
who became interested in pragmatism. Rorty's style is
conversational while Lyotard's	 is	 increasingly
analytic.
Lyotard's seminal account is given in two essays;
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge and
What is Postmodernism? In the first essay Lyotard
attempts to plot the course of the change in the
practices, purposes and institutions of knowledge. The
description he offers leads him to the central issue of
legitimation. He frames his account with the
proposition that in this particular epoch, the post-
modern, there has undergone a transformation of
knowledge.	 This change occurs for a variety of
reasons.
The two key characteristics in the change in the
nature of this knowledge is an exponential
transformation in technology which has in turn affected
dramatically the nature of research and the circulation
of knowledge.	 The organising matrix of this
transformation is information.	 Lyotard asserts that
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any knowledge that cannot be translated into
information will not find a place in the new channels
of knowledge circulation. This change has
consequences for users of knowledge. He suggests that
the relationship increasingly takes the form of that of
consumers and producers of any other commodity and is
the cornerstone of economic development in the late
20th century:
It is widely accepted that knowledge has become
the principle force of production over the last
few decades; this has already had a noticeable
effect on the composition of the work force of the
most highly developed countries and constitutes
the major bottleneck for the developing countries.
In the postindustrial and postmodern age, science
will maintain and no doubt strengthen its
preeminence in the arsenal of productive
capacities of the nation states.14
A consequence of this is that the political
context in which knowledge as information functions is
clearly different to any previous context. Lyotard
describes the traditional space of knowledge, research
and its legitimation in the unversity as follows.
There was the model of the Napoleonic order in which
the transmission of knowledge functioned in order to
provide the state with an administrative class. The
developement of this class of would provide stability
for the state and in effect would provide the
conditions for general progress and liberty for the
people. There is, thus, a twofold basis to this
demarcation for the proper functioning and legitimation
of knowledge, though Lyotard argues that the second
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purpose acts as a smokscreen for state control over the
institutions of knowledge. The next model was that
decided upon by von Humboldt in Germany in the early
nineteenth century. Lyotard argues that this model of
the unversity was essentially Hegelian in its relation
to the state. Knowledge is no longer, even as an
alibi, a resource for the betterment of the state and
the people. Nor is knowledge pursued for its own sake:
German idealism has recourse to a metaprinciple
that simultaneously grounds the development of
learning, of society, and of the State in the
realization of the "life" of a Subject called
"divine life" by Fichte and "Life of the spirit"
by Hegel. In this perspective, knowledege first
finds legitimacy within itself, and it is
knowledge that is enitled to say what the state
and what society are.i'
In this way knowledge is not positive not solely
concerned with its referent but is knowledge about that
knowledge. It becomes in the Hegelian sense
speculative and thereby legitimises itself. Positive
science is in effect meaningless without its sublation
into and by spirit. This form of legitimation he calls
modern:
I will use the term modern to designate any
science that legitimates itself with reference to
a meta-discourse of this kind making an explicit
appeal to some grand narrative, such as the
dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning,
the emancipation of the ration4; or working
subject, or the creation of wealth.ip
In post-industrial culture these grand narratives
of legitimation are no longer credible. There are a
variety of reasons for this. 	 Not least as Lyotard
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points out the gnawing nihilism of the idealist and
humanist narrative legitimations of Knowledge.
Technological development deepens this.
There is the increase in resourcing of research by
private capital. During the Keynesian economic order
research was conducted through this form of financing
in two ways. Direct technological applications
producing short-term profit (applied research) and
basic research with a return in the future through
innovation that would eventually prove decisive in the
market place. Clearly however in this case the motive
for research is less the pursuit of scientific truth
than the securing of market advantage:
The State and/or company must abandon the idealist
and humanist narratives of legitimation in order
to justify the new goal: in the discourse of
today's financial bankers of research, the only
credible goal is power. Scientists, technicians,
and instruments are vchased not to find truth,
but to augment power.1'
It is this direct and functional relationship
between knowledge and power that accelerates the
problem of delegitimation. The new criteria for what
counts as knowledge is a functional one based on
efficiency and performativity. It could be said that
such an order legitimates itself in circular fashion
through the technical means it has at its disposal
which decides what counts as knowledge, truth and
reality:
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Power is not only good performativity, but also
effective verification and good verdicts. It
legitimates science and the law on the basis of
their efficiency , legitimates this efficiency on
the basis of science and law. It is self-
legitimating, in the same way a system orwized
around performance maximization seems to be.1.°
The criterion of performativity renders the issue
of the legitimation or delegitimation meaningless.
Certainly such a question cannot be posed from within
the functionalist language game of the system.
However there are two reasons why this system
cannot sustain itself under such conditions which have
nothing to do with their lack of legitimation. The
demands for optimisation of performance produce
intolerable strains on the economic order through
capital over-accumulation. But Lyotard asserts that
because of the post-modern credulity towards grand
narratives the marxist narrative of salvation from this
'contradiction' of capital is not credible. Secondly,
the imagination necessary for technological
developement is not possible within the logic of
functionalism. So even though a functionalist system
may encourage a certain frisson or dissension it is
done in order to increase performativity and within a
certain consensus about possible innovatory moves. If
the principle of power is therefore homeostasis the
real motor of scientific advance according to Lyotard
is paralogy - the capacity to make a move which changes
the rules of the language game which opens up new
possibilities and domains for research.
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Hence Lyotard's advocacy of pragmatics and
agonistics which he argues is a feature of post-modern
science in any case. This is of course what Habermas
wants to dispute because, as Lyotard points out, he is
wedded to the narrative of emancipation and the
teleology of consensus:
Returning to the description of scientific
pragmatics, it is now dissension that must be
emphasized. Consensus is a horizon that is never
reached. Research that takes place under the
aegis of a paradigm tends to stabilize; it is like
the exploitation of a technological, economic, or
artistic "idea". It cannot be discounted. But
what is striking is that someone always comes
along to disturb the order of "reasons". It is
necessary to posit the existence of a power that
destabilizes the capacity for explanation,
manifested in the promulgation of new forms for
understanding or, if one prefers, in a proposal to
establish new rules circumscribing a new field of
research for the language of science.19
Universal	 pragmatics	 in	 the	 service	 of
'emancipation' regulates movements within the language
game. However it is arguable whether Lyotard's
description of the experimental moves within the
language game is post-modern or whether it in fact
conforms to the notion of art-specific practice of
modernism.
There are real similarities between the pragmatic
agonistics of post-modernism in Lyotard and Richard
Rorty's pragmatics of conversation. Rorty in some
respects aligns himself more easily with the shorthand
account of post-modernism.	 His work borrows
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fragmentarily from Derrida's deconstruction of
metaphysiscs. It is this which provides him with a
schema for his attack of the enlightenment and of
philosophical foundations in general. In effect the
issue of foundationalism in Rorty takes the place of
legitimation in Lyotard. The key feature of this anti-
foundationalism is an affirmation of the historical and
cultural contingency of the subject. Translating into
Rorty's purposefully coy language, there is no
objective world l out there' for the subject to discover
and thereby confirm his/her place in a system of truth:
to put the point in Heidegger's way, "language
speaks man," languages change in the course of
history, and so human beings cannot escape their
historicity. The most they can do is manipulate
the tensions within their own epoch in order to
produce the beginnings of the next epoch.2°
Rorty wants to redescribe philosophical tradition,
to refurnish it, in order that a conversation may take
place unrestricted by the mistaken, redundant and
unproductive questions and schemas of philosophy. This
refurnishing will allow him, he asserts, to avoid
accusations of 'irrationalism' or 'relativism'.
Moreover this conversation despite the appeal to
Heidegger is not a hermeneutic dialogue. As Lyotard
points out it has no interest in the pursuit of any
type of occulted truth. It is just conversation. "Re-
furnishing" is a way of keeping the conversation going.
This is the mark of the liberal ironist and without
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wanting to press the similarities too far it is
somewhat analogous to paralogy:
Ironists specialize in redescribing ranges of
objects or events in partially neologistic jargon,
in the hope of inciting people to adopt and extend
the jargon. An ironist hopes that by the time she
has finished using old words in new senses, not to
mention introducing Brand-New words, pe le will
no longer ask questions in the old words.
Despite admitting to being a "postmodern bourgeois
liberal" Rorty wants to redeem the liberal, secular
impulse of the enlightenment as a practical project.
He argues that the vocabulary whereby it established
itself was appropriate for its time but its
universalist claims are now destructive of its
practical liberalism.
Because he wants to take truth (universal and
relativist) off the agenda of any debate concerning how
we should conduct ourselves, philosophy becomes a
surplus requirement. Truth becomes the pragmatic
result of conversations which have taken place by
changing the topic - the topic being the questions of
philosophy. The conversation is therefore free ranging
and without conditions especially the one requiring it
to arrive at the truth or consensus. It is this latter
point that divides Rorty's liberalism from Habermas'.
With Lyotard, Rorty sees that language of emancipation
as a redundant narrative. Furthermore, taking a swipe
at Plato, his ideal figure in this postmodern liberal
society would be the poet. This also separates him
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from Habermas for as I have already mentioned Habermas
fears the "irrationalism" of any viewpoint that aims at
anything other than undistorted communication:
A poeticized culture would be one which would not
insist we find the real wall behind the painted
ones, the real touchstones of truth as opposed to
touchstones which are merely cultural artifacts.
It would be a culture which, precisely by
appreciating that all touchstones are such
artifacts, would take as its goal the creatism of
ever more various and multicolored artifacts."
It is clear then that for Rorty the political
liberalism of modernity can only be preserved through a
turn to a post-modern ironics that eschews traditional
propositional truths in favour of truths that extend
the conversation in new directions. Therefore these
artifacts are not foundations.
While there are definite similarities between
Lyotard and Rorty both recognise the fundamental
differences. For example, because Lyotard rejects
meta-narratives of subjectivity, he is sceptical of the
subject being made the transcendental condition for
Rorty's conversation:
It is as if the I/you relationship marked by the
exchangeability of letters between persons or
empirical individuals were a transcendental
condition of philosophy, of history, of progress,
of Enlightenment, in short of those things that he
is concerned with (and I am certainly not scornful
of them). But to accord oneself the privilege of
the pragmatic, even under the cloak of the
greatest modesty (simple 'solidarity'), is finally
to get the essential on the cheap."
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Rorty on the other hand argues that Lyotard's
fundamental commitment to experimentation for its own
sake as an interesting but unimportant pursuit
unfortunately too reminiscent of traditional utopian
leftism:
Those who want sublimity are aiming at a
postmodernist form of intellectual life. Those
who want beautiful social harmonies want a
postmodernist form of social life, in which
society as a whole asserts itself without
bothering to ground it.24
There are other differences which concern Rorty
and Lyotard that could be discussed. For example,
while Alex Callinicos criticises the inconsistency of
Lyotard's conception of post-modernism he misses the
fundamental	 feature	 which	 is	 its	 modernist
schematization.	 Post-modernism is the re-writing of
modernism and not its citation. This is the key
difference between Lyotard and other conceptions of
post-modernity, of which Rorty is the most honest and
coherent exemplar. The point of Lyotard's language
games is that they are irreconcilable. On the other
hand I would argue that all affirmative accounts of
post-modern practices rest on the de jure valorisation
of a principle of eclecticism (not only in the
harnessing of different theorists to the same end, but
also in its generic pick and mix; film, literature,
television etc,) which becomes de facto synthesis.
Hence Rorty too, while having a more differentiated
account of recent philosophy, elicits one fundamental
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impulse. The problematising of foundations and the
consequent issue of legitimation for judgement and
critique. In the end therefore I would suggest that
the measure of an affirmative account of post-modernism
lies in its being motivated by an epistemelogical
anxiety, despite Rorty's belief that it is otherwise.
In the end, post-modernism in the area of philosophy
and architecture is still motivated by the traditional
problem of the universal versus the particualar. It
seeks a new arrangement between the two. In
architecture it is the local and particular which is
valorized over the international style and values of
modernism. In philosophy universal reason is rejected
in favour of the diversity of particular language
games.
Symptomatic of this epistemological anxiety at the
core of the issue of the post-modern are the
'tonalities' attributed to post-modernist works; irony
and parody. Though it is often suggested that irony is
a modernist trope Rorty for one replaces angst with
irony as a post-modern mode of being-in-the-world.
Parody is cited by Kearney among others as uniquely
post-modern. In effect it is the post-modern gloss on
tradition in the works of Warhol and John Barth for
example. In this way the only purpose of much of what
passes for post-modernist practice seems to be to
provide a kind of intellectual frisson.
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I would argue that this is one reason why
Baudrillard is often misunderstood to be a post-
modernist. His well cited observations on Disneyland
(that it is there to conceal the fact that it is the
real America) for example has become a metonymy of his
entire project. What is perceived as fin-de-siecle
gallows humour, by Kearney and Kellner for example, is
in fact Baudrillard playing straight. If there is an
element of intellectual conceit in Baudrillard's work
it is one that is rigorously and pasionately pursued.
It is though, a conceit of the object. Baudrillard's
work is a meditation on the object, from the early
analyses of the commodity and symbolic exchange to the
later ironic fascination of the object, unrelated to
the perspective of a subject.
The theoretical question that Baudrillard will
eventually pose to himself is how to vanish as a
subject and a theorist and reappear as an object,
brutally indifferent to the political economy of the
subject and the referential truths of theory. To
account for this, and the phenomenon which gives rise
to it, Baudrillard will invent a whole set of concepts.
These concepts are not determined by the rules of the
subject. They are not the function of a strategy.
Like the secret rule which Baudrillard suggests is the
basis for an Artwork, his writing refuses the ironic
self-reflexivity (and 'knowingness') of post-modernist
practices. Baudrillard's theoretical writings are not
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primarily concerned with changing the rules of a game,
of philosophy or sociology for example. Baudrillard
rejects the values of dialogue and conversation.
Whether naively, ambitiously or bizarrely, Baudrillard
comes to see his theory as an event which, like the
object, absorbs all the passions of the subject and all
the energy of the real. What follows is an attempt to
trace the trajectory of this would-be vanishing. As
his work develops, it becomes increasingly hard to make
the architectural analogy stick. The static
architectural space and its dimensions do not
adequately represent Baudrillard's practice of
disappearance. A closer analogy is with the speed and
light of what Paul Virilio understands as the
projectile of the cinema:
...the arts continue to disappear in the intense
illumination of projection and diffusion. After
the age of architecture-sculpture we are now in
the time of cinematographic factitiousness;
literally as well as figurative ly, from now on
architecture is only a movie...2
This vanishing of Baudrillard is not a different
account of the much heralded death of the author. The
architecture of subjectivity, of interiority and
exteriority is broken down in his account, through a
manouevre he calls seduction which is more than a
simple absence. This vanishing is a function of a
particular theoretical trajectory which I shall begin
to elucidate in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE METAPHYSICAL
FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.
Know Thyself - Socrates.
Only the Shallow know themselves - Oscar Wilde.
Merely glanced at, Baudrillard's early writings
seem to be of a piece with many of the concerns
emanating from continental philosophy during the late
1960s and early 1970s. Condensed into a brief mise-en-
scene the issues addressed, in no particular order of
importance would be; language as system or code; the
demise of history as a concept which could provide a
rigorous foundation for the understanding of how we
have arrived at particular philosophical, political or
social conjuncture; whither Marx and Freud after their
political and psychic domestication (or as one
particular strain suggests, after political and psychic
Stalinism)?; what to do with the flawed and failed
subject of humanism, and of course reason as the
subject's passport to freedom; and finally the concept
of power (ideology, manipulation, control) insofar as
it is deeply affected by the very posing of the other
questions, and the various ways in which they would be
putatively resolved.
All of these questions impinge to a greater or
lesser degree on Baudrillard's starting point, and
hence have some bearing on all future modifications and
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transformations of his work. This is especially
important because Baudrillard's work and intellectual
journey has often been regarded as the disappointed and
embittered exile of someone who would be at home in
some variety of critical philosophy.
There are many reasons for this. A whole
generation of French theory is often understood as a
reaction to the failure of the promise of revolution,
specifically that of May 1968. One might suggest that
post-modernism as a concept appears specifically as a
result of the widely considered theoretical and
political limitations of marxist and psychoanalytic
theory. Baudrillard suggests in a interview that the
attempt to couple marxism and psychoanalysis was in
fact a sign that:
...both had buggered off, and that it was only
through their desperate copulation that the knack
could be saved, each becoming the other's nagging
child ..(it]..really represented the ideological
apogee of both of them. (ROC p.27)
This is the demise of the so-called 'grand
narratives'. If Baudrillard himself in his early work
draws from both psychoanalysis and marxism the
relationship is not as intimate as a coupling. It is
more of a case of borrowing their clothes. What also
developed, and is often associated with post-modernism,
was not the idea that the "system" is capable of
assimilating all forms of critical opposition but that
the system only functioned according to binary
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structures - that a system required such opposition for
stability. I will show that Baudrillard does at some
stage present binary regulation as the self-reproducing
matrix of the current system. However it is not
language but the genetic code which will provide the
model for the commutability of terms.
In the restricted definition of the post-modern as
the redundancy of the grand narrative one could argue
that the theoretical development of Baudrillard's work
fits neatly into such a paradigm. It is manifested by
what one could more grandly call a turning, or more
mundanely, that the direction and more formai theory of
his early writings are apparently left behind in his
later ones. Baudrillard becomes increasingly oblique.
In the language of Seduction he is preserving a secret
by which he delays the inevitability of his writing
becoming a hostage to the terrorism of the transparency
of meaning. A useful parallel could be drawn with the
reception of Derrida's work where most of critics such
as Terry Eagleton ("He has not delivered on some of the
promises which were implicit in his earlier work")
"prefer" his early writings while often his effusive
admirers, such as Rorty, valorize the later work.
For better or worse the credibility of
Baudrillard's entire work seems to rest on a particular
reading of his early writing. 1 The identikit picture
is someone wrestling with Marx in obviously changing
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times. This person has sociological leanings, the
evidence for which is found in the residue of a method
and his choice of subject matter. Baudrillard himself
confesses in a later interview that in his early work
he was still interested in a sociology of distinctions.
He was interested at this stage in attempting to
formalise the ways in which the mechanisms of social
prestation reproduce the control of political economy.
This is done not as the ideological effect of economic
forces but through the functioning of a code, the
political economy of the sign. Nevertheless,
Baudrillard could not be described as having been at
any stage a semiologist. Baudrillard has throughout
his work been consistent in his suspicion of meaning as
a function of the metaphysical structure of
signification, and therefore of semiology's
domestication of the sign. As will become clear, his
interest in symbolic exchange is an example of this.
Baudrillard's early work could be seen as an
exploration, an attempt to find a language to describe
social and economic processes that is not compromised
by the set of problems he identifies in traditional
Marxist analysis. In short, he sees the concepts of
production, needs, the subject and the object (insofar
as it framed in terms of use-value/exchange value) as
analytically bankrupt, whose theoretical reserves can
no longer pay their way. Unlike Douglas Kellner, who
regards Baudrillard's early tarrying with Marxist
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analysis as his theoretical Eden from which he is
banished through the original sin of 'aristocratic
Nietzscheanism l , I would argue that Marxism for
Baudrillard was only ever an historically dominant form
of economic, social and cultural analysis that for
various reasons - political and philosophical -
demanded to be undone. The significance of
Baudrillard's interest in Marxism is in its analysis of
the object. Baudrillard is not interested in the
issues of alienation, justice or revolution but in the
functioning of the object, and in the case of Marxist
analysis in the object as commodity.
A key feature of Baudrillard's theoretical
trajectory is the dissatisfaction and disenchantment
that motivates his work. This is manifested in his
dalliance with various conceptual schema and his
ongoing discarding of them. One could cite Freud,
Marx, Lacan and the sociology of distinctions as early
theoretical flirtations. In this chapter these
features will become obvious. What interests me here
though are the elements which are sustained throughout
his work and which destabilise his theoretical
flirtations. There are two key features here;
1) An attack on the subject in its various
apparitions. I would argue that to judge Baudrillard
by his own criteria would be to evaluate the success of
his attack on the subject.2
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and
2) a fascination with the `object' and the way it is
systematically put to work in the service of a series
of political, moral and epistemological schema.
Ultimately its submission by a code of value.
One familiar way of understanding this second
trait in Baudrillard's work is in terms of a surrealism
that is not committed to the liberation of the subject
through the phantasm produced. 3 Baudrillard argues
that surrealism marks the moment when the object is
"liberated" as function, its new reality principle,
through the processes of production. However
surrealism is not so much a transgression of functional
logic but the recognition of and a consequent play on
the disparity of the new functionality of the object
and the anthropomorphic object. The surrealistic
aspect of Baudrillard's work is often underestimated or
mistaken for the practice of rhetoric at the expense of
theoretical rigour. A good example of this is Douglas
Kellner's comments on Baudrillard's later work:
One cannot help but wonder what it was that led
Baudrillard to conclude that objects now reign
supreme, and that we should submit to their
dictates and laws. Was his word processor (if he
has one) taking over his thought processes ? Or
was his television set controlling his imagination
Did his car, as on an episode of the old
Twilight Zone television series, start driving him
one day?4
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Kellner presents an intriguing set of
possibilities. However I hope to show how Baudrillard
arrived at such a position without necessarily having
been held hostage by his word processor.
In The System of Objects and Consumer Society
Baudrillard is often read as attempting to provide a
more sophisticated marxist analysis of a post-
industrial order. Baudrillard considers the assertion
that the political and economic problem of the late
twentieth century is no longer that of the production
of goods but the necessity of their consumption. The
problem addressed is: what does the practice and system
of consumption consist of? In what sense can it be
said that consumption, as opposed to production,
constitutes a system? Furthermore it could be argued
that in order to understand the theoretical development
of his work one other issue remains in the background
of his analysis of production and consumption. That
is, what is at stake in the relation constructed by
both the system of production and consumption. Not the
fact that it is an exploitative relation or alienating
relation but that it is a relation at all. I would
suggest that this lies behind the attraction in his
early work in the principle of symbolic exchange.
Baudrillard's style of argumentation often
consists of a consideration of various theoretical
positions before addressing their assumptions and
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unsatisfactory philosophical consequences. For
Baudrillard, the practices of consumption draw out
important assumptions in sociological and economic
analysis. The most problematic area, as far as he is
concerned, is the extent to which such analysis rests
either on notions of alienation on the one hand or of
self-fulfillment through a calculus of satisfaction of
needs on the other.
In The System of Objects this polarity is
displayed in its structuring of the analysis of
advertising. Is advertising an ideological practice or
is it a rational enlightening for people of their wants
and needs? However it is really only through paying
attention to Baudrillard's worrying away at the status
of the object that one can avoid the error of reading
Baudrillard's early work as a point of critique which
he later rejects. The central question is posed as
follows:
At the stage of artisanal production objects
reflect the contingent and singular character of
needs. While the two systems are adapted to one
another they are no better integrated since they
depend on the relative coherence of needs, which
are fluid and contingent: there is no objective
technological (technique) progress. Since the
beginning of the industrial era, manufactured
goods have acquired coherence from technological
organization (l'ordre technique) and from the
economic structure. The system of needs has
become less integrated than the system of objects;
the latter imposes its own coherence and thus
acquires the capacity to fashion an entire
society. (SO pp.14-15)
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What could be clearer than this as a statement of
intent with respect to Baudrillard's theoretical
interests. How has the object come to attain such a
position of domination? Baudrillard is dissatisfied
with the notion that commodities function as a discrete
economic system either reflecting, on one account, or
producing on another, a coherent set of needs. The
object of consumption is not the reference of a
particular essential human need. Neither is it the
fulfilment of a ideologically constructed specific
need. According to Baudrillard, the object of
consumption requires for its ontological status its
transformation into a sign . As a commodity or object-
sign what is consumed is not a material object but the
idea of a relation - a social and personal statement of
one's place in the world. Consumption is therefore an
activity directed not towards the usefulness,
functionality or materiality of an object which would
satisfy a natural or produced need. So for example
"materiality", "usefulness" and "functionality" may be
bought but only as an abstract, or material, sign. Its
"usefulness" is signified through object-sign
differentiation rather than through any essential
quality of the object. Baudrillard argues that this
function of consumption makes it a historically unique
relation to objects.
What distinguishes this analysis of the commodity
object as vehicle of social and philosophical relation
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from a traditional Marxist one is that this idea of a
relation is produced as a consequence of an essential
lack. These objects do not mediate reality or distort
it. They conjure up its very idea. The dynamic of
consumption is not therefore merely the polar opposite
of active production. Consumption is a labour of lust
and its object is constantly shifting and it cannot be
terminated by either satiation through satisfaction
(the resolution of tensions), or controlled by an
appeal to humanist morality, via "basic needs", which
would aim at moderating it. I will develop this issue
presently. For the moment it is enough to note that
Baudrillard is consistent throughout his work in
rejecting the notion of alienation. The activity of
consumption cannot therefore be moderated or reformed
from the starting point of essential needs:
At the heart of the project from which emerges the
systematic and indefinite process of consumption
is a frustrated desire for totality. Object-signs
are equivalent to each other in their ideality and
can proliferate indefinitely: and they must do so
in order continuously to ful-f ill the absence of
reality. It is ultimately because consumption is
founded on a lack that it is irrepressible. (910
p.25.)
The Lacanian vocabulary is particularly noticeable
here and is a good example of Baudrillard's flirtation
with psycho-political analysis. There is the process
of a desire, constituted by a lack, moving along a
chain of object-signs without limitation or finality.
This is why it is "irrepressible". The object-
commodity is not a fetish for that would make it a
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function of the psychology of the alienated subject.
Hence Baudrillard would reject any psycho-economic
description of consumption. It is the object-commodity
itself which presents the abstract idea of fulfilment,
of satisfaction, in its proliferation. Yet its very
condition of possibility as commodity-object requires
the constant deferral of satisfaction. Looking at it
this way it is the commodity that is sovereign:
We are living the period of the objects: that is,
we live by their rhythm, according to their
incessant cycles. Today, it is we who are
observing their birth, fulfilment and death;
whereas in all previous civilizations, it was the
object, instrument, and perennial monument that
survived the generations of men. (CS p.29.)
At this point in his work Baudrillard believes
that paradoxically, we are no longer in the time of the
subject, if we ever were, but live according to the
time of the object. Or more specifically, the time of
the commodity. We are now made to bear witness to the
object-commodity. This is not to say that Baudrillard
is criticising the dehumanizing effects of capitalism.
He will argue that the concept of the subject is
irrevocably tied to the logic of political economy.5
He identifies the two dominant analyses of the
commodity's function as utility in the discourse of
economics, and conformity in the language of sociology.
As I have already shown Baudrillard indicates why both
attitudes towards the commodity are theoretically
unsatisfactory.	 Of the two positions Baudrillard
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concedes that the classical economic theory of the
equivalent utility of objects is more consistent than
the moral critique of it. In assessing the claims of
J.K. Galbraith he cites the example of the equivalent
satisfaction level of a rich person who buys yet
another fur coat and the hungry man who buys a
hamburger. Classical economics asserts an equivalent
level of satisfaction, for it cannot be proved
otherwise, while Galbraith's moral, and needs based
critique, disagrees. According to Baudrillard,
Galbraith's position is at the very least empirically
incorrect. He assumes that each specific need can be
satisfied by a particular empirical object and such a
need is originally produced by marketing and
advertising. However advertising does not always work
and consumer needs are adaptable and elastic, and can
be fulfilled by a variety of objects:
The empirical "object," given in its contingency
of form, color, material, function and discourse
(or, if it is a cultural object, in its aesthetic
finality) is a myth. How often it has been wished
away! But the object is nothing. It is nothing
but the different types of relations and
significations that converge, contradict
themselves, and twist around it, as such - the
hidden logic that not only arranges this bundle of
relations, but directs the manifest discourse that
overlaps and occludes it. (CPES p.63)
So for Baudrillard the object can only appear as a
relay of relations.	 In "The Ideological Genesis of
Needs", Baudrillard identifies four logics of
signification (or forms whereby it appears) of the
object. As there are no empirical objects, what the
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object means is determined by the particular form of
value specific to each logic:
1) The functional logic of the object. This is the
object as technical instrument. It would be a generic
object like a "hoover" or Baudrillard's example of the
refrigerator, "fridge". At a basic level the object is
not substitutable for another product. For example if
I want to buy an object to freeze food only a fridge,
and not a T.V. or V.C.R., will satisfy my requirements.
It is an object of specific utility. At first glance
there seem to be problems with this description of the
functional object insofar as Baudrillard appears to
naturalize the object which goes against the thread of
his critique of essential needs. I will come back to
this.
2) The economic logic of exchange. The object here is
the commodity. The object in this instance is
therefore substitutable as it is determined by the
logic of the market. In this instance the
aforementioned "hoover" or "fridge" may appear
according to this logic if it is a luxury item.
3) The logic of symbolic exchange. The object in this
case is ambivalent and reversible (through
reciprocality), its value wholly dependent upon the
relationship established by the exchange. Baudrillard
cites the "gift" as such an object. Strictly speaking
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the object is erased in symbolic exchange. It has no
value, or "objective" meaning in itself - functional,
economic or prestigious. The giving is intransitive.
Such an object is unique. Baudrillard contrasts the
substitutability of the fashion ring with the
permanence of the wedding ring. The symbolic is
however in principle exclusive of the economic.
4) The logic of sign-value. This is the object of
consumption which is constituted through difference.
The object of consumption is a status sign. The object
is substitutable but in this case through the play of
signs as in fashion:
The definition of an object of consumption is
entirely independent of objects themselves and
exclusively a function of the logic of
significations.
An object is not an object of consumption unless
it is released from its psychic determinations as
symbol; from its functional determinations as
instrument; from its commercial determinations as
product; and is thus liberated as a sign to be
recaptured by the formal logic of fashion i.e., by
the logic of differentiation. (CPES p.67)
It is at this level that one can begin to identify
the metaphysical basis for the political economy of the
sign. The system of representation is a necessary
condition for the functioning of political economy.
In the logic of sign-value the symbolic and the
functional are excluded. Though as I have said it is
possible to display the 'functional' as a sign, to put
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it in quotation marks. However the commodity-sign is
not transformed from a product into a sign of prestige.
The object exists only as an element in a calculus of
signs. It becomes a signifier and the political
economy of the sign is the signified of utility or
functionality (the reality principle) which acts as an
alibi for sign-value.
The specular myth of the autonomous object of
utility, its utility being the reality principle of the
object, simultaneously produces the subject. They are
unified through the relation of need. According to
Baudrillard each can only be defined in circular
fashion need being the functional relation of subject
to object and object to subject:
Metaphysics itself has never done anything else
and, in Western thought, metaphysics and economic
science (not to mention traditional psychology)
demonstrate a profound solidarity, mentally and
ideologically, in the way they posit the subject
and tautologically resolve its relation to the
world. (CPES p.71)
This proposition demonstrates that Baudrillard's
account is not a purely sociological or politico-
historical one. The logic of economic science is part
of the wider genealogy of occidental metaphysics.
Recent transformations in political economy are not
hermetic. There is no "last instance" of economic
determination if the economic is conceived outside the
metaphysical thought by which it is abstractly
constituted. One example of which is this circular
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logic which is in fact the principle of adequation, the
identity principle of A=A. Hence the individual and
its needs do not only enter the system of productivity
through what he calls consummativity. Needs are not
the primary qualities of a subject which are then
manipulated and alienated. They are what sustains the
concept of the subject. Needs, he writes, are:
better defined as a function induced (in the
individual) by the internal logic of the system:
more precisely, not as a consummative force
liberated by the affluent society, but as a
productive force required by the functioning of
the system itself, by its process of reproduction
and survival. (CPES p.82)
Having shown the systemic necessity of the
integration of the sign with political economy,
Baudrillard contends that traditional Marxist analysis
is flawed as long as its first principle is that of
production. The error is firstly that such analysis is
directed towards the content of ("bad" objects and
"good" objects") and not at the formal logic of
production. Marxist analysis of political economy is
in fact a reflection of the productivist logic of
political economy. Use value is not a beyond of
economic exchange value. As we have seen it is the
signified to exchange value's signifier.
	 It is an
essential reference of sign-value.
	 It does not
transcend it but it acts as its horizon. It is
ultimately the reality principle of exchange value.
The principle of to each according to his needs is, as
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Baudrillard shows, essential to the logic of sign-
exchange value. There is:
...a homology between the emancipation in the
bourgeois era of the private individual given
final form by his/her needs and the functional
emancipation of objects as use values. (CPES
p.132)
While traditional marxist analysis unmasks the
content of political economy based on the abstraction
of exchange value it can only confront its form as a
reflection of it. It leaves untouched the tautology
whereby need is constituted and constructs an
anthropology of use-value. Just as exchange value is
not a substantial feature of an object but rather the
form by which a social relation is expressed, so use
value as a principle of Marxist theory does not
describe anything innate about an object. Utility and
use-value operate as the 'moral law' of the object.
In this way it is:
...an abstraction of the system of needs cloaked
in the false evidence of a concrete destination
and purpose... (C.P.E.S. p.131)6
According to Baudrillard, marxist theory is rooted
in a reflection of a particular phase of political
economy and the consequent Marxist genealogy. In the
first pre-capitalist phase only the surplus is
exchanged. Though as Baudrillard points out it is only
through the abstraction of the dialectic that such
archaic societies can be described purely in terms of
their containing the seed elements of political
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economy. Hence they are merely pre-capitalist. The
retro-narrative of marxism proposes that while there is
a major transformation from this first order to
industrial capitalism the putative third order is
merely an extension of the second. In this third phase
there would be a general encroachment of exchange value
into what had previously been considered "unalienable"
such as "love", knowledge etc. Baudrillard argues that
there is an as extensive mutation from industrial
capitalism to post-industrial capitalism as there is
from pre-capitalist society to industrial capitalism:
The mutation concerns the passage from the form-
commodity to the form-sign, from the abstraction
of the exchange of material products under the law
of general equivalence to the operationalization
of all exchanges under the law of the code. With
this passage to the political economy of the sign,
it is not a matter of a simple "commercial
prostitution" of all values (which is the
completely romantic vision from the celebrated
passage of the Communist Manifesto: capitalism
tramples on all human values - art, culture,
labor, etc. - in order to make money; the romantic
critique of profit). (MOP p.120)
This extensive mutation is complex and as we have
seen already has a different logic. The contradictions
which Marx saw as the seeds of destruction of
capitalism are integrated and distributed 	 through
consumption, by the code.	 All political and social
distinction and difference is not only contained by the
code but anticipated by it. The system of sign-
exchange depends on the incessant play of difference in
order that it may function at all. There is no longer
the competitive sign of representation with a signified
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but rather the pure commutability of signs. Even
though the code does not function according to a logic
of representation it uses the "referent" (use-value) as
its alibi. Baudrillard argues therefore that there is
necessary equivalence and homology between the system
of representation and political economy. What is
critical to understanding Baudrillard's position is his
refutation of the apparent theoretical choice between;
a) the naive idealism of treating the sign and
representation as the final determinant of social and
political change,
or
b) the "materialist" theory situating the economic as
the final determinant.
There is nothing to choose between these two
alternatives. The system itself does not present
this difficulty: it comprises neither materialism
nor idealism, nor infrastructure nor
superstructure. It proceeds according to its form
and this form carries along all of them at the
same time: production and representation, signs
and commodities, language and labor power. (MOP
pp.130-131)
In effect Baudrillard could be said to have
"deconstructed" the core principle of political economy
and the marxist criticism of it. That is say, he
attempts to show how the apparently essential feature
of an object, its use-value, is a function of the
"supplementary" logic of exchange.
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As I have shown, the system of needs goes hand in
hand with the system of commodities, and the
abstraction of the individual subject is a function of
the logic of sign-exchange:
The individual is an ideological structure, a
historical form correlative with the commodity
form (exchange value), and the object form (use
value). The individual is nothing but the subject
thought in economic terms, rethought, simplified,
and abstracted by the economy. The entire history
of consciousness and ethics (all the categories of
occidental psycho-metaphysics) is only the history
of the political economy of the subject. (CPES
p.33)
This is a strong claim for Baudrillard to make and
is something which is sustained in ever more
sophisticated, or convoluted, ways throughout his work.
The subject is constructed through this operational
mirror of production and is constituted and brought
about through the 'theology of value'. Despite the
Marxist attack on homo economicus, its analysis is
still a function of production and thereby acquires its
own subject which is bound by utility.
	 It is a
different manipulation of the same code of value.
I would argue that it is Baudrillard's
understanding of the subject which ultimately makes his
work unacceptable to his many critics. For instance
Kellner simply asserts:
I believe that we can specify what needs and use
values of various commodities serve our own
purposes and self-defined needs (that is, what
furthers the goals of self-valorization in
opposition to capital-valorization)./
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The philosophical basis for Kellner's attitude is
firstly empirical. He naturalizes the relation of need
between subject and object in exactly the manner that
Baudrillard identifies as the process of consumption.
He argues that somehow through personal experience we
can identify a scale of use-values and needs. Assuming
this relationship he contentedly and confidently re-
asserts the pivotal role of the subject. Kellner on
the one hand agrees with Baudrillard's analysis of the
importance of consumption for the generation of a
capitalist political economy. On the other hand he
rejects the theoretical basis which makes such an
analysis coherent and possible i.e., the recognition
that the subject, needs and use-value are the
cornerstones of a political economy of consummativity.
It is worth noting that in this respect Kellner is
like many commentators of recent French philosophy. He
recognises and applauds an iconoclastic element in it
before disavowing those iconoclastic features in favour
of moderation.
The only truly open practitioner of such a
strategy is Richard Rorty. He admires the "ironic"
writing of Nietzsche and Derrida for example and argues
for the poeticization of culture which would be an
inversion of the platonic Republic. But on the basis
of a pragmatic "hunch", prefers the political
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liberalism of Dewey and Habermas. His difference with
Habermas being "merely philosophical". Furthermore he
is convinced of the necessity of a "de-divinized"
contingent self whose limits are those of "her"
language. Nevertheless it is clearly an affirmation of
the subject. Rorty recognises that essential to the
anti-humanism of recent continental philosophy (he
emphasises the particular contributions of both
Foucault and Heidegger in regard to this) is its
incompatibility with capitalist liberal democracy. In
any case Rorty, for reasons concerning both his
pragmatic liberalism and suspicion of philosophy with a
big "P", rejects the move whereby a philosophical
theory is universalised in a political or social
agenda.
For many critics the criteria for whether
Baudrillard is a philosopher worthy of interest rests
on the presence or otherwise of an explicit political
commitment. If Baudrillard represents the human
subject as the central element of political economy,
the subject is clearly compromised:
The whole system of individual values - this
religion of spontaneity, liberty, creativity, etc
- is bloated with the productivist option. Even
the vital functions are immediately "functions" of
the system.
We must reverse the terms of the analysis,
and abolish the cardinal reference to the
individual, for even that is the product of this
social logic. (CPES p.86)
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Hence, if there is any alternative to political
economy it cannot have the subject of humanism as a
principle of its organisation. In The Mirror of
Production Baudrillard develops his attack on the
subject. The mirror of production not only designates
Marx's theoretical dependence on the productivist logic
of capitalism, but the specular phantasm whereby the
subject is posited and represented. This comes about,
Baudrillard argues, through the conceptual opposition
in Marxist theory of quantitative and qualitative
labour. Quantitative labour is labour as a commodity.
It is abstract, universal and according to Baudrillard
"commensurable". It has abstract exchange value. This
abstract labour has no value in itself. Qualitative
labour is incommensurable, it produces specific
utility. It is concrete and its own end. But it also:
signifies the comparability of all human practice
in terms of production and labour. Or better: the
abstract and formal universality of the commodity
labor power is what supports the "concrete"
universality of qualitative labor. (MOP p.27)
The supplementary logic of this opposition
organises a conceptual series in Marxism. Elsewhere
Baudrillard remarks that the whole of Marx can be seen
in terms of an aspiration towards a good use of
economy. According to Baudrillard, when Marx makes the
ontological distinction between abstract labour and
concrete labour he is in fact affirming the reality
principle of production which is the condition of
possibility for political economy.	 Qualitative,
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concrete labour is a rationalisation and
anthropological mystification of an abstract generic
activity - production. Baudrillard attempts to show
how this logic permeates the Marxist discussion of play
or non-work, which on his reading, is thought wholly in
terms of the production of value. In play the subject
is liberated through producing himself as value.
Unlike abstract production the activity is not
determined by the production of contents. However it
is determined by its task of producing a higher form of
value. It confirms that even, or especially, in non-
work man's essence is as the producer of value:
Exactly as the pure institutional form of
painting, art, and theater shines forth in anti-
painting, anti-art and anti-theater, which are
emptied of their contents, the pure form of labor
shines forth in non-labor. (MOP p.41)
It would appear on this reading that the apparent
concreteness of play is in fact entirely abstract.
Every activity and relation must yield value. This is
the core of Baudrillard's difficulty with Marx.
Marxist analysis reproduces the code of political
economy, of production and value. Even leisure is
founded on the productive and is not a useless activity
or waste. Baudrillard argues that the threat to the
system is its inability to allow for the anti-
production of symbolic exchange value - waste, excess,
destruction and reciprocality. All social and
political difference is tolerated, anticipated and
necessary:
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We are faced with coding, super-coding,
universalization of the code, proliferating
axiomatization of the capitalist system (Deleuze).
But against the triumphant abstraction, against
the irreversible monopolization, the demand arises
that nothing can be given without being returned,
nothing is ever won without something being lost,
nothing is ever produced without something being
destroyed, nothing is ever spoken without being
answered. In short what haunts the system is the
symbolic demand. (MOP p.147)
The symbolic demand forBaudrillard is an
alternative non-economic order irreducible to the
system of political economy and representation. The
possibility of revolt occurs in the margins in groups -
youth, women, blacks - in a refusal of rationalization
through classical politicisation. Ultimately it
rejects its articulation in the axiomatics of political
economy. There is a transformation of this analysis
throughout Baudrillard's work and I will return to
this.
However what Baudrillard identifies in The Mirror
of Production as epistemological problems of the
dialectic - which Baudrillard resolves into conceptual
oppositions that replay the specular origin of the
Marxist critique of political economy - can be viewed
more specifically as a problem concerning the
restricted economy (of production) of theory. The
fundamental problem of theory, most evident in the
dialectic, is the production of its object. It is the
reduction of the singular to the same whose narrative
is the production of meaning. Though Baudrillard does
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not explicitly offer this as a criticism of Marxist
theory it is implicit in his analysis of the retro-
narrative and prophesy of the dialectic. This concern
with the position of theory is a common theme of recent
French philosophy though it is often presented (on the
side of the subject) as the issue of recent theory's
self-reflexivity. An example would be Derrida's debate
with Gadamer in which what is truly at stake is the
implicit desire of hermeneutic interpretation to set
the terms and framework whereby its object is
understood as the function of a subject. Baudrillard,
like Derrida, wants to reverse the relationship. As we
will see this problem exercises Baudrillard through the
rest of his work.
I have attempted in this chapter to give a brief
outline of Baudrillard's analysis of production,
subjectivity and the political economy of signs. The
purpose of which is to set up the background for his
account of the simulacrum. What is at stake for
Baudrillard in the simulacrum can only be appreciated
through recognising the total complicity of the
subject, production and the reality principle in
political economy and its enlightened rational and
moral critiques:
The concept of critique emerged in the West at the
same time as political economy and, as the
quintessence of Enlightenment rationality, is
perhaps only the subtle, long-term expression of
the system's expanded reproduction. (MOP p.50)
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For this reason the form of Baudrillard's
theorising begins to take on a different shape. Any
lingering commitments to critical distance and
difference will eventually be abandoned in favour of
theory as a 'pure event', without a critical context
(of rationality or subjectivity) or a necessary
destination. The negative passes over to the side of
the object.
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CHAPTER 3: HOW A MYTH AT LAST BECAME THE
REAL WORLD
The real is not threatened by its double
today (Clement Rosset): it is threatened by
its very idiocy. Cool Memories
There are two fundamental questions that must be
addressed regarding the concept of the simulacrum in
Baudrillard's work. Firstly does the simulacrum have
its origin in contemporary political economy or is it
in fact a structure of western thought. Secondly, and
this is not inseparable from the question of its
historical genesis, to what extent does Baudrillard
displace the simulacrum as a question of representation
by the simulacrum as the motor of a technological
imaginary. In some respects the double genealogy is
not really resolved throughout his work. However
representation and its history begins to take more of a
centre stage in Baudrillard's account of the
simulacrum. His account of the reality principle of
the political economy of the sign leads him to focus
more specifically on the function and dynamics of the
real. It could be argued that in fact, and I will look
at this in the next chapter, that the current
simulacrum brings to an end the system of political
economy. In short Capital no longer functions
according to the critical and reality principles of
political economy.
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In his early work his analysis of representation
produces two genealogies of the sign. On the one hand
he attempts to show how technological and economic
development are produced at the same moment as the
political economy of the sign. At the same time his
analysis of this political economy suggests that this
process is grounded in traditional philosophical
concepts and reasoning. The result of this analysis is
the concept of the simulacrum.
In this chapter I will set out the ground for an
account of Baudrillard's concept of the simulacrum.
This scene setting seems to me to be necessary for the
word simulacrum is much misunderstood. Most
commentators on Baudrillard and on the 'simulacrum'
(David Harvey for example whom I cited in the first
chapter) take it to be synonymous with an image or a
representation. This is not the case and leads to a
fundamental misreading of his work. Partly because of
this misreading, but also because of underlying serious
misgivings about the consequences for the possibility
of a critical politics, Baudrillard's theory of the
simulacrum has been considered controversial. The
wider debate on the simulacrum has been almost entirely
conducted within the framework of post-modernism. So
in this section I will outline firstly what I think is
a more congenial philosophical heritage for the
reception of the notion of the simulacrum in the
analyses of Derrida and Deleuze. While it is not the
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case that Baudrillard, Derrida and Deleuze give similar
accounts of the simulacrum there are points of
contact.' Firstly, the fact that in all three accounts
what is at issue in the simulacrum is more than a
question of the image. Secondly, the accounts provided
of the simulacrum have consequences for the way they
perceive their own writing. In short its relation to
the 'world'. I will also look at the perspectives on
it from those who take it to be exemplary of the post-
modern. Though I would argue that my account of the
analyses of the simulacrum by Derrida and Deleuze will
shed some light on what is at stake in the simulacrum
for Baudrillard, none are reducible to each other.
Firstly, Deleuze, in an appendix to The Logic of
Sense entitled The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy
sets up his analysis with Nietzsche's declaration that
the task of philosophy is to reverse Platonism.
Charting this reversal is the ultimate end of his
analysis of the simulacrum. He argues that this
reversal would not be a simple abolition of the
dichotomy of the world of appearances and the world of
essences. This seems to me to be crucial to
understanding any conception of the simulacrum. This
opposition is only the foil for a manoeuvre by Plato to
establish a moral order.
	 According to Deleuze the
division of essence and appearance, of true object and
image, is motivated by a will to selection.
	 This
process of selection establishes a proper genealogy or
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lineage by which all claims to truth, purity and
authenticity may be measured. Deleuze notes however
that this Platonic procedure is jettisoned at important
moments in favour of various myths of circulation - the
Phaedrus and the Statesman are the dialogues cited by
Deleuze. In these texts the analytic function of
division as a means of classification (division of
genus into species for example) becomes a moral
function in the process of elective participation:
The characteristic of division is to surmount the
duality of myth and dialectic, and to reunite in
itself dialectical and mythic power. Myth, with
its always circular structure is indeed the story
of a foundation. It permits the construction of a
model according to which the different pretenders
can be judged.4
Hence the place of anamnesis by which souls are
credited with original contact with the Ideas or Forms.
In this operation a distinction is made between true
love and well-founded delirium on the one hand, and the
sensual forgetfulness of the false pretender. This
feature of memory is also fundamental to conceptions of
the simulacrum in Derrida and Baudrillard. In
Deleuze's reading the criterion of proximity to a
founding truth organises many stories at the heart of
Platonic dialogues and what is crucial to discerning
the truth is to set up and identify the false pretender
which at some point, Deleuze argues, is constituted as
and revealed to be a mirage or simulacrum. He notes
that of the three important dialogues concerning
division - the Phaedrus, the Statesman and the Sophist
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- only the latter contains no founding myth, no means
whereby one can measure the just pretender. What
occurs in this text is the definition, delineation and
tracking down of the false pretender. In this story,
according to Deleuze, Plato realises through the figure
of the sophist that the simulacrum is not just a false
copy or distorted distant misapprehension of an
original:
Copies are secondary possessors. They are well-
founded pretenders, guaranteed by resemblance;
simulacra are like false pretenders, built upon a
dissimilarity, implying an essential perversion or
deviation. It is in this sense that Plato divides
in two the domain of image-idols: on the one hand
there are copies-icQns, on the other there are
simulacra-phantasms.'
Deleuze argues that this difference is the
fundamental axis upon which the function of
representation is founded. Representation considered
not as external image of an object but as having an
internal fidelity to an essence or model. As far as
Plato is concerned true representation is governed by
the principle of establishing a limit upon which
selection can be made, and lineage can be established
in a secondary way. The difference between copies and
simulacra is not one of degree, the simulacrum in this
instance being merely a further remove, a copy of a
copy. The essential difference depends on the notation
of resemblance to the model. Resemblance here is
understood as the model of the Same imposed upon the
copy. 4
 The simulacrum is more than the same and the
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similar and is an act of dissemblance. Deleuze
suggests that the difference between the two can also
be defined in terms of how they are produced. Whereas
the good copy is the result of the activity of someone
with true knowledge and who uses understanding to
achieve the end of resemblance. The simulacrum, on the
other hand is not a function of knowledge:
The copy can be called an imitation to the degree
that it reproduces the model; since this imitation
is noetic, spiritual, and internal, however, it is
a veritable production ruled by the relations and
proportions constitutive of the essence. There is
always a productive operation in the good copy
and, corresponding to t4,is operation, a right
opinion, if not Knowledge.
The simulacrum is on the other hand, a non-
productive effectivity. It is not brought about
through the operation of knowledge but is entirely
external to it. Deleuze suggests that Plato, in his
definition of the simulacrum, correctly identifies the
threat to his entire philosophical project. That is to
say, the simulacrum is huge, is of immense depths and
hidden caves which cannot be fully comprehended by the
observer. The resulting confusion on the part of the
beholder of the simulacrum is not based on mere
misrecognition or mistaken identity.
	 It is of an
entirely different order:
This simulacrum includes the differential point of
view; and the observer becomes a part of the
simulacrum itself, which is transformed and
deformed by his point of view. In short there is
in the simulacrum a becoming-mad or a becoming
unlimited, as in the Philebus where, 'more and
less are always going a point further', a becoming
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always other,
able to evade
the Similar:
never equal.6
a becoming subversive of the depths,
the equal, the limit, the Same, or
always more and less at once, but
It is in this, the difference, movement and
destruction of limits that Deleuze identifies as
synonymous with the eternal return. The simulacrum is
both the same and inclusive of difference and is in
fact constitutive of the origin and the Same:
Let us consider the two formulas: 'only that which
resembles differs' and 'only differences can
resemble each other.' These are two distinct
readings of the world: one invites us to think
difference from the standpoint of previous
similitude or identity; whereas the other invites
us to think similitude and even identity as the
product of deep disparity.'
The former, in which difference is a function of a
prior identity, is the form of copies-icons in the
domain of representation. The latter in which
difference is primary, is what he calls the
phantasmatic world of the simulacra. One is directed
towards the finite and convergent, the other, the
simulacrum in its constitutive externality is
productive of divergence and heterogeneity.
Deleuze extracts his analysis of the simulacrum
from Plato and resituates it as a moment in a
Nietzschean logic. Firstly, he introduces the
aesthetic not in order to place simulation within
representation but to explain its mechanism as being
exemplary of what he calls modernity, specifically the
series in modernity.	 The model used is Joyce's
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Finnegan's Wake in which a heterogenous series of
divergent stories are told which are not different
points of view on the one story. The divergent series
produce an internal resonance a forced movement. 8 This
is the power of the simulacrum. According to Deleuze
this is also the structure of the phantasm as defined
by Freud which is the affective charge brought about
through the difference of two series - the infantile
and the post-pubescent:
The affective charge associated with the phantasm
is explained by the amplitude of the forced
movement which carries them along. Thus the
conditions of real experience and the structures
of the work of art are reunited: divergence of
series, decentering of circles, constitution of
the chaos which envelops them, internal resonance
and movement of amplitude,	 aggression of
simulacra.9
The simulacrum internalises and contains the two
series of the same and different and it is in this that
its power resides. The Same and the Similar upon which
Plato's Model and Idea are organised can now be
understood as effects of the simulacrum. Any essence
is a simulated one:
Resemblance subsists, but it is produced as an
external effect of the simulacrum, in as much as
it is built upon divergent series and makes them
resonate. Identity subsists, but it is produced
as the law which complicates all the series and
makes them all return to each one in the course of
the forced movement. In the reversal of
Platonism, resemblance is said of internalized
difference, an identity of the Different as
primary power.lu
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This doubling of the simulation, its demonic power
of the false, is mirrored in the structure of
Nietzsche's eternal return. The eternal return
according to Deleuze is the forced movement of
simulated conformity of the Same and the Similar. And
it is precisely this movement which destroys any
attempt at selection and foundation. For each model is
simulated and paradoxically when the Same is not
simulated it is a simple illusion.
If simulation is 'inseparable' from the eternal
return it is clear that the eternal return itself can
only be a simulation of a theory. This is the reversal
of Platonism. As will become clear there are
differences between Baudrillard's and Deleuze's
conception of the simulacrum. What is interesting is
this idea of the simulation of theory contained in
both. What is common to both is the attempt to detach
theory from an assumed and highly problematic relation
with the real.
Though it may not be the focus of his analysis,
this question of the status of theory is also
ultimately raised by Derrida. It can be said that
Deleuze's agenda in his work on the simulacrum in
Plato, is to show its alignment with a principle of
change vis a vis key aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy
so Derrida's examination has its own frame of
reference; the reading and writing of a text, its
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conditions of possibility, and the displaced motor of
the textual movement. The process of reading a text is
given as identifying a seam, ripping it back and
weaving in an extended thread:
There is always a surprise in store for the
anatomy or physiology of any criticism that might
think it had mastered the game, surveyed all
threads at once, deluding itself, too, in wanting
to look at the text without touching it, without
laying a hand on the `object', without risking -
which is the only chance of entering into the
game, by getting a few fingers caught - the
addition of some new thread.11
This well known, if not well read, essay of
Derrida sets out the now infamous Platonic exclusion of
writing from the domain of truth, knowledge and
understanding. There are a whole set of criteria by
which writing is deemed either an imperfect vehicle for
the conduct of philosophical inquiry, or is positively
a threat to the activity of reason in its pursuit of
true knowledge. It is the latter, understood
psychoanalytically as a moment of disavowal, that are
considered by Derrida to be defining moments for the
organisation of a text. In order to specify exactly
Derrida's notion of the simulacrum it is necessary to
follow his exploration of the function of writing in
his reading of the Phaedrus.
The twin axis upon which this reading revolves is
that of writing as Pharmakon (poison, cure, medicine)
and as a paidia (game). Of the former, which I shall
treat first, much has been written, identifying it as a
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nom-de-plume of deconstruction. Yet much of this
commentary has focussed on a semantic ambivalence in
the word Pharmakon - cure and poison. It is clear
however, that Derrida's reading is not motivated by an
etymological paradox. It is rather concerned with the
pharmakon as a self-generating pattern of effects which
reproduces itself in/as the governing logic of the text
and exemplary of textuality in general. Consequent to
the emphasis on the semantic paradox of the pharmakon
is the issue of speech and writing.
	 This is often
treated as a kind of anthropological truth. It is
clear however that writing, for Derrida, designates
Plato's text it serves firstly, and literally, as a
scapegoat upon which various aberrant practices and
ideas are blamed. And secondly, as a kind of black
economy upon which Plato's conceptual economy depends.
One example of this is the series distributed by the
term Pater; Father, chief, good(s), capital. This
series also designates the familial connections
necessary for participation:
The status of this orphan [writing], whose welfare
cannot be assured by any attendance or assistance,
coincides with that of a graphein which, being
nobody's son at the instant it reaches
inscription, scarcely remains a son at all and no
longer recognizes its origins, whether legally or
morally. In contrast to writing, living logos is
alive in that it has a living father (whereas the
orphan is already half dead), a father that is
present, standing near it, behind it, within it,
sustaining it with rectitude, attaching it in
person in his own name...1'
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However this lineage is important not as an
anthropological structure but because it is the
mechanism for the correct and proper exchange of value.
. The logos for Plato in the Phaedrus is a living
creature (Zoon), and should be of noble blood.
Derrida's reading of the Phaedrus parallels Deleuze's
at other crucial points particularly in his account of
the Myth of Thoth recounted in Plato. This story has
origins in Egyptian mythology and is woven into the
text for obviously exemplary reasons. Derrida argues
that it is not a case of simply borrowing, or adding,
in order to give an example. It is the very logic
which attempts to delimit writing. Furthermore, it
conforms to a problematic concerning the relationship
between mythos and logos in western philosophy. The
Myth itself concerns the displacement or substitution
invited by Ra to Thoth the God of writing:
Be in the sky in my place, while I shine over the
Blessed of the lower regions... You are in my
place, my replacement, and y94 will be called
thus: Thoth he who replaces Ra.-"
Thoth is also the generator of plots, intrigues
and violence which according to Derrida is wholly
related to his designation as the God of writing:
This process of substitution, which thus functions
as a pure play of traces or supplements or, again,
operates within the order of the pure signifier
which no reality, no absolutely external
reference, no transcendental signified, can come
to limit, bound or control: this substitution,
which could be judged 'mad' since it can go on
infinitely in the element of the linguistic
permutation of substitutes, or substitutes for
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substitutes: this unleashed chain is nevertheless
not lacking in violence. One could not have
understood anything of this 'linguistic' immanence
if one saw it as the peaceful milieu of a merely
fictional war, an inoffensive word-plax in
contrast to some raging polemos in Ireality'."
It is worth noting that the language in which
Derrida couches his account is not dissimilar from
Deleuze's. The madness which follows results from the
infinitely variable permutations. Hence what is at
stake in this simulacrum is more than merely a
linguistic event. Derrida refuses to oppose it to some
reality outside and beyond this process.
The madness and death accompanying the God of
writing relates directly to the motif of the pharmakon.
Madness would be a function of the temporal flux
resulting from the unlimited substitution. Presence is
infinitely deferred and memory is rendered impossible.
As the pharmakon itself is both cure and poison, the
writing as mnemic, as a kind of techne is undermined by
its incapacity to mirror the understanding required in
the pursuit of the true.
	 As a mnemic device it
produces forgetfulness instead of aiding memory. I
will come back to this in a moment. Ultimately it is
precisely in the operational guise of this writing as
repetition that Plato recognises its fundamental
threat, as a poison.
In the Timaeus Plato contrasts the disease as a
living being with the effective disease of a medicine
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which aggravates a problem. The natural disease is
preferable over its synthetic 'cure' which in fact is
an irritant. Moreover, according to Derrida, the
internal opposing sense of pharmakon as writing is not
one opposition among a series of values set up by Plato
but is the matrix of seriality in general. The idea of
limit fundamental to the hierarchical values is folded
upon this model of contamination. Derrida goes so far
as to argue that translations of the Greek pharmakon
singularly by either remedy or poison is not an
accidental feature of translation, but rather an effect
of Plato's attempt at maintaining an economy of order:
It could no doubt be shown and we will do so when
the time comes, that this blockage of the passage
among opposing values is itself already an effect
of 'Platonism', the consequence of something
already at work in the translated text, in the
relation between 'Plato' and his 'language'.. All
translations into languages that are the heirs and
depositories of Western metaphysics produce on the
pharmakon an effect of analysis that violently
destroys it, reduces it to one of its simple
elements by interpreting it, paradoxically enough,
in the light of the ulterior developments it
itself has made possible)'
At the same time that this effect ignores and
forbids the pharmakon, it leaves it untouched in its
own effects. There are two elements of interest in
this passage that converge somewhat with Deleuze's
analysis. There is of course the aspect of Platonism
as functioning on the basis of blockages and limits.
Secondly the pharmakon effect, or writing is
fundamental to western metaphysics. I will return to
this second aspect presently. For the moment I will
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attempt to specify the simulacrum as function of
writing, or more properly, as one of its headless
faces.
The simulacrum directly confronts the Platonic
project in the question of memory. The insufficiency
of writing as mnemic device has already been shown. It
is manifestly condemned as either incapable or leading
to a false knowledge based on repetition or appearance.
It is in fact hypomnemic, casting a spell on the soul.
Because it has no lineage, no proper origin, the seeds
of writing are wantonly dispersed to no purpose.
Furthermore, it is a weak apparatus for memory's
surveillance of knowledge. The model of anamnesis is
more than an image, it is a myth assigned to the task
of securing the heart of truth. If writing is contrary
to proper re-presentation there lurks the danger of its
appearing as a false pretender:
For writing has no essence or value of its own,
whether positive or negative. It plays within the
simulacrum. It is in its type the time of memory,
of knowledge, of truth, etc. That is why men of
writing appear before the eye of God not as wise
men (sophoi) but in truth asfake or self-
proclaimed wise men (doxosophoi). 16
The simulacrum mimics, it simulates the
fundamental platonic order of knowledge, truth and
memory. This simulation sets itself beyond the order
of representation since, in Plato's terms, it has no
proper origin, and its purveyor, the simulacrum-man is
the Sophist. His signs are memorials, monuments, the
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dead letter. The sophist is a magician, the artist of
illusion and his magic is the simulacrum. One recalls
the image of Thoth as the magician, the bearer of the
occult drug, the pharmakon:
A formula to be recited before the sun: I I am
Thoth, inventox and creator of philters and
letters, etc'. 1 ' (cit p.94)
It could be said that the simulacrum can be
recognized as the shadowy figures of Plato's cave.
Though this is a simple inversion of the existing order
of knowledge. It is however from the perspective of
the sophist, ersatz truth, the only form in which truth
appears in any case, and it is the necessity of its
empirical appearance and registration which produces
the remainder, that which was not thought;
...the philosophia, the episteme are not
"overturned", "rejected", "reined in", etc., in
the name of something like writing; quite the
contrary. But they are, according to a relation
that philosophy would call simulacrum, according
to a more subtle excess of truth, assumed and at
the same time displaced into a completely
different field, where one can still, but that's
all, " mime absolute knowleggse", to use an
expression coined by Bataille...."
The 'relation' of the simulacrum is one of an
excess of truth. As I will show, like Baudrillard's
conception of the Hyperreal (an excess of the real),
the simulacrum in this instance is problematic for
Platonism and metaphysical thought in general. Its
relation to the real or the true is in effect absorbed
by the operation of the simulacrum (becoming more) and
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meaning, the presence of the true and the real, itself
is thereby displaced and infinitely deferred. It must
be stressed that the simulacrum is a process as this
absorption is not the drawing into an interior. In
this way the miming or simulation of 'absolute
knowledge', or of concepts of knowledge in general, is
in effect non-knowledge. It is a thinking without
relation or end. This structure will be seen both in
Baudrillard's account of the mass and in his perception
of his own writing.
Derrida however, like Deleuze has his own
philosophical and historical agenda to which Plato's
delineation of the simulacrum is enlisted. It is clear
that this displacement he refers to is nothing other
than the deconstruction of western metaphysics. Also
what is fundamental to the construction and possibility
of memory for Derrida is the process of repetition.
This aspect of inscription is perceived by Plato as
harbouring a double threat. Manifestly the repetition
as a mnemic device produces a catechetic knowledge
without understanding. Secondly the forms or ideas of
things by definition and in principle must be
repeatable as the same over time. Yet repetition as
inscription is the inauguration of a movement, a
spacing, a deferral and ultimately the displacement of
the idea as present to itself. And it is here that one
returns to the issue of resemblance identified by
Deleuze as the key to understanding the importance of
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the simulacrum and ultimately resolved by him through
the notion of the eternal return:
A perfect imitation is no longer an imitation. If
one eliminates the tiny difference that, in
separating the imitator from the imitated, by that
very fact refers to it, one would render the
imitator absolutely different: the imitator would
become another being no longer referring to the
imitated. Imitation does not correspond to its
essence, it is not what its is - imitation -
unless i,t is some way at fault, or rather in
default.."
It is worth recalling here Deleuze's remark that
it is only the image, or representation, that is
illusory. This is the paradoxical structure of the
simulacrum or phantasm. A pure imitation or simulacrum
through eliminating its difference from the imitated,
becomes therefore absolutely different. Plato has
already argued that its familial lineage, its lack of
proper origin render it unsuitable as a form of
resemblance to the object of true knowledge. It is
also clear that its structure analytically poses the
gravest threat due to its supplementary logic. Plato
recognises the necessity of repetition and attempts to
demarcate it through his description of anamnesis,
which is also a spectral genealogy. Plato tries to
make the necessary moment and movement of difference in
repetition a movement of the same. He attempts to
borrow, to add on to a whole, the necessary condition
of repeatability but this adding on is in fact an
interiorised repression, "laying out within itself a
space of repression" 20 .	 While Deleuze accounts for
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this through the dynamics of the eternal return Derrida
situates it within the economy of differance:
the being-present (on) in its truth, in the
presence of its identity and in the identity of
its presence, is doubled as soon as it appears, as
soon as it presents itself. It appears, in its
essence, as the possibility of its own most proper
non-truth, of its pseudo-truth reflected in the
icon, the phantasm, the simulacrum. What is not
what is, identical and identical to itself,
unique, unless it adds to itself the possibility
of being repeated as such. And its identity is
hollowed out by that addition, wA.thdraws itself in
the supplement that presents it."
Thus the simulacrum is the condition of
possibility for the eidos. The eidos no longer
epistemologically dominates the field but is produced
as effect. In this way, repetition or registration in
the economy of differance which has as its motor the
simulacrum, functions in a similar manner to the
eternal return. Both Derrida and Deleuze offer a
theory of circulation which accounts for the simulacrum
effect as a fundamental event and dynamic process of
western philosophy. For Derrida it is its internal
limit which can be read as the fault line of
metaphysical thought. Both differance and the eternal
return (via the will-to-power) result in a description
of the simulacrum which situate it as the dynamic
unthought engine of thinking. Both account for the
same in terms of difference and identify the indigenous
threat it poses to Platonism. They also understand
their writing as an instantiation of the simulacrum.
There are of course fundamental and important
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differences. For Derrida the simulacrum is the ghost
in the machine of western philosophy. In a
discontinuous disengagement he attempts to unsettle and
seduce the governing concepts of metaphysics. This is
in order to unblock and unleash the incessant and
unlimited force of writing and the simulacrum as a
challenge to thought and knowledge:
Writing can only mime them [truth, Plato's
dialectics]. (It could be shown, but we will
spare ourselves the development here, that the
problematic that today, and in this very spot,
links writing with the (putting) in question of
the truth - and of thought and speech, which are
informed by it - must necessarily exhume, without
remaining at that, the conceptual monuments, the
vestiges of the battlefield (champ de Bataille),
the signposts marking out the battle between
sophistics and philosophy, and, more generally,
all the buttresses erected by Platonism. In many
ways, and from a viewpoint that does not cover the
entire field, we are now on the eve of Platonism.
Which can a4o be thought of as the morning after
Hegelianism.42
It is clear thus far that the simulacrum for both
Derrida and Deleuze functions as a pivotal instance
coterminous with their general philosophical projects.
The concept of the simulacrum is produced through an
examination of the place and function of
representation. It is not an addendum but rather a
matrix which has produced a set of moves and effects in
the history of philosophy. The similarities are
delimited by particular philosophical manoeuvres, in
this instance either deconstruction or Nietzschean
critique. It should be clear however that the issue of
the simulacrum cannot be approached simply in terms of
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the image. Furthermore it is difficult to see in their
respective analyses anything uniquely post-modern. The
simulacrum on their account is not a specifically
contemporary experience or event. It marks the 'eve of
Platonism' for Derrida, a true twilight zone which in
such thought will always find itself. One final and
crucial feature of their respective accounts of the
simulacrum is that it is not a function of
communication. The simulacrum is never present as such
as either image or essence. In this way the simulacrum
is precisely that which forbids communication. Hence
both Derrida and Deleuze underwrite their theory as a
'mime' or a simulation of theory. The simulation of
that which would communicate.
It will become clear that Baudrillard's account of
the simulacrum intersects with those of Derrida and
Deleuze. As I will show Baudrillard is also thoroughly
sceptical of a realist simulacrum. However before
addressing his analysis I will briefly attempt to put
the simulacrum in the more nebulous context of its
reception within the framework of post-modernity.
The appearance of the simulacrum as an object of
investigation is but one of a collection of worries and
perceived threats that constitute the debate on post-
modernism. One other important element is drawn from
current perceptions about the nature of language,
namely that the circulation of signifiers dominates
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that of the signified. Presented in a certain way this
is meant to suggest that the world is a text, without
the criterion of the real whereby it can be measured.
As I have shown that for Derrida such an opposition is
spurious. Alongside the continual innovation in
communications technology there is a perceived pattern
in which the civilization of the image may be divined.
Richard Kearney writes of the parodic imagination as
the key to an understanding of post-modernity:
The role of the image in post-modern culture is
essentially one of parody. By this is meant that
the image no longer refers primarily to some
'original', situated outside itself in the 'real'
world or inside human consciousness. Devoid of
any fixed reference to an origin, the image
appears to refer only to other images. The post-
modern image circulates in a seemingly endless
play of imitation. Each image becomes a parody of
another which precedes it...and so on. The idea
of an 'authentic' image is thus subverted - as is
evident in the practice of pastiche w4lch informs
contemporary forms of representation."
This description covers some of the detail
provided by both Derrida and Deleuze. However there
are fundamental differences. This can be shown by
contrasting the notion of pastiche with Deleuze's
heterogenous series. The former is a technique
mastered by a subject while the latter is not remotely
the function of a subject. If Kearney is correct (and
I think he is) in identifying this as a feature of what
may be termed post-modern, the post-modern concern with
representation signifies less a threat to subjectivity
than its zenith in its ability to play the field of
tradition and history. I would argue that pastiche is
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not even the presentation of incommensurable ideas,
rules or styles but is in fact the simple synthesis of
different objects or styles. At best it may be the
expression of a subject disillusioned with tradition
and the narratives of emancipation. Baudrillard
identifies post-modernism as the practice and fetish of
inferior imitation:
...the ultimate configuration, that of
"postmodernism", undoubtedly characterizes the
most degenerated, most artificial, and most
eclectic phase - a fetishism of picking out and
adopting all the significant little bits and
pieces, all the idols, and all the purest signs
that preceded this fetishism. (A.R. pp.40-41.)
In this way post-modern pastiche far from
radicalizing and hastening the demise of the subject,
the true and the real, amounts to little more than
auto-biographical memorials. Furthermore Kearney's
analysis of the post-modern also skirts a key problem.
This is that certain features of post-modernity are
understood to herald an entirely new situation.
However as we saw in both Derrida's and Deleuze's
analyses the simulacrum and the challenge it poses to
proper representation was at some level already
understood by Plato to be the internal limit of his
account of knowledge. I would argue that it is the
perception of the constitutive elements of post-
modernity as something utterly new which produces the
tone of crisis or apocalypse. The simulacrum for both
Derrida and Deleuze is never contemporary. It is the
deferral or excess of the contemporaneous. As I will
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show Baudrillard understands crisis to be solely a
function of linear time.
Nevertheless this perception of crisis is acutely
felt	 in the domain	 of the	 critical
	 evaluation of
culture. An apparently lethal	 combination of the
critique of rationality and	 the
	 society of the
spectacle displaces the ground of traditional aesthetic
criteria. The aesthetic in this instance stands for
the means of discerning value. In respect of post-
modern artistic practices the apparent displacement of
the values of authoriality and originality changes the
status and perception of art. Richard Kearney cites
the examples of the parody of tradition in Martin
Sharp's pop poster of Van Gogh and Larry Rivers'
presentation of Rembrandt's "Dutch Masters". It could
be argued that these are forms of post-modern
iconoclasm whereby the sanctified icons of tradition
are stripped of their aura. I will return to the
notion of aura in the following chapter as it is
fundamental component of Baudrillard's technological
imaginary, which in fact is the apotheosis of the
imaginary. However parody, satire and iconoclasm are
not unique to the post-modern. What may be unique to
post-modernism is the knowingness of its pastiche and
parody, the manner in which its iconology is
incessantly paraded in quotation marks.
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Nevertheless as Kearney points out there is in
post-modern art not only a direct parody of tradition
but an indirect challenge to its sublime objects. Take
for instance Andy Warhol's celebration in his
seriographs of images from popular and consumer
culture. On this reading the boundaries between high
art and popular culture become increasingly obscured
and the modernist demand for an elite avant-garde
bearing the burden of the enlightenment of mankind
becomes theoretically and politically suspect. In this
way the traditional criteria and sources of value are
put in question. Again, at the risk of being
repetitious, it is worth recalling Deleuze's account of
Plato's anxiety over the foundation of his hierarchy of
values. Though the question must be asked as whether
this anxiety over value can be attributed to post-
modern art practice. Furthermore whether Warhol counts
as post-modern is questionable.
In any case for some critics the consequences of
this is the valorisation of kitsch through the
equalisation of all culture through the lack of any
certain means of establishing value. 24
 According to
the perceived logic of the signifier, the fear is that
everything becomes, or already is the same as anything
else. Kearney cites Milan Kundera's observation that
the pleasure of the trivial represents:
the kitsch-man's need for kitsch - the need to
gaze into the mirror of the beautifying lie and be
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moved to t9ars of gratification at one's own
reflection.43
Kundera restricts, as a thoroughgoing humanist,
restricts his abhorrence of reflection to the false
pretender of Kitsch. It is demeaning of true art. He
leaves aside the operations and assumptions of critical
reflection organised around its reflective
subjectivity. With respect to the question of taste
however it is also worth mentioning Bourdieu's account
of this phenomenon in terms of a sociology of
distinctions.	 It is as for him a practice of re-
valorization.	 The practice of revaluing heretofore
kitsch objects signals a certain social and educational
status. Such activity is an attempted display of
social power. This can be seen either as the triumph
of bourgeois values or the emergence of the everyman.
It is the latter which Michel De Certeau schematizes.
However , there is another way, outside the
framework of the subject, of perceiving what is in
effect the indifference of values. I would argue that
the goalless fascination, not the celebration of, the
trivial is expressive what I would prefer to call the
untermensch. The untermensch is the subject unburdened
of all existential and political projects of truth,
meaning, history or reflection. The untermensch is not
in pursuit of a sentimental imaginary, as Kundera
suggests of the kitsch-man. The untermensch is only
exhausted by the labour and tedium of truth, identity
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and history and is therefore indifferent to their
metaphysical charisma. Hence as E.M. Cioran suggests,
the frivolous replaces the value of enduring sobriety;
No one achieves frivolity straight off. It is a
privilege and an art; it is the pursuit of the
superficial by those who, having discerned the
impossibility of any certitude, have conceived a
disgust for such things; it is the escape far from
one abyss or another whicti i. being by nature
bottomless, can lead nowhere."
In Lyotard's language it could be said that
implicit in the frivolous is a rejection of the grand
narratives. Though it is hardly perceived as such.
And therein lies its force. It is to no end. Michel
De Certeau writes extensively on the poetic practices
of everyday activities such as walking, cooking,
stealing (la perruque) exercised against the backdrop
of an apparently all pervasive system of exploitation
and control in an attempt to redeem some source of
value. Baudrillard, as I will make clear, proposes a
different scenario guided by the assumption that
developments in communications technology produces a
mutation in subjectivity. The subject metamorphosised
into the Mass.
One can understand how these features attributed
to the notion of post-modernity worry certain
commentators. The problems of value, discrimination
and the supposedly unlimited autonomous circulation of
signifiers with no ties to the real. However such
critics miss what is essential to the simulacrum in
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Deleuze, Derrida and Baudrillard. That is, if theories
of representation have their limit in the simulacrum,
then it is surely misguided to treat the simulacrum in
terms of language and representation.
For example, in the area of film studies, and film
is considered paradigmatic of the "civilization of the
image", the pre-eminence of Lacanian theory has lead to
theorising the cinematic image in terms of language and
narrative. Such an image is treated merely as an
extension of the dreamwork and resolved through the
application of psychoanalytic categories which situate
the subject positions of actors and audience. The film
is an event organised around the scopic drive. The
cinematic image signifies like any other system of
signs and is therefore reducible to the operations of
representation. In this way the cinematic image is
given an extra-cinematic time and place - the time and
place of the narrative imposed upon it. What is
specific to the image is displaced through the
imposition of narrative categories. Deleuze counters
that:
A theory of the cinema is not 'about' cinema, but
about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and
which are themselves related to other concepts
corresponding to other practices, the practice of
concepts in general having no privilege over
others, any more than one object has over others.
It is at the level of interference of many
practices that things happen, beings, images,
concepts, all the kinds of events. The theory of
the cinema does not bear on the cinema but on the
concepts of the cinema, which are no less
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practic41, effective or existent than cinema
itself." (Cinema 2)
In short, the object of any interpretation becomes
a moment in the narrative of interpretation, it makes
it represent. According to Baudrillard such is the
destiny of theory predicated on truth. It is of
necessity tautology. As I will show, he proposes that
the simulacrum is without a scene, a narrative of time
or place, or essentially a mise-en-scene.
Scott Lash is one of the few commentators on post-
modernity who have identified what is at stake in the
reduction of the cinematic image (a simulacrum) to
representation. Lash does draw upon Lyotard's
description of the 'perceptual memories' of the
unconscious.	 However the fundamental feature of
Lyotard's unconscious is that energy is discharged
figurally through the primary process. 	 It is the
secondary process through which energy is discharged
verbally. So, according to Lash's argument, if the
unconscious resembles the cinema it is because it
figures not because it is structured like a language.
He cites Benjamin to support his claim that cinema
figures rather than narrates:
As Benjamin noted, cinematic reception, unlike
reception of the painting or novel, takes place
not in a state of 'contemplation', but of
'distraction'. Cinema consists of a set of
mechanically reproduced images which can be
presented along the lines of the temporal
causality of narrative realism. But as a literal
set of images they come closer to the disconnected
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temporality of the succession of perceptual
memories in the unconscious.28
However what is curious about this is that on the
one hand he seems to suggest that the cinema is
generically figural rather than discursive while on the
other says that it can be made to function narratively.
Lash distinguishes four categories of cinema.
1)	 Realist or narrative cinema is organised around
quattrocento perspective and whose narrative is
temporally sequential. The space of the subject viewer
is fixed by the narrative development and the
investment of the secondary process in a 'hero' who
functions as an ego-ideal.
2) Mainstream post-modern cinema is a figural cinema
but one whose effect is to fix the identity of the
subject, not through secondary processes of
identification, but through primary process investment
in spectacle.
	 He cites the films of Spielberg and
Schwarzenegger as examples of this.
3) Modernist cinema is discursive cinema insofar as it
acts to distanciate the audience from the image through
allusion and reference to the rules and conventions of
the cinematic imaginary. It is also modernist insofar
as it introduces cultural differentiation marking the
difference of the cinematic image from the real.
According to Lash the distance it produces allows for a
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greater flexibility of subject position from the image.
An example here would be Godard whose Deux ou trois
choses juxtaposes the narrative commentary which
documents the process of film making, with the sleight
of hand of the image.
4)	 Postmodernist transgressive cinema which is a
figural cinema but unlike mainstream cinema does not
fix the subject position of the viewer. This
flexibility stems not from the critical distance of
modernist cinema which opens to question the
conventions of cinematic practice but rather through a
problematisation of the fixed nature of the real.
According to Lash this process of de-differentiation
(of the real from the artificial) is the key element of
post-modernity. This is, as I will show, prominent in
Baudrillard's conception of the simulacrum. The point
is that the real is not de-differentiated from its
representation through the conventions and language of
cinema, thereby becoming a text in the crude sense.
Rather it is de-differentiated from its resemblance.
Recalling Derrida, it is the absence of the tiny
difference between the object and its perfect imitation
which makes them absolutely different for the latter is
no longer an imitation of the object. It is its own
simulation.
Lash suggests that the disturbance of the real as
constitutive of art has a pictorial precursor in the
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figural motor of surrealism. The real becomes a figure
through the juxtaposition of disparate referents. This
operation, he says citing Breton, is a `poeticizing of
the banal' (similar to Cioran's frivolity) and is
exemplary of the refusal by surrealism of the
distinction between life and art:
The surrealist innovation thus is a
problematization of what constitutes the real. It
is thus similar to Warhol's silk screens, which
problematizes, not just high art, but also the
real in that it reveals reality itself to be
composed of images...If art is no longer to be
considered a of a different order than life, than
the idea of aesthetic avant-gardes is questioned.
If theory itself is to be no longer the `double'
of art or life then Nietzschean affirmation and
not crit„ical theory would be on the intellectual
agenda.2
If theory is no longer purely imitative,
reflective of life or reflective in general, then as
the "demonic power of the false", it is its own
simulation. I will discuss in a later chapter
Baudrillard's own challenge to the real through
seduction in which he also enlists the example of
surrealism in support of his argument. For the moment
it is enough to note that the issue of the simulacrum
cannot be simply reduced to a narrative of
representation.
It is clear then that what is at stake in the
concept of the simulacrum is more than an anxiety over
the duplicity of the image. The accounts offered by
both Derrida and Deleuze suggest that it marks the spot
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at which the thought of the real world, and its ratio
of value, breaks down. I would argue that the post-
modern concern over representation, reference and the
values and objects of tradition is not motivated by the
same questions. In its anxiety its mood is curiously
modern. The demise of the grand narratives is
perceived as a kind of homelessness or exile. I would
argue that this demise is perceived as a fundamentally
empirical event: the idea that at some point they were
true. What is diagnosed is the historical failure of
grand narratives and not, as in Derrida for example,
their structural impossibility. For this reason the
apparent iconoclasm of post-modernism is somewhat
pathological.
For Baudrillard the simulacrum is not the
different as a condition of the possibility and
impossibility of the same. It is in fact the self-
generating mechanism of the same, its absolute
perfection. On Baudrillard's account it will become
clear that we have entered the utopia, to put it in a
particular language, of absolute presence. However and
precisely because of this it is also the moment of
collapse
	 and	 catastrophe	 of	 the	 system of
representation. At its limit there is neither the
real, the difference nor the negative upon which the
systems of representation and political economy depend.
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What is increasingly evident is that as
Baudrillard elaborates on his analysis of the
simulacrum, with the pure-event for example, he also
begins to see the effects of the simulacrum in terms of
the dissolution of memory. As is clear from the
analyses of Derrida and Deleuze this renders
problematic the possibility and conditions of judgment.
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CHAPTER FOUR: INDIFFERENT SIMULATION
We have abolished the real world: what world is
left? the apparent world perhaps?...But no! with
the real world we have also abolished the apparent
world! Nietzsche.
In the preceding chapters I have tried to suggest
that there are problems with schematising simulation in
terms of post-modernism. Framing the issue of the
simulacrum in terms of post-modernism gives it an
ideological status. Or else it is reduced to a semi-
aesthetic concern with surfaces and appearances rather
than content or essentials.
	 I have shown its
specificity and its fundamental importance in the
accounts of Derrida and Deleuze. In this section it
will become clear that Baudrillard has a different
agenda for the simulacrum than that proffered in the
debate on post-modernism.
	 It also differs from the
accounts of Derrida and Deleuze.
	 Nevertheless it
retains a primary role in the development of his work;
it is not an addendum.
	 It is the impetus behind
transformation in his work. The problematic of
production is resolved into the dynamics of the
simulacrum. The time of production and its conceptual
network, as I will show implodes into the immanence of
the simulacrum. In particular Baudrillard's account of
the simulacrum marks the point in a theoretical
trajectory culminating in Baudrillard's desire to
disappear as a subject and theorist.1
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It is true to say that the issue of the simulacrum
does converge with the question of representation. But
it will only be one phase of the simulacrum - the
simulacrum of reference. There are four areas which
delimit the background and operations of the
simulacrum;
1) In his analysis of the concepts of production and
value in the political economy of the sign he revealed
the metaphysics of use value in the reality principle
of the object. With the concept of the simulacrum
Baudrillard tries to define how the production of the
reality principle is no longer just a function of
political economy. It will become an end in itself
through the process of reproduction. He offers, as I
will show, a genealogy of the sign describing its
various transformations.
2) He describes the simulacrum in terms of a code.
This code is not based on the structuralist model of
the code but on the model of DNA and genetics.
3) The simulacrum is also a function of technological
development which has transformed the production of the
image and consequently and the way in which it is
perceived and experienced. Though as I will show to
talk in terms of perception is misleading. This has
serious consequences for any conception of politics or
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social organisation. Furthermore technology is neither
a purely instrumental object nor (despite the
fundamental structure of the code) a new ontological
determinant.
4) Like the simulacrum in the accounts of Derrida and
Deleuze, Baudrillard's conception has effects on the
entire framing of his analysis. Ultimately this
question of theory will be addressed in various forms;
in terms of a seduction, a pataphysics and a fatal
strategy. However in his work on simulation in
Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard barely begins
to consider the consequences of his conceptualisation
of the simulacrum for his theoretical writing.
For schematic purposes I will deal in the main
with the first two schemas in this chapter, while
drawing attention to the theoretical effects they will
produce.
It should be clear from this, and from the last
chapter, that the simulacrum cannot be analysed as a
function of language. It is not a signifier of a
signifier. One of the features in the reception of
recent continental philosophy is its formalisation as a
problematics of language. In its reception as post-
modernism this reading is magnified. An obvious
example is the reception of Derrida's concept of texte.
Derrida's precautionary zeal is a warning against
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getting the essential "on the cheap" - in language for
instance:
The devaluation of the word "language" itself, and
how in the very hold it has upon us, betrays a
loose vocabulary, the temptation of a cheap
seduction, the passive yielding to fashion, the
consciouness of the avant-garde, in othe words -
ignorance - are evidences of this effect.'
If the simulacrum cannot be understood in terms of
language I will also show that it is not reducible to
an image. As I have already suggested, post-modernism
has a tendency to mask the differences between a
variety of different philosophers and regards them as
symptoms of a common problem, that of language. It
could be argued that if there is a significant
convergence it is not on the problematic of language
but that of empiricism and its redefinition.
Baudrillard's simulation inaugurates a new world of
sense. But as will become clear, in a reversion of
McLuhanism, it is a purely external sensorium. In any
case as Derrida notes, empiricism traditionally derives
its force from a simple opposition to the values of
idealism. Baudrillard is aware of this problem in his
theorisation of the simulacrum. Hence his professed
disinterest in a "realist" simulacrum, either
understood in terms of language, or dependent on the
metaphysical foundations of subjectivity, consciousness
and pure perception. In short the simulacrum is
neither a function of language (whichever model you
choose to use) nor an appearance for a subject. The
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analysis of the simulacrum does not just work on the
side of the `object' while leaving the subject alone.
It changes both sides of the equation.
One other general feature worth mentioning here is
a parallel with Derrida's analysis of the unfolding of
the problematic of writing as a symptom of the closure
of an epoch, logocentrism. Baudrillard's description
of the current simulacrum also seems to function at the
limit of an historical and philosophical project.
However it is only rarely that a history of thinking is
implicated in the current unfolding of the simulacrum.
Baudrillard offers a genealogy of the sign which
traces its movement from being a function of the feudal
order and then political economy, to its ultimate
transformation and disappearance in the hyperreality
of simulation. The three orders of the sign are as
follows.
1) The Counterfeit: this is the mode of appearance born
out of the renaissance. With the breakdown of feudal
order new forms of signifying social positions were
necessary. The medieval hierarchy of signs disappeared
as did the immutable order it reflected. In a society
of fixed cast and rank:
signs are limited in number, and are not widely
diffused, each one functions with its full value a
interdiction, each is a reciprocal obligation
between castes, clans or persons. (Sim p.84)
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This is the era of the obliged sign which
designates directly one's place in the social order.
These are signs of prestige. When this order ended so
did the era of the bound or obliged sign, inaugurating
the open competition of equivalent signs and ushering
the age of the counterfeit. Their arbitrariness is the
condition of their equivalence. There is general
proliferation of signs which bear no resemblance to the
obliged sign of limited diffusion. He calls this sign
the counterfeit not because it fakes a real sign but
because from its new perspective, the obliged sign
appeared to correspond with the real. It simulates its
own necessity. This necessity is produced as a
simulation of the arbitrary sign's correspondence with
the real.	 In the following passage Baudrillard
identifies this as the genesis of modernity:
it is its counterfeit, not by corruption of an
original, but by extension of a material whose
very clarity depends on the restriction by which
it was bound. No longer discriminating (it is no
more than competitive), unburdened of all
restraint, universally available, the modern sign
still simulates necessity in taking itself as tied
somehow to the world. (Sim p.85)
The modern sign he argues is nostalgic for a past
in which it was obliged and symbolic of a law of
nature. One could ask to what extent can the clarity
and distinction of symbolic feudal sign be considered
to be a sign for it does not appear to simulate
anything. Baudrillard proposes that the modern sign
simulates obligation but can only do so through the
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neutral values of competitive signs that can be
exchanged. Nevertheless there is a magnificence to
this sudden semiurgy:
It is the Renaissance that the false is born along
with the natural. From the fake shirt in front to
the use of the fork as artificial prosthesis, to
the stucco interiors and the great baroque
theatrical machinery. (Sim p.87)
In a typically deconstructive move, the modern
sign is originally counterfeit and it is this which
constitutes the "natural". This produces a neurosis of
the natural which haunts the modern sign and is the
motivation in its simulation of reference or a natural
union with the real. Like Derrida's remarks on the
"technics" of writing, it believes it leaves its field
neutral. This he argues is the very structure of
technology in is its desire to imitate and thereby
reproduce "natural" processes. 3
 It is this
technological imaginary that the modern sign pursues,
which is in effect the pursuit of the real throuqh its
reproduction. Baudrillard suggests that this desire
for unity with the real is expressed in the Renaissance
search for universal substance which would mirror the
modern sign in its equivalence in all objects. David
Harvey gives an example of this shift in the
transformation of mapping brought about in the
Renaissance. The "sensuous", finite and place-bound
maps of the medieval world evoke a tactile experience
of place. 4
 For the moment it is enough to note that
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Renaissance mapping unifies space through perspective
and geometry. This simulates a new natural order:
The fixed viewpoint of perspective maps and
paintings...generates a `coldly geometrical' and
`systematic' sense of space which nevertheless
gives l a sense of harmony with natural law,
thereby underscoring man's moral responsibility
within God's geometrically ordered universe'...A
conception of infinite space allowed the globe to
be grasped as a finite totality without
challenging, at lest in theory, the infinite
wisdom of the deity.'
Geometry and perspective become the sign of space.
It is the "closed mental substance" of Renaissance
perspective space which orientates and masters all
objects and the world from one point. This issue of
perspective is crucial to the development of
Baudrillard's theorising. His attack on the subject is
largely based around its opening as perspective and
hence he will eventually counterpose the `black hole'
of the mass which absorbs all `lines of flight'.
However there are limitations to the extension of
this sign. It is a simulation to the extent that the
counterfeit forges its own origin. Nevertheless it
basically operates according to analogy. If it is also
technical in that it is imitative, attempting to
produce an ideal counterfeit of the world, it is
finally and necessarily limited by its form of
production.
	 In this way the latter factor is
constitutive of its frame of reference.
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2) Production: The Industrial Simulacrum. The second
order of simulacra is founded on the productive
technologies of the industrial revolution. Signs are
no longer counterfeited but serially produced. The
origin of the sign or what it refers to is not
constitutive of its operationality. The phenomenon of
the series is now introduced as the form of production.
Baudrillard uses the example of the distinction the
classical automaton and industrial robot to display the
operational changes wrought by the second order
simulacra. The classical automaton in its severely
mechanical movements, provokes classical concerns
concerning reality and appearance and the natural and
unnatural. Using the Derridean conception it is the
clearly defined difference between the real and its
imitation which assures the reality of the natural.
The robot replaces the metaphysics of being and
appearance, of resemblance, conjured up by the
automaton, with a logic of efficiency and production.
Baudrillard believes that such a mechanics is a less
charming attempt at an imaginary 'mastering of the
world.' Man's double, if the robot can be understood
as such, is now productive and mechanical. The
apparent difference no longer concerns the distinction
between abstract, dead labour of which the robot is a
model, and living labour. Such a reading invokes the
idea of useful work. The counterfeit is displaced by a
productive mechanical, serial simulacrum. There is now
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the possibility of two or of n identical objects.
The relation between them is no longer that of an
original to its counterfeit - neither analogy or
reflection - but equivalence, indifference. In a
series, objects become undefined simulacra one of
the other. And so, along with the objects do the
men that produce them. Only the obliteration of
the original reference allows for the generalized
law of equivalence, that is to say the very
possibility of production. (Sim p.97)
This order inaugurates the production of
equivalent objects, each simulacra of the other. The
origin of the sign in the industrial age is therefore
technique, in the formal reproducibility of signs and
objects. Equivalence, destroyed at the level of
original reference, is re-introduced as the generalized
law of exchange. This manouvre forms the general
matrix for the mutations of the simulacra from one
order or level to the other.
Baudrillard argues that production should only be
considered a moment in the order of simulacra. This is
a serious committment for Baudrillard to make.
Productive capital is but one historical form of a
disenchanted world of equivalence. Its disenchantment
rests precisely in it being the historical world. The
linear, irreversible progress of human endeavour. The
homogenous time and space of emancipation, liberation
and equality driven by historical inevitability.
Industrial production produces referents in a variety
of ways; in the commodity law of value; its critique
presented as the intrinsic use-value of objects; in the
fixed exchange rates of the gold standard; ultimately
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in the fixity and unity of the productive, autonomous
subject. Production prohibits the useless, exploiting
it, making of everything a reserve to be tapped or
invested. It does this as a matter of course because
it is autonomous. It is the motor and determinant of
history. Baudrillard argues that it is not potentially
liberating or emancipatory. Or if it is, this is only
because the latter cannot be understood except in terms
of liberating a potential - something which has not
been hitherto used, a waste. In the order of
production everything, everywhere must be put to work -
psychically, socially, politically or economic. Every
need finds its equivalence, every potential finds its
realisation. In this way the industrial simulacrum is
limited. It requires reference in the real to sustain
it. The medium is not yet the message.
3) At this point one may ask what is really at stake
in simulation? Baudrillard has already accounted for
two different forms.
	 Both have a different set of
effects. The issue for Baudrillard is that the
simulacrum, which is simply the simulacrum of the
world, introduces a particular disenchanted relation to
the world. It imposes new forms for the circulation of
objects and at the same time giving them meaning and
value. Production is ultimately its own end. It has
no other purpose. Hence the change from production to
reproduction is hardly even a matter of time. What
occurs is not a revolution in the sense of an
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overturning of capital but a revolution in a cycle of
value, whereby it reproduces itself as an end in
itself. Paradoxically this is also the end of the
historically determined appearance of production in
that it does not produce anything - the use-value or
exchange value of an object. The simulacra designate
transformations in forms of circulation. What follows
from this is also a transformation in the manner of the
subject that produces and the object which is produced.
The technical efficiency and superior capacity of the
productive simulacrum over the counterfeit one is only
superceded in its realisation as its own end, in
reproduction. It consumes itself in its own doubling.
No longer even requiring the brief mediation of the
object. It becomes pure ciculation:
Benjamin first (and later McLuhan) understood
technique not as a "productive force" (wherein
marxist analysis is lost) but as medium, as from
and principle of a whole new generation of
sense...Technique as medium dominates not only the
"message" of the product (its use-value) but also
the force-of work that Marx wished to make the
revolutionary message of production. Benjamin and
McLuhan saw this matter more clearly than Marx;
they saw the true message: the true ultimatum was
in reproduction itself. And that production no
longer has any sense; its social finality is lost
in the series. The simulacra win out over
history. (Sim pp. 99, 100)
There are many questions raised by this. When
Douglas Kellner 6
 criticizes Baudrillard for reducing
media to their technological essence he misses the
central point of Baudrillard, McLuhan and Benjamin.
Kellner fundamentally understands technology to be
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instrumental. The issue here is the transformation of
sense.	 Reproduction inaugurates a new prosthetic
sensorium. 7
	In some respects it is a deeply
anthropological account of production whose starting
point is really the industrial revolution.
	 Its
historical momentum rests in its deepening of the
disenchantment of the Renaissance simulacrum.
Disenchantment is the conception of a world, of a real.
This is implicitly counterposed by Baudrillard to the
order of symbolic exchange which is without signs of
the real and whose circulation of objects is neither
rooted in accumulation, nor the equivalent exchange of
objects. Objects in symbolic exchange had no intrinsic
use or end. Ultimately the genesis and linear time of
history heralds the disappearance of the reversible
cycle of symbolic exchange. If history is in effect
the history of production it is no accident that it is
the model of reference and representation. It is the
absolute vantage point of perspective. Perspective not
just as a mastery and unification of space but as a
mastery and convergence of time.
In this third order there is only reproduction
without reference. Value is not predicated on exchange
or use-values. This third order of simulacra is the
post-industrial order in which the real is defined as
that which is capable of being reproduced. Baudrillard
relates a Borges' story in which the map of a territory
is so detailed that it covers exactly the space which
108
it maps. With the decline of empire the map frays and
all that is left is a few threads in the desert.
Baudrillard argues that the equivalence of the map,
which evokes the charisma of difference between the
real and its representation, is a second order
simulation. Such a simulation is of the order of the
double, the mirror and the imaginary. According to
Baudrillard, if one wrote a story allegorising the
current order of simulation it would be the territory
rotting across the map leaving a desert of the real.
One might be tempted to say that it is the map which
precedes the real and engenders it. However simulation
abolishes the difference between the real and
imaginary. Simulation is now of an order of genetic
commutation:
The real is produced from miniaturised units, from
matrices, memory banks and command models - and
with these it can be reproduced an indefinite
number of times. It no longer has to be rational,
since it is no longer measured against some ideal
or negative instance . It is nothing more than
operational. In fact since it is no longer
enveloped by an imaginary, it is no longer real at
all. It is a hyperreal, the product of an
irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a
hyperspace without atmosphere. (Sim p.3)
It is worth noting here the absence of negativity
in the current order of simulation. Its transformation
is not dialectical. The concrete ends of production
(the commodity or revolution) no longer pertain in this
order. The displacement of the real by the hyperreal
leads to a panic proliferation of signs of the real and
the true. This is an expression of the hyperreal in
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the real's "striking resemblance to itself". There is
an hysteria of production but it is not motivated by
accumulation as in the logic of political economy. It
is an attempt to restore the real through the
simulation of production.
Nevertheless it is a function of capital insofar
as it is an extension of capital's pursuit of a reality
principle. This is already at work in the principle of
production. Reproducibility is not after the fact, it
is its condition of possibility:
...it was capital which was the first to feed
throughout its history on the destruction of every
referential, of every human goal, which shattered
every ideal distinction between true and false,
good and evil, in order to establish a radical law
of equivalence and exchange, the iron law of its
power. It was the first to practice deterrence,
abstraction, disconnection, deterritorialisation,
etc.; and if it was capital which fostered
reality, the reality principle, it was also the
first to liquidate it in the extermination of
every use-value, every real equivalence, of
production and wealth, in the very sensation we
have of the unreality of the stakes. (Sim p.43)
Baudrillard therefore far from relegating capital
in his analysis of simulation, or valorising culture as
the principle of the 'civilization of the image',
places it as a source for the hyperreal. Capital
requires the destruction of original reference, in
order to establish its pure unmediated circulation
through the general equivalence established at the
level of production - or rather reproduction. What he
does do is separate its operations from the logic of
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political economy. He suggests that political economy
is a simulation model for capital. It is what he calls
a phantom reference or a simulation reference.
Here we get to the matrix of these transformations
in value. Just as the natural law of value in the
Renaissance was maintained as an imaginary referent in
the succeeding phase of the commodity law of value so
the commodity law of value is recycled in the
structural law of value. This imaginary is therefore
the sign of something that was only ever another sign.
Finally in the incessant pursuit of the real,
capital perfects it in the disappearance of the real
into the hyperreal. This is a spiralling process (a
revolution) where each previous law of value is
absorbed in the successive functioning logic, or order
of simulation of the system:
The current revolutions index themselves on the
immediately prior phase of the system. They arm
themselves with a nostalgic resurrection of the
real in all its forms - in other words, with
simulacra of the second order: dialectics, use
value, the transparency and finality of
production, the 'liberation' of the unconscious,
or of repressed meaning (of the signifier or of
the signified called desire), and so on. All of
these liberations offer an ideal content, the
phantoms which the system has devoured in
successive revolutions and which it subtly
resuscitates as revolutionary fantasies. (Sim
p.57)
One could say therefore that the real, on the side
of the system, has always already occurred.
	 It is
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mirrored, in total complicity, on the side of its
critique as a future event. The consequence of this,
similar to his analysis of the mirror of production, is
that all critique based on notions of alienation and
ideology re-inforce the phantoms whereby capital
sustains itself. Capital now functions at a different
level, having dissolved its own contradictions. It is
beyond the true and the false. The current order of
simulation operates according to the neutralization of
referents, determinants and finalities of production by
the code. It is no longer a question of criticising
Capital on the basis of its exploitative exchange value
as there is nothing to exchange. The medium is the
message:
...when the medium becomes the message, we enter
the cool era. This is really what happens with
money. Having arrived at a certain stage of
severed connection, money ceases to be a medium or
a means of commodities, but becomes the
realisation of the system in all its spiralling
abstraction: it is circulation itself. (EOP p.114)
In the second industrial order the abstraction of
exchange value has its alibi in the reference of use
value. The smooth working of the system was sustained
through the maintenance of a representative equivalent
in the commodity. However this order is superceded by
the structural law of value in which capital only
requires a commitment to the reproduction of the real,
but without its referents! Therefore simulation in the
hyperreal, unlike the principle of exchange value at
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the heart of representation, has no equivalent in the
real:
All this [the 'real' contents of political
economy] is surpassed by the other stage of value,
that of total relativity, generalised commutative,
combinatory simulation. This means simulation in
the sense that from now on signs will exchange
among themselves exclusively, without interacting
with the real (and this becomes the condition for
their smooth operation). (Sim p.60)
The logic of production no longer has any
representative equivalence in the real. Capital and
its simulation now operates as a code. The code is a
model from which everything proceeds. The code
operates immanently and is capable of producing
combinations generated by its binary structure. There
is no longer any necessity for the transcendent
finalities of use-value or history. Where there was
once finality in the objective reference of utility,
there is now the genetic structure of the model which
produces all possibilites simultaneously:
Only the model makes sense, and nothing flows any
longer according to its end, but proceeds from the
model, the signifier of reference", is a kind of
anterior finality and the only reference there is.
(Sim p.101)
In some respects there is nothing particularly
unusual about such a hypothesis based on the notion
that the form or mode of production determines what is
produced. What Baudrillard is arguuing is that a mode
of production is replaced by a code. It is this which
makes the current order worthy of attention.
	 The
113
question of means and ends, of modes and relations,
therefore escapes what is essential to this order. In
the current phase of simulation, it is not to be
understood as a more sophisticated technological
determination but as a pure medium of reproduction.
The finality of determination belongs to the previous
order. Causality and generic teleology gives way to
genetic mutation;
Practically and historically, this signified [the
replacement of teleological determination by the
code] the substitution of social control by the
end.., for social control by anticipation,
simulation and programming, and indeterminate
mutation directed by the code. Instead of a
process which is finalized according to its ideal
development we generalize from a model. (Sim
p.111)
Parallels can be drawn here with Derrida's account
of metaphysics in the way it anticipates possible moves
through the always already. If there is difference
here it is in the variation of the same. One could
even draw a comparison with Plato's forms. 8
	This
process marks an advance over the previous forms of
control. The transcendent ends of History, Man and
progress are absorbed by a further revolution in the
cycle of simulation. This mode of reproduction allows
capital the simulation of necessity, of its origin and
end (revolution). Because it is no longer confronted
with a real, reference or ideological rationality its
own internal contradictions (and its semblance of
power) disappear:
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Once short-circuited the myths [of origin and end
of capital, the revolution as the generic
potential of man] ...in an operationality of fact
and without discourse, once capital itself has
become its own myth, or rather an interminable
machine, aleatory, something like a social genetic
code, it no longer leaves any room for a planned
reversal; and this is its true violence. (Sim
p.112)
The code is irreversible. Hence it is not only an
anticipation of the real but an anticipation of death
in its own dead power. The resurrection of dead power
by critical and moral thought is equivalent to the
hysterical production of the real. Baudrillard's
formulation of the code qua model is the genetic code:
ail cells, electronic cells, party cells,
microbiological cells: always the search for the
smallest indivisible element, whose organic
synthesis would be made according to the givens of
the code. But the code itself is but a genetic
cell, a generator where myriads of intersections
produce all the questions and possible solutions,
so that choices (by whom?) can be made. (Sim
p.105)
The code dispenses with teleology, causality and
determination. With the code as the model of
simulation everything is given all at once. With the
disappearance of history and teleology, time is also
absorbed by this indifferent space of simulation. This
describes a process of instantaneous communication and
complete saturation of space.
Hence it could be argued that all interpretation
or analysis is misdirected in its attempt to uncover
the underlying cause or direction of its object. But
Baudrillard is saying more than this. Such activity is
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not flawed, it becomes an exacerbated function of a
system given over to a hysteria of the real and a
frenzy of truth. When simulation destroys perspective
space referenda replace reference. If the idea of a
medium did not entail the idea of different realities
which are mediated it could be said that simulation is
a pure medium . He cites the activities of polling,
surveying and sampling as extensions of the digitality
of the code to `everyday life', simulating the time and
place of the bizarre notion of public opinion. The
poll is a `pure medium' in that it is not the bearer of
any content. The binary structure, the zero and one,
provides the given and its possible transformations.
The poll, the sample, the test, therefore reflect
nothing and herein resides their `spectacular nullity'.
Reflection of course belongs to the psycho-metaphysics
of perspective, the mirror and the double. Public
opinion polls are spectacular because they are devoid
of content and are representative of nothing. Though
this of course cannot be criticised in the name of some
superior, concrete expression of public opinion.
Opinion is anticipated and absorbed through questions
and thus has a spectacular image for the `public' in
the simulation of opinion. Polls reproduce the
operations of simulation, the anticipation of the model
over reality for they do not represent, express or
refer to anything whatsoever.
	 Public opinion is
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measured as to whether it can meet the simulated
horizon (its reality) of its own testing:
As to the response of the polled to the poll-
takers, the natives to the ethnologist, the
analyzed to the analyst, you can be sure that the
circularity is total: the ones questioned always
pretend to be as the question imagines and
solicits them to be. Even psychoanalytic
transference and counter-transference fall today
under the sway of this simulated, simulated-
anticipated response, which is nothing other than
the very model of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
(Sim p.130)
This is the short-circuit of the real in the
network of simulation.
	 Yes. No.
	 The answers are
exchangeable. The paradox is of course that the
referent of the public or natives (in ethnology, for
testing is but generalized ethnology and biopsy)
disappears in the medium of its interrogation and
production. Thus it provides the very justification
and necessity for its continued sampling. Baudrillard
is therefore not suggesting that public opinion is
somehow distorted by media polling.
	 Its existence
depends on polling. 9
 It is not the false
representation in contradistinction to the true
representation of the franchise in a democratic
election. According to Baudrillard there is no
difference. The statistical constraint of polling is
the very paradigm of the vote in the alternating terms
of the "representative" democratic systems:
Democracy realizes the law of equivalence in the
political order. This law is accomplished in the
back-and-forth movement of the two terms which
reactivates their equivalence [and]...allows... a
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public consensus to be formed and the cycle of
representation to be closed...the vote comes to
resemble a Brownian movement of particles or the
calculation of probabilities. It is as if every
one voted by chance, or monkeys voted. (Sim pp.
131-132)
Representation presumes at some level the open
competition of signs. However for simulated
equivalences binary regulation is the key to the
stability of the system. Alternation of the two terms
leaves no room for a space of representation. This
process absorbs and neutralises its referent, 'the will
of the people'. The minimal difference of New York's
Twin Towers is emblematic of the binary operation
regulating Capital.
	 Previously, he argues, the
vertical transcendence, competitive jungle and mutual
reflections of	 the
	 New	 York	 skyline indicated the
competitive struggle of	 Capital. However the
development of	 Capital does not move naturally from
open competition to oligopoly to monopoly. It is
rather a 'tactical doubling of monopoly' that describes
the current phase of Capital. The Twin Towers are a
model of binary duplication. The competitive
verticality of New York's midtown skyscrapers with
their corporate jostling for space presents the very
image of competition and vertical transcendence which
is the final guarantee, the lender of last resort of
representation. The Twin Towers do not indicate a
struggle between competitors but duplication through
oppositional couples:
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From the smallest disjunctive unity
(question/answer particle) up to the great
alternating systems that control the economy,
politics, world co-existence, the matrix does not
change: it is always the 0/1, the binary scansion
that is affirmed as the metastable or homeostatic
form of the current systems. (Sim pp.134-135)
The system is metastatic in its capacity to
anticipate and reproduce its oppositional equilibrium.
The effect is inertia - dead power. The bipartite
political systems of substitution is a function of a
unitary system organised by binary regulation. It is a
process of neutralization that absorbs competition in
the maintenance of stable equilibrium. However if
there is equivalence it is not in the sense of there
being a correspondence with the real. Moreover any
system of equivalence will need a "lender of last
resort", a general equivalent which would guarantee an
exchange or translation. Simulation is more
sophisticated than exchange value in political economy
in the generation of equivalences:
The system of equivalences imposes in effect the
form of a general equivalent, and therefore the
centralization of a global process. Archaic
rationality compared to that of simulation; there
is no longer a single general equivalent, but a
diffraction of models that plays a regulatory
role. No longer the form of the general
equivalent, but that of distinctive oppositions.
(Sim pp.138-139)
The consequences of this for any attempt to grasp
the real of an event is bleak. Baudrillard gives the
example of a scenario of simulation in which a
terrorist bombing may have a variety of attributable
causes.	 Was it leftist terrorists?	 Right wing
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provocation? Centrists looking to discredit
"extremes"? The police looking to highlight their own
security interests? According to Baudrillard all are
equally true. The only way that the reality principle
may be saved is through a check on this vertigo of
causality simulated by models. This is achieved
through the simulation of a perspectival space, which
restricts the field and provides a vanishing point on
the horizon of the real. Simulation models do not act
according to a determinate logic. "Facts" are
anticipated through the intersection of various models.
In fact they may all stem from the same model. The
point is that all possibilities are exchangeable.
Hence any critique of such an event by providing a
perspective and distance endorses an equivalence
between the real and its theoretical representation
which appeals against this distortion of reality.
However this is flawed for at least two reasons;
1) It misses what is essential to the system, that it
lives off the anticipation of the real;
2) It benefits the system by the restoration of a
political credibility which the system lacks:
Ideology only corresponds to a betrayal of reality
by signs; simulation corresponds to a short
circuit of reality by signs. It is always the aim
of ideological analysis to restore the objective
process; it is always a false problem to want to
restore the objective process; it is always a
false problem to want to restore the truth beneath
the simulacrum. (Sim p.48)
120
Critical thought is already anticipated by the
model. It is an expression of the simulation of value
which the sustains the system of simulation. It is a
analysis indigenous to the second order simulation. It
is a resurrection of a dead power. Baudrillard wants
to substitute the credibility of the real with a "pure
event", devoid of determination, linear causality,
origin, finality, meaning and mediation. It is only in
this way that one can begin to recognise what is at
stake in the current order of simulation. Which is to
say that power is an effect of the real and all
attempts to engage with it at that level sustain its
simulation. Power depends on the distinction between
the true and the false in law, and the difference of
real and imaginary in its representation. The
consequences of this political "incredibility" is the
subject of my next chapter.
With his genealogy of the simulacrum Baudrillard
attempts to account for the transformation in capital.
Hence it is not attempting the same tasks required of
the simulacrum in both Derrida and Deleuze. It is
mainly directed at the project of critical thought,
showing why as a second level simulation, it is
insufficient as an explanation of the current order of
the hyperreal. Hence at this stage it is somewhat
limited in its range. For both Derrida and Deleuze the
simulacrum ruptures fundamental conventions of thought
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and the idea of the world they generate. The thought
of the simulacrum is built into their analyses.
However Baudrillard has not yet considered the
consequences of the thought of simulation for his own
theoretical enterprise. It is only when Baudrillard
begins to think of, and analyse, an alternative
response beyond the concept of symbolic exchange that
his analysis of the simulacrum begins to develop
theoretical momentum. This is ironic considering that
it is for this account of simulation that he is has
gained a certain notoriety. What is really interesting
about Baudrillard's work is where he takes this insight
concerning the hyperreal.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CRITICAL INDIFFERENCE OF THE
MASS
We mistrust the swindler, the trickster, the con-
man; yet to them we can impute none of history's
great convulsions; believing in nothing; it is not
they who rummage in your hearts, or your ulterior
motives; they leave you to your apathy, to your
despair or your uselessness. E.M. Cioran.
An examination of Baudrillard's conceptualisation
of the mass begins to reveal the wide ranging effects
effects generated by simulation. It will become clear
that the concept of mass functions at a variety of
different levels. It is most obviously an effect of
Baudrillard's analysis of what happens with the demise
of the political in the hyppereal.
The work in which Baudrillard theorises the mass
is titled In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities
(though there are moments in Symbolic Exchange and
Death in which mass-like activity is proposed). The
silent majority is the bane of critical political
discourse. It has traditionally designated the
essentially apolitical, but conservatively disposed,
bourgeois majority. It is disdainful of all liberal
and progressive projects.
Hence Baudrillard's choice and valorisation of the
term of mass is polemical in that it feeds off this
association. Traditionally the mass is a degraded term
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of political and social discourse unthinking,
irrational, uncritical and beast-like. However this is
precisely what commends the term for Baudrillard. The
fact that, on his reading, the mass abjures all
perspective, especially critical perspective,
proffering only silence as a phenomenon from which one
might learn how to deal with the current system of
simulation. Yet with his conception of the mass the
reader enters into a world truly bereft of any
distinction between the real and simulation. If there
is a moral it is only the simulation of one. At the
level of the system's duplication of itself, the mass
also refers to the critical mass of this system, the
moment of its implosion. The simultaneous point of a
systems realization and its immanent deacy.
The mass, as opposed to the social, is a concept
adequate to the third level simulation of the
hyperreal. He argues that the mass and its operations
replaces the terminology and theoretical network and
principles of the social. The latter belongs to the
second order. For Baudrillard the social designates
the functional and utilitarian product of political
economy.	 It is an application of the principle of
work, accumulation and the useful. With his
schematization of the mass Baudrillard attempts to
undermine the values and logic of the social and more
fundamentally the principles whereby it is conceived.
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The social is in Bataille's sense, a project. It
is the space and dynamic for the rational exchange of
the humanistic and utilitarian. However, Baudrillard
will theorise the absorption by the mass of the energy,
hope, future and progress of the social. This process
of absorption has numerous effects and may be
understood with reference to its scientific
connotations. Though this is not quite correct. For
Baudrillard the effects of the mass are seen not
through scientific analogy, but as a material process.
In what follows I will focus on Baudrillard's
description of the general response (or more properly
non-response) to the hyperreal. What he proposes in
his analysis of the mass is a somewhat unique and
unusual scenario in the area of "political" activity.
Hence the disappointment of critics like Kellner.
However, I would hope that given my presentation of his
work so far this development can be seen as a
theoretical necessity. For Baudrillard to attribute to
the mass a political agenda or responsibility would
completely contradict the theoretical direction of his
work. Therefore the political worries of commentators
such as Kellner miss the point. It is a purely
external criticism, bringing to bear categories and
schema that have no bearing on Baudrillard's writing.
It is akin to criticising Finnegan's Wake for not
having punctuation. The mass would not be the mass if
it had a political or revolutionary function or
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destiny.	 It is not the second level concept that
Kellner would like it to be.'
In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the
Sign, The Mirror of Production and Symbolic Exchange
and Death, while attacking the concepts of ideology,
alienation and the productivist logic which motivates
them, Baudrillard is still tempted by a form of
resistance beyond political economy in the practice of
symbolic exchange. This took the form of micro-
resistance by marginal groups, the waste or residue of
the economy.	 Hence one must bear in mind this
principle in considering the mass. However the
consequences of his theory of the simulacrum make this
response to political economy seem too romantic and
explosive. There is in some respects a difference in
the tone of Baudrillard's writing. His propositions
outbid the system in terms of its cynicism.
This shift in tone is a consequence of his reading
of the current order. Political economy itself becomes
a simulation and the system is no longer an explosive
one. The latter belongs to the second-level, the order
of production. On the contrary the current system is
implosive. The system sustains itself on the
simulation of political opposition, on the belief in
the referentials of political truth. The mass as I
will show is not of, or a beyond of the political
order.
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The previously attractive idea of the
transformation of value through symbolic exchange is
ditched on the basis that for something to be spent it
must still have value. Baudrillard becomes
increasingly diverted by the ritual of challenge rather
than the possibility of symbolic exchange. In a review
of the Oeuvres Completes of Georges Bataille he writes:
He [Bataille] who has so well explored the human
sacrifice of the Aztecs should have known as they
did that the sun gives nothing, it is necessary to
nourish it continually with human blood in order
that it shine. It is necessary to challenge
[defier] the gods through sacrifice in order that
they respond with profusion. In other words, the
root of sacrifice and of general economy is never
pure and simple expenditure - or whatever drive
[pulsion] of excess that supposedly comes to us
from natue - but is an incessant process of
challenge.'
The mass is an early expression of this concept of
challenge, a concept wich foregrounds his later work.
In Seduction 3 he contrasts the game of seduction (of
appearances) to the teleology and law of production (of
meaning). He now extends the logic of the simulacrum
to an analysis of what has heretofore been understood
as the social but which, in the third level simulation,
is superceded by the mass. The presentation of this is
organised around two specific objectives:
1) an investigation of the concept of the social (and
its replacement by the mass); what it has designated,
127
and how the term functioned as an integal part of the
productivist logic of political economy;
2) given the logic of the simulacrum how is one to
understand critical analysis, whose object and its
predicates are rooted in the previous era of
production. Baudrillard's account of the mass is
wholly bound up with the nature of criticality and
critical concepts. It is an extension of his analysis
of Marx in The Mirror of Production.
Baudrillard argues that any form of critical
discourse or interpretation is, at best, deeply flawed.
It freezes its dead object of interpretation in order
to resurrect it as meaning through the practice of
interpretation. Interpretation becomes cryogenesis.
An example of this in The Precession of Simulacra can
be found in Baudrillard's description of an
anthropological discovery - of the remains of the
Tasaday Indians. What occurs is a perfect model of the
consequences of traditional theory and interpretation.
However there is in this, an allegory of the effects of
the mass. For on contact with air, the remains, the
now ethnological artifacts, begin to decompose:
For ethnology to live, its object must die.
But the latter revenges itself by dying for having
being "discovered", and defies by its death the
science that wants to take hold of it.
Doesn't every science live on this
paradoxical slope to which it is doomed by the
evanescence of its object in the very process of
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its apprehension, and by the pitiless reversal
this dead object exerts on it. (Sim pp.13-14)
The ethnologists simulate a sacrifice through the
closing down of the dig. In a delicious irony the
savages are indebted to science for still being savages
but thereby become a simulation model, provided by
ethnology, for all other primitives.	 In the
"challenge" and defiance of their own death, ethnology
loses its object. This seems to be a fundamental
condition of any theory. However the object always has
its revenge:
It is science which ostensibly masters the object,
but it is the latter which deeply invests the
former, following an unconscious reversion, giving
only dead and circular replies to a dead and
circular interrogation. (Sim p.17)
It is the construction of the truth and the
reality princple of an object that Baudrillard
identifies as the fantasy of meaning in any scientific,
critical or hermeneutic enterprise. In his early work
his concern was how the critique of capital and the
political economy of the sign was a function of that
which it criticised. In short what were the
metaphysical assumptions behind critique governed by
concepts such as ideology, manipulation and
interpretation. What becomes increasingly important in
his work is interpretation, critique and theory in
general and the objects (like the Tasaday) they
produce.
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The mass as conceived by Baudrillard is this
principle ostensibly applied to the field of sociology.
In an interview Baudrillard suggests, possibly
ironically, that the only sociological work he has done
concerns this analysis of the socia1. 4 However I would
argue that his analysis, despite dealing with the
social is, in the end, not the least sociological. It
is not really even meta-sociology. It is an account of
that which heralds the end of sociology. That is to
say the useless form of the mass. In some ways it is
futurology as history. It is the beginning of a
thought, culminating in Fatal Strategies, concerning
how the future, and utopia, came to pass.
Thus far I have attempted to outline the issues
Baudrillard is unravelling in his account of the mass.
But what exactly is it? Properly speaking, it is not
representable. Nevertheless Baudrillard plays on its
variety of associations. The Mass denotes matter,
earth (in the electrical sense) and majority (mass of
people). Despite its connotation of plebeian
subjugation and slavery it has no moral import.
Neither is it a negative moment in a dialectic. The
mass is not an object of manipulation or the subject of
history.
	 The mass absorbs and neutralises all the
destinies of meaning given to it - Reason, History,
Culture, Revolution. This absorption not the
expression of a collective rationale or practice. It
is not the means to the end of a political project.
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Neither is it an act of self-interest. There is no
psychology of the mass for it is not a subject,
consciousness or agency. It is neither active nor
passive as it is neither subject nor object.
Baudrillard defines it as the neutral (ne-uter),
or the indifferent, like the current simulacrum. Its
effects are inertia and silence. Using Baudrillard's
model of simulation as the I satellisation of the real',
it can be said that the mass is the Black Hole into
which these satellites of the real disappear. The
gravity of the real, the ground of reference, is not
enough to prevent it from being absorbed by the
implosive inertia of the mass. The result of this is
that all the great metaphysical referents are drawn
towards the black hole of the mass. Nevertheless it
must be stressed that this process has no meaning.
Using the scientific analogy the event-horizon of the
mass prevents light (meaning) escaping.
The question must be asked as to whether
Baudrillard is borrowing the terminology from science
(the code and the black hole of the mass) and is
therefore only metaphorizing a process which occurs at
a different level. One response to the problem of the
status of scientific metaphor is to consider the
language as one element of what he calls pataphysics,
"the science of imaginary solutions". Pataphysics
serves a double function in Baudrillard's writing. At
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one level it is an expression of his anti-cultural
instincts. The mass is a pataphysical elaboration of
this anti-intellectual impulse. Secondly pataphysics
is a simulation of science, but of a science of the
impossible. In this way it traverses the limitations
of traditional science which, according to Jarry is
grounded not on genuine experimentation and the journey
into the unknown but convention and utility. Moreover
it neither presumes a world or any relation of theory
to a world:
Pataphysics will examine the laws governing
exceptions, and will explain the universe
supplementary to this one; or less ambitiously,
will describe a universe which can be and should
be - envisaged in place of the traditional one,
since the laws that are supposed to have been
discovered in the traditional universe are also
correlations of exceptions, albeit more frequent
ones, but in any case accidental data which,
reduced to the status of unexceptional exceptions
possess no longer even the virtue of originality. 6
This science of exceptions can therefore also be
understood as the science of remainders, of that which
is excluded from the conventional and traditional order
of the world. Furthermore, in Baudrillard's hands this
science will aim at its own disappearance in order to
"choke" its own meanings. It is a simulation of the
"true" world thereby absorbing it. Therefore in his
analysis Baudrillard attempts to simulate the masses
absorption of meaning:
We must manage to choke back the meanings we
produce - which always tend to be produced. If a
theory - or a poem, or any other kind of writing
(it's not endemic to theory) - indeed manages to
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implode to constitute a concentric vortex of
implosion, then there are no other effects of
meaning. Theory has an immediate effect - a very
material one as well of being a void. (FB p.128)
So theory, in simulating the mass, is not like a
void but is a void. 6
 In a sleight of hand, while
describing the effects, without determination, of the
mass Baudrillard maintains, and hopes, that it is not
representable. It has no meaning and is not of the
second level order of representation.
A pressing question then is how does Baudrillard
intend to disappear. The possibility of such a project
is signalled in the word `Shadow' in the title. In an
interview he describes the effect of "shadowing" by the
artist Sophie Calle:
For no particular reason...she followed a stranger
in the street; she became his shadow and thus in a
certain sense, erased his traces, acted as his
destiny...She herself is nothing.
	 She has no
desire in all this. She doesn't want to go
anywhere, even though she follows him all the way
to Venice. She doesn't want to find out what he
is or to know his life. She is the proof that,
although he thought he was going somewhere, in
fact he is going nowhere. Where he supposedly is
there's no one. (FB p.118)
The Mass, as shadowed (and erased) by Baudrillard,
is in effect nothing, and is a concept with no
theoretical destiny or horizon of meaning. It would
not be difficult to draw parallels with the concerns of
recent deconstructive thought and the putting under
"erasure" of concepts. However Baudrillard would want
to emphasise that this operation (like the mass) has no
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significance whatsoever. I will show the development
of this in the pataphysics of "disappearance" in
chapter seven.
The mass therefore unlike the social must be
understood in terms of its "radical lack of
definition", its indifference.	 It is not a body of
opinion or a collective consciousness. Like the
simulacrum, of which it is a phenomenon, it cannot be
exchanged for its equivalence in a real by
representation. Baudrillard's interest in the social
is not just based on its apparent theoretical
inadequacy as a term rooted in a previous order of
simulation. It is important because it is paradigmatic
of the 'relation' in general. The very definition of
the social implies relation. Baudrillard's analysis of
metaphysics and the political economy of the sign is
directed at the disenchanted relations that capital
imposes though its various exchange values. Relation
in general, according to Baudrillard, is disenchanted
and is the cornerstone of idealism and metaphysics -
the relation of equivalence of the identity principle,
of representation, of subject and object and the
relation imposed by the logic of cause and effect to
name but a few. This manouvre is an attempt by
Baudriilard to provide a materialist basis to his
account of the mass, and also his conception of his own
writing. By stressing this I want to emphasise his
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affinity with the concerns of recent continental
philosophy
The mass therefore does not designate a relation
and its space of activity is not a space of relations.
It is not a function of a theoretical subject-object
polarity. It does not have the negative force of the
social and cannot be alienated. As I have said
Baudrillard calls it the ne-uter, the neutral into
which all distinction and difference is absorbed.
The mass absorbs all relations directed at it,
substituting fascination for contemplation or
meditation. He argues that all the great systems of
meaning whether, from religion or revolution, only ever
held a profane fascination for the mass. He defines
fascination as the "extreme intensity of the neutral".
In this way the fascinated mass exerts intense
implosive force on all the sober referents aimed at it.
The mass leaves meaning to the civil servants of truth:
They [the mass] have never been affected by the
Idea of God, which has remained a matter for the
clergy, not by anguish over sin and personal
salvation. What they have retained is the
enchantment of saints and martyrs; the last
judgement; the spectacle of the Church; the
immanence of ritual - the contrast to the
transcendence of the Idea. (SSM p.7)
Hence the mass must be radically distinguished
from the social. The social would be one particular
rational, and historical destiny projected on to the
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mass. This "enchantment" of the mass has many sources
and parallels, one of which is in the renaissance
understanding and practice of the art of politics.
This art of politics has a symbolic resonance
unconnected to any set of political ends. He argues
that the concept of politics which emerged with
Machiavelli and ecclesiastical politics initially
emerged as a strategy, or a game of signs with a
complete disregard for ends. Hence Machiavellianism
would not be understood as the cynical pursuit of power
but rather as an exercise in virtuosity. The political
space is of the same order of the simulated
perspectival space of the period. It is a theatre of
games rather than representation and was not a function
of a rational quest for power, or of a democratic,
representational imperative. According to Baudrillard
the insight and sophistication of the players lies in
the recognition that power is dead once it is aimed at
as an object, substance or reference, for power never
functions according to the real and its relations:
Power did not always consider itself as power, and
the secret of the great politicians was to know
that power does not exist—[it knows]..that it is
only a perspectival space of simulation, as was
the pictorial Renaissance...This secret of power's
lack of existence...also belonged to the great
theologians and inquisitors who knew that God does
not exist, that God is dead...Power is truly
sovereign when it grasps this secret and confronts
itself with that very challenge. When it ceases
to do so and pretends to find a truth, a substance
or a representation (in the will of the people,
etc.)...it dies in effect at the hands of that
infatuation with itself. (FF pp.58-59)
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A change occurs in the eighteenth century,
specifically with the French Revolution.	 The ludic
origin of the political mutates into the
representational. Just as perspective changed from a
mechanics of the ludic into 'the place where a truth of
space and of representation was inscribed' (SSM p.17),
so the political was invested via representation with a
referent: the will of the people.
Baudrillard argues that for a period, under the
sway of liberalism a balance existed between the
competing claims of the political and the social - the
political in this sense designating the legislative and
institutional forms of the state as opposed to the
newly signified needs of the social (people).
However, two interdependent forces disrupt this
balance - capital and its marxist critique. The
theoretical premiss of marxism sought the end of the
political through the transparency of the social - no
need for the representation of the people. The
legislative and institutional forms of the political
are completely harnessed to the demands of the social.
Yet according to Baudrillard the social was initially
posited by Capital as a momentary source of value and
has already surpassed the particular historical model
which required the social. The transparency of the
social as the end of certain marxist analyses has
137
occurred but not because of the revolutionary order
which was prophesied therein. The dynamic which brings
this about is simulation - the current form of
Capital's circulation. The implosion of perspectival
space occurs through the absolute saturation of space
by the simulation of the social. All interstices of
space are filled by this relation. It is a question of
the logic and telos of the social attaining the purity
of its own immanent presentation, actualised and
realised thereby reaching its own fantastic limit and
vanishing point. He writes that
at this point of absolute reference, of
omnipresence and diffraction in all of physical
and mental space... its specificity is lost, its
historical quality and its ideality vanish in
favour of a configuration where not only the
political becomes volatilised but where the social
itself no longer has any name. Anonymous. The
Mass. The Masses. (SSM pp.18-19)
When Baudrillard writes, approvingly, of this
'reversal of energy' he is describing the process of
implosion. There is no longer a referential equivalent
corresponding to the social. He argues that the only
referent of the social is the simulated one of the
'silent majority' produced by the simulacra of polling,
surveying and testing. I will return to the question
of how this functions presently.
What I want to focus on are the effects of the
mass. In so far as the social is a particular
orientation of perspective space he suggests that just
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as perspective is a simulation model, a simulated and
unified configuration of the real, so is the social.
Hence the rational destinies in general (democracy,
revolution,emancipation, etc,) and the idea of relation
in particular, which are imposed by the social, are
delusory. They are of interest to Baudrillard only
because they are fascinating effects of the simulated
truth of perspective space. Furthermore the idea that
increased socialisation is produced as an effect of the
rational expansion and extension of capital, conceals
the violence, symbolic and otherwise, as the dynamic at
the heart of things:
The social itself must be considered a model of
simulation and a form to be overthrown since it is
a strategic form of value brutally positioned by
capital and then idealized by critical thought.
(FF p.53)
In The Precession of Simulacra Baudrillard argued
that viewing capital as accountable for its abuse,
violence and injustice is a fantasy of enlightenment
thought. Criticising capital for being immoral is a
complete misrecognition of what is essential to it.
Capital is not of the order of morality or rationality.
Critical thought understands it as an instrumental
force capable of being harnessed to the needs of the
social through economic rationality. 	 Capital both
produces and destroys the social but the violence by
which it does this has nothing to do with the social:
Ultimately things have never functioned socially,
but symbolically, magically, irrationally, etc.
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Which implies the formula: capital is a defiance
of society. That is to say that this perspective,
this panoptic machine of truth, of rationality, of
productivity which is capital, is without
objective finality, without reason...(SSM pp.68-
69)
What is increasingly fundamental to his analysis
of the mass is that it is a model of a non-critical
response. It is not a model of resistance to the
current form of capital - simulation. Recalling the
sentiments expressed in The Precession of Simulacra,
the scandal of Capital is that there is no scandal.
This is important to note, for if in The Mirror of
Production Baudrillard gestures towards an alternative
conception of value as a form of resistance, in his
conception of the mass he denies the theoretical
premiss (alternative conceptions of value) upon which
such resistance depends. He cites recent sociological
analyses which propose that the mass is not the passive
receiver of the messages addressed at them by Capital,
the media and advertising. On this reading the mass
decode the messages imposed upon them and re-code them
according to their own codes and values. 7 Baudrillard
argues that such a process depends on a quasi-
anthropological conception of the mass as a tribe with
its own codes, structures and values. Such forms of
identity no longer exist if they were ever anything
other than an anthropological fantasy - a retro-
narrative of wishful thinking:
Critical thought judges and chooses, it produces
differences, it is by selection that it presides
over meaning. The masses, on the other hand, do
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not choose, they do not produce differences but a
lack of differentiation...(SSM p.35)
The mass as a simulacrum has no capacity for
producing difference, for making judgements or
evaluations. It exorcizes their possibility. This is
of course the Platonic nightmare of the simulacrum. It
induces a paralysis of reason.	 In the world of
simulation	 reason	 cannot	 produce	 difference,
distinction, value or hierarchy.
It must be emphasised therefore that when
Baudrillard describes the effects of the mass he is not
proposing a plan of action or a preferred strategy in
responding to Capital. There is no rational or just
course of action. He does not make the mass represent
a political or emancipatory force. The mass is an
immanent moment of the system of simulation, the focus
for testing surveying and information:
The mass realises that paradox of being both an
object of simulation (it only exists at the point
of convergence of all the media waves which depict
it) and a subject of simulation, capable of
refracting all the models and of emulating them by
hypersimulation (its hyperconformity, an immanent
form of humour). (SSM p.30)
The mass is not beyond the system through bearing
some transcendent order of value. It may be said that
in order to understand Baudrillard's own agenda, he can
be conceived to be emulating the immanent humour of the
mass. What Baudrillard means by the hyperconformity of
the mass is its response, inertia, silence and
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muteness, to all the simulation models orbiting around
it. These models - statistics, advertising, revolution
all attempt to represent the mass - which are
communicated, directed towards, and simulating the mass
are absorbed through an 'ironic fidelity'. It is a
simulation of obedience and passivity, but it may also
be the simulation of revolution and activity depending
on the discourse which attempts to manipulate, produce,
discover or emancipate its object:
From this would follow, in the literal sense, a
pataphysics or science of imaginary solutions, a
science of the simulation or hypersimulation of an
exact, true, objective world, with its universal
laws, including the delirium of those who
interpret it according to these laws. The masses
and their involuntary humor would introduce us to
a pataphysics of the social which ultimately would
relieve us of all that cumbersome metaphysics of
the social. (SSM pp.33-34)
The position of the mass is analogous to that of
the Tasaday Indians in the refusal to be made into an
object.
Baudrillard proposes that the only equivalent to
this refusal of meaning is terrorism. 	 However
terrorism is not the expression, medium or
representative of the 'frustrated' silence of the mass.
On the one hand, and contrary to its own beliefs, the
effectiveness of terrorism does not lie in its defence
of and solidarity (a relation) with the repressed. On
the other hand it is not a threat to the state.
Terrorism, like the mass, is effective only when it has
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no direction or objective and is without determination.
Baudrillard argues that any attempt to attribute a
rational destination for terrorism, or to subject it to
a logic of cause and effect, gives foresight to
something which replicates the 'blindness' of a system
of indifferent simulation. The system does not work
according to the logic of value (and therefore use-
value)	 but is	 indiscriminate and indifferent
simulation.
	 Like the mass there are no political
objectives or consequences to terrorism. Hence the
targets are also replicas of this undifferentiated
system - anybody:
Paradoxically, it seems that the innocent pay the
crime of being nothing, of being lotless, of
having been dispossessed of their name by an
equally anonymous system whose purest incarnation
they become. (SSM p.56)
Baudrillard argues that its only resonance is in
the "shock effect" in the media. However, it is not
quite correct to say "in" the media. For terrorism is
of the order of fascination ("the extreme intensity of
the neutral", SSM p.58). 8 The mythical agenda on both
sides of terrorism miss the indifferent essence to
media as absorbers and neutralisers of meaning - its
senseless, mute, indifferent fascination. Terrorism,
as a medium is in Baudrillard's conception an event.
An event is without causality or finality. Therefore
there is no (mise-en) scene or context for it. All
attempts to attribute meaning to it, to 'exterminate'
it with meaning is an attempt to deflect its nullity
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which is its implosive force. Why is this bombardment
of sense necessary? Baudrillard argues that the hyper-
reaction of the system - via information, the media,
politicians, talking heads - is a hysteria of the real.
There is an excessive proliferation of meaning in an
attempt to resignify it as a moment of the real. Or
more to the point, to reinvest the real with meaning.
Yet, for Baudrillard, the effectiveness and challenge
of terrorism resides in the response it provokes:
the virulence comes from the implosion - and the
death of the terrorists (or of the hostages) is of
this implosive order: the abolition of value, of
meaning, of the real, at a determined
point...Around this tiny point, the whole system
of the real condenses, is tetanized, and launches
all its anti-bodies. It becomes so dense that it
goes beyond its own laws of equilibrium and
involutes in its own over-effectiveness. At
bottom, the profound tactic of simulation (for
it's very much a matter of simulation in the
terrorist model, and not of real death) is to
provoke an excess of reality, and to make the
system collapse under an excess of reality. (SSM
p.120)
The questionable circumstances surrounding the
death of the German terrorist Andreas Baader works to
the advantage of the system. It introduces the truth
via this doubt thus shifting the focus from the
fascination of death (its futility) to the truth of the
death, valorising death - "How did he die? What does
it mean? How do we represent this?" Hence anyone
calling into question the role of the German government
in all of this sustains the real. If there is any
reality to terrorism it is in its threat to the
"social" - its institutions and its value:
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Whether or not one accepts its brutality, it alone
truly marks the end of the political and of the
social. It alone betrays this reality of a
violent implosion of all our systems of
representation. (SSM p.53)
Its violence is not of a political or real order
but the violence of a challenge to the real.
Baudrillard's brief fascination with terrorism as a
simulation model is clearly of a piece with his account
of the end of the expansive, explosive systems and the
representative forms of their simulation. He is not
alone among recent philosophers who have understood
terrorism to be paradigmatic of a contemporary
problematic.	 However it will become clear
Baudrillard's analogy of terrorism and the mass renders
his analysis markedly different from other contemporary
considerations of terrorism. As far as Baudrillard is
concerned they would be too meaningful, underwritten by
value.
Both Lyotard and Eco, as sometime chroniclers of
"post-modernity", isolate terrorism while making it a
function of the changing interests of the system of
power. Lyotard understands terrorism as a violent
displacement of the question and pragmatics of the
"just" - the just, like the simulacrum, precludes a
ground or criteria of discrimination and judgement. He
gives the example of a kidnapping in which the
kidnapped is treated as a means, thus betraying a basic
Kantian edict. Threats of death are directed not at
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him but at a third party - the state. As in
Baudrillard's analysis, terrorism distorts its effects
through an improbable pedagogical imperative, when it
aims at public opinion. Hence terrorism may be a
function of the state as well as urban guerillas.
Without passing judgement he distinguishes the stake of
death in terrorist blackmail addressed to a third party
from war in which death and violence is a two-sided
(immanent) affair. He argues therefore that the
destruction of an American army computer in Heidelberg
is an act of war rather than terrorism.
Eco's understanding of terrorism is superficially
similar to some elements of Baudrillard's form of
analysis.
	 It is precisely because of such
similarities, particularly concerning power and
'resistance', that both are generally understood to be
post-modern writers. Concerning this notion of power
in the modern state, Eco argues that the Red Brigades'
attempt to strike at the heart of the state, supports a
concept of power that no longer exists - of ideology,
manipulation and direct repression which is controlled
from some central source. In fact it encourages the
idea of the state that has passed with the demise of
the Gutenberg Galaxy and its replacement by a post-
mechanical order of information and communication. The
network and limits of power in this order are not bound
by the geography of the state.
	 Terrorism of the
conventional kind is misdirected;
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Only the Red Brigades, those last incurable
romantics of Catholic-papist origin, still think
the state has a heart and that this heart can be
wounded; and they fail because the kidnapping of
one Moro, or ten or a hundred, doesn't weaken the
system, but rather recreates the consensus around
the symbolic ghost of its "heart", wounded and
outraged.9
Eco, with an instrumental view of technology,
suggests that Itechno'-terrorism is better suited to
the new situation. Moreover the technological
"terrorism" he entertains is non-violent directed only
at the simulated consensus essential to the miantanance
of order. It is aimed at the periphery of a system
whose "power" functions at that level. He gives an
example of the technology of photocopying. Rather than
buying a book students in effect expropriate property
through the extensive duplication. This has only
limited effectiveness as publishing houses raise the
price of books to the extent that only institutions and
libraries buy them. Nevertheless they recoup their
revenues through for example halving the print but
doubling the price. Hence its results and aims are not
revolution but resistance, harrassment, staying in the
game. Of course for Baudrillard the notion of
resistance is fundamentally another metaphysics - of
opposition, agency and meaning. In Fatal Strategies he
returns to the model of terrorism with his
transpolitical concept of the hostage and I will
discuss that in chapter seven.
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As I have pointed out Douglas Kellner for one
criticises the political limitations of Baudrillard's
concept of the mass. Yet it is clear that Baudrillard
uses it as a starting point for the examination of a
whole range of issues: critical negativity; relation;
sociology and theory in general; the winding down and
implosion of the order of production; the state of
politics in the hyperreal; and terrorism.
There is one other dynamic fundamental to the idea
of the mass, and that is the conceptualisation and
operations of the media. In the following chapter I
will address the role of media as a process of
simulation and as constitutive of the mass.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE MEDIA IS THE MASS(AGE)
"...through images we dream of the immortality of
protozoa." (EC p.36)
In the last chapter I outlined the different
functions the concept of mass serves for Baudrillard.
In its unrepresentability it marks the limit of all
critical, rational and productive activity. For this
reason it could be considered the remainder of
simulation. It is indifferent to its 'interests' as
conceived by any enlightened project. It absorbs and
circulates the various messages projected at it. The
latter is the vain attempt to shore up the real and its
referents. Baudrillard's account of the mass, modern
media and simulation are informed and driven by an
agenda of anti-humanism.
	 They mark the limit of
fundamental
	 principles
	 of	 western
	 thought.
Paradoxically they are the end of a dynamic whereby the
same wins out over the different. According to
Baudrillard the current melodrama of difference is yet
another narrative in the service of an absract utopia
of eventual reconciliation.
For Baudrillard the fact that the mass circulates
indifferently all messages entitles it to be considered
as a medium. In this chapter I will be looking at how
this expands and clarifies what is at stake for him in
the mass. In doing this I will examine the question of
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the media as conceived by Baudrillard. Baudrillard has
a certain notoriety as a sometime theorist of the
modern media.	 This he would argue is based on a
fundamental misreading of the simulacrum. This
misunderstanding, as I have pointed out, is the idea
that the simulacrum is an image. From this perspective
the simulation of the modern media is considered merely
as the most sophisticated form of image production and
image perfection. However for Baudrillard the question
of media is not reducible to the global and psychic
colonisation of the unconscious as perceived by the
film director Wim Wenders.1
Baudrillard brings to bear an an entirely
different set of problems on the question of the media.
If his early work does consider the media in a somewhat
conventional way, though never really as the empty
peddler of ideology, he develops his account in line
with the issue of simulation. His analysis owes much
to McLuhan. This largely forgotten media prophet is
resurrected by Baudrillard. Not for his optimistic
evolutionary vision but because McLuhan refused the
instrumental view of technology. Despite his apparent
radicalism, he recognised in a traditionally
anthropological way the transformations in subjectivity
wrought by media technologies. For example:
Man the food gatherer reappears incongruously as
information gatherer. In this role electronic man
is no lss a nomad than his paleolithic
ancestors.4
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Though Baudrillard does not have a 'tribal' view
of technology he harnesses McLuhuan's essential insight
to his own anti-humanistic agenda. Modern media are
worthy of attention in that far from extending man, the
subject becomes a terminal in this network of
information. Or as I will show, and this recalls the
reversion of the mass, a projecting screen.
With respect to media Baudrillard is also
interested in the more general question of relation.
He will argue that, paradoxically, modern media are
destructive of relation. It is not even as if they
impose a false or delusory relation. However this does
not make him a technophobe as Kellner suggests. In the
end though it is with the concept of mass that
Baudrillard draws out the full implications of modern
media as the condition for the impossibility of
communication.
Baudrillard works with a variety of conceptions of
the media, each addressing different issues. These can
be categorised as the following; media understood as
the new communications media; the idea of a medium in
general as establishing a relation; modern media as a
form of testing; and the equivalence of media and the
mass.
It could be said that one of the constitutive
elements of the mass is the media. Yet Baudrillard
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would also like to argue that the mass is a medium. So
what does the media mean for Baudrillard? In what
follows I will address the different conceptions that
Baudrillard has of media - from his early semi-formal
appreciation of it as a form of control via the code,
to his later descriptions of it as inseparable from
that which he will identify as the current disenchanted
simulacrum.
I would argue that Baudrillard's reputation as a
sometime media theorist is misplaced. Baudrillard, as
much as any theorist of media, describes and constructs
media as a concept in such a way as to support his own
theoretical project. Hence the shifts in emphasis and
attributes of media as his work develops. This is true
to the extent that it would be hard to abstract and
isolate a concept of media from his own particular
philosophical agenda. It would therefore be difficult
to "apply" generally, outside the limits of its place
in Baudrillard's work. I would suggest that the
notoriety and difficulty in Baudrillard's conception of
media is due to the sameness of media theory. Most
theories of the media rest on some notion of ideology
and semiology. Baudrillard does flirt with ideology in
his early work on media. He also limits his analysis
here to media as T.V., Radio etc. However he will
reject this and build on other ideas developed therein.
However Baudrillard's non-ideological approach is often
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mistaken for some sort of pure identification with
"the" media. Mark Poster writes:
Baudrillard has developed a theory to make
intelligible one of the fascinating and perplexing
aspects of advanced industrial society: the
proliferation of communications through the
media...The new media employ the montage principle
of film (unlike print) and time-space distancing
(unlike face to face conversation) to structure a
new linguistic reality. Baudrillard theorizes
from the vantage point of the new media to argue
that a new culture has emerged...3
There are a number of flaws with this, an analysis
of which will help to specify Baudrillard's position.
In general, the theoretical direction of his work does
not support Poster's claim. It is but one element.
With respect to modern media, Baudrillard, taking
McLuhan's logic of the medium to its limit will assert,
that not only is there no message, but there is no
medium. If there is no medium (which paradoxically is
that which defines modern media, for there is nothing
to mediate) one can hardly take its side. Furthermore
a central feature of this is the destruction of
perspective space. The latter of course is one element
that recommends modern media to Baudrillard. There are
no vantage points. This is important to note as it
informs Baudrillard's later conception of his own
writing. Furthermore, Poster seems to suggest that
Baudrillard's writing reflects the techniques of
montage used in film. This line of argument possibly
stems from a particular understanding of recent
continental philosophy, in which the discourse of the
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theorist reflects the object being theorised. This is
the idea of an immanent presentation of the rules and
concepts derived through the analysis. It is often
understood in terms of 'self-reflexivity'. The problem
with this perception is that there is the danger of re-
introducing the subject, vis-a-vis self-reflexivity,
into theories which attempt to problematise
subjectivity. The result is a untheorised form and
distant relation of hermeneutics. However I would
argue that while Baudrillard becomes increasingly aware
of this problem of theory it is not elaborated in the
way proposed by Poster. I have already addressed
Baudrillard's suspicion of meaning wherever it appears.
If the media are to be theorised as function of general
communications, Baudrillard's work would have little to
offer.
In effect, he deconstructs the term "media", to
show that contrary to common preconceptions the media
does not mediate. The founding principle of modern
communications is non-communication. 4 The single most
consistent thread in Baudrillard's work on the modern
media is the proposition that it (like the mass)
fabricates non-communication. Hence any theoretical
expression and reflection of the media will not be
found in montage but in non-communication. This
increasingly becomes the desired destiny of his work.
In what follows I will show the development of this
project.	 I will also emphasise that montage for
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Baudrillard is like a movable feast. It's meaning
varies from place to place. What is consistent, and
this cannot be over stressed, is that he never
considers it to be merely a modern, or more
sophisticated form of representation.
In the early essay "Requiem for the Media",
Baudrillard still envisions some form of symbolic
exchange as an instance of defiance to the political
economy of the sign. In it he addresses himself to
contemporary theoretical views of the media:
1. McLuhanism - the medium is the message. The
modern media are revolutionary firstly because of their
electronic structure and secondly because they are
tactile. The surpassing of one medium (roads by the
telegraph) by another medium is a revolutionary event.
It produces unforeseen transformations in human
perception and social organisation.
2. Modern media ("the media") are subject to another
power or control. The assumption here is that by
appropriating the modern communications media, changing
the content or "the message", one changes media
effects.	 The form remains unquestioned.	 It is
essentially an instrumental view of media. It also
neglects the wider historical conception of media such
as adopted by McLuhan.
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3. The new electronic media by their very essence are
a socialist and democratic form of open communication,
are immanently rational and are a universal source of
information. The project here is to liberate this
potential through the extension of the technological
means.
Though Baudrillard ultimately rejects McLuhan's
vision of the media, his perspective on media as forms
of circulation place his work closer to McLuhan than to
other models and conceptions of media. However he
would reject the epistemological imperative at the core
of McLuhan's axiomatic of 'the medium is the message'.
A medium is a relation, and its effects are both social
and psychic.	 For example, McLuhan's Understanding
Media is subtitled The Extensions of Man. Media
understood in this way are not technological
accessories of an immutable, ahistorical subjectivity.
For this reason media are not just the disseminator of
images. Even on McLuhan's reading, even if the latter
were true, it would only have been a recent event in
the evolution of communications.
Baudrillard focuses on the instrumentalist nature
of the last two propositions particularly in so far as
they have been proposed by various theorists of the
left. The main figure in this instance is Hans
Enzensburger. He notes that left theorists have been
suspicious of mass-media culture as the vehicle of
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ideological manipulation but his alternative optimistic
view is on Baudrillard's account equally naive.
Enzensburger argues that the media need to be liberated
from their present purpose and put in the service of
open-communication and democratic exchange. However,
this assumes that the media is the merchandising and
advertising of a dominant ideology with its (economic)
determinant somewhere else.
In contrast with Poster's assumption about modern
media, Baudrillard argues that what is specific to
modern media (unlike roads and railways for example),
is its fabrication of non-communication. It is this
which constitutes the current forms of power and
through which social control function. It does this
through the imposition of a code. Most commentators
recognise the latitude Baudrillard gives himself by not
having a consistent or coherent account of the code.
In the last chapter for example simulation was shown to
be based on the genetic or binary code. In his early
work on media, I would suggest that in this instance
what is at stake for Baudrillard in the code is the
simulation of a relation. The media precludes any
response, any responses are what he calls response
simulation by which the exchange is already integral to
the transmission. Phone-ins and feedback are examples
of such reversibility without reciprocity.
	 He also
cites referenda as being the mass-media par excellence
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in which the response is already determined by the
question:
It is speech that answers itself via the simulated
detour of a response, and here as well the
absolutization of speech under the formal guise of
exchange is the definition of power. (CPES p. 177)
This passage is a good example of the residual
commitment to symbolic exchange in this essay. Speech
in this quote is the moment of reciprocity of symbolic
exchange which is replaced by the reversibility of
feedback. In this essay Baudrillard is
uncharacteristically tempted into considering this
essential form of modern media as intrinsically
ideological. It reproduces all possible events in its
own form. Therefore his argument against Enzensburger
rests on the fundamental abstraction of the media in
its presentation of events. Despite the optimism of
Enzensburger, Baudrillard argues that all events,
"political" or otherwise have the status of a fait
divers. Local events are diffused to the extent that
they acquire an abstract universal historical aura. As
the world becomes smaller and the political import of
local events grows, the miscellany of the media invades
the political. His argument is not that this
miscellany trivialises but that it imposes its own
model on all categories of events:
In fact the essential media is the model. What is
mediatized is not what comes off the daily press,
out of the tube or on the radio: it is what is re-
interpreted as the sign form, articulated into
models, and administered by the code...At best,
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what can occur under the aegis of the media is a
formal surpassing of the categories of fait divers
and politics, and of their traditional separation,
but only the better to assign them together to the
same general code. (CPES pp.175-176)
In this way Baudrillard denounces both the
Orwellian myth of the media as an essentially
terroristic form of social control or as a resource of
liberatory potential.	 These two positions are
underwritten by a bipolar theory of communication such
as that proposed by Roman Jakobsen, viz;
Transmitter - Message - Receiver.
Encoder - Message - Decoder.
This analysis of Jakobsen guarantees the terrorism
of the code. It exchanges, distributes and reproduces
itself among the two terms as message. It also
provides a linear and teleological account of media and
communication. The message always arrives at its
destination. Moreover this process is analogous to the
system of abstract economic exchange in which people no
longer exchange but the system is reproduced through
them. For this reason any attempt at political
intervention at the level of content the media will
necessarily fail, for in aiming political acts at the
media it forgets the media's 'pursuit of the political
act in order to depoliticize it' (CPES p. 174). Thus
Baudrillard argues that the left-right distinction of
traditional politics has been rendered meaningless by
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the media and credit should be given where it's due.
Ultimately, he argues:
In fact the essential Medium is the Model. What
is neutralised is not what comes off the daily
press, out of the tube, or on the radio: it is
what is re-interpreted by the sign-form,
articulated into models, and administered by the
code (just as the commodity is not what is
produced industrially, but what is mediatized by
the exchange system of abstraction). (CPES pp.175-
176)
One reason I would avoid calling Baudrillard's
approach in this essay ideological, is the response he
proposes. He rejects Eco's formulation of resistance
through the re-interpretation of the media code. Eco
cites the post 1 68' popularity of graffiti in
advertising as an expression of this resistance, as a
takeover of a media form. For Baudrillard graffiti is
effective not as a content but because on the street it
breaks the form of non-response imposed by the media.
As I noted in the last chapter, Baudrillard is
sceptical of the I techno-terrorism' advocated by Eco, a
fraying of the edges of the system. What is
significant about graffiti for Baudrillard, is not that
it communicates, or communicates better, but that it
establishes a reciprocal relation rather than the
mediated reversible one:
At the limit [of the technological code) to be
sure, it is the very concept of medium that
disappears - and must disappear: speech exchanged
dissolves the idea and function of the medium, and
of the intermediary, as does symbolic land
reciprocal exchange...Reciprocity comes into being
through the destruction of mediums per se.
"People meet their neighbours for the first time
160
while watching their apartments burn down." (CPES
p.177)
In this way symbolic exchange is destructive of
relation and media. I want to argue that Baudrillard
will abandon the 'face to face' described here in
favour of a less meaningful simulation of media's
essential non-communication.
Baudrillard after developing the analysis of
simulation, comes to a different appreciation of media
non-communication. The notion of media is also less
limited. There is a shift in emphasis in Baudrillard's
later books from analysis of the form of the media, to
an analysis of its commonly perceived effects in the
dissemination of information. There are two strands to
which I will attend.
	 Both concern the most common
conceptions of media.
	 Firstly the question of the
'spectacle' which Baudrillard replaces with the notion
of fascination. Secondly the related function of
information, not as a possibility for the expansion of
knowledge, but as a testing which destroys the distance
of the spectacle.
Baudrillard	 is	 sometimes
	 identified	 as
nihilistically affirming the idea of the 'society of
the spectacle' or a 'post-modern carnival'. He
certainly has some affinity with Debord's conception in
that they are both concerned with an apparent
transformation of forms of control. However Debord's
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analysis is traditionally Marxist.	 This fact alone
would limit their resemblance.
Debord's spectacle is an ideological operation
whereby capital reproduces abstract social relations
through mediatization. The spectacle refers to the
operation in which capital has reached such a stage of
development that, no longer disguising itself in
abstract social relations, it is objectified in the
spectacle.
The	 spectacle	 is	 the	 existing	 order's
uninterrupted discourse about itself, its
laudatory monologue. It is the self-portrait of
power in the epoch of its totalitarian management
of the conditions of existence.
The spectacle of Capital is the extension of the
commodity into all areas of human affairs;
The spectacle is capital to such a degree of
accumulation that it becomes an image.6
Reality, as a result of capitalist accumulation
has been commodified to the extent that all objects and
relations are the vehicles and expressions of the
system, and this system is essentially alienating.
Capital still functions according to accumulation and
the abstraction of exchange value. Debord's criticism
is directed towards its perversion of use-value:
In the inverted society of the spectacle, use
value (which was implicitly contained in exchange
value) must now be explicitly proclaimed precisely
because of its factual reality is eroded by the
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overdeveloped commodity economy and becausy
counterfeit life requires a pseudo-justification./
Therefore behind exchange value, no matter how
distorted and abused, lies the factual reality of use-
value.
There are many reasons other than the immediately
obvious ones concerning use-value, alienation etc., for
Baudrillard rejecting such a model. In "The Order of
Simulacra" he put forward the model of the DNA code as
the current model of simulation whereby Capital
functions.	 The binary regulation of the code
neutralises all differences - especially the difference
between reality and simulation. One expression of this
is the operations of referenda, polling and testing
which produces a circular response.
Baudrillard is particularly interested in
Benjamin's analysis of filming a actor from a variety
of different positions. The film editor chooses the
frames and composes the film from, as it were, the
series of optical tests.	 This testing is for
Baudrillard more significant than cinema as reproducer
of images. The audience identifies with the camera in
film thus destroying the heretofore theatrical distance
of the actor. The cinema then is not a technologically
advanced system of representation but a model of
scientific experimentation. What he wants to emphasise
here is that film generally understood as a visual
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medium, has its `sense' elsewhere, in the tactile. He
cites the dadaist cinematic project which understands a
film as a `projectile' which invades the reflective
space of the audience. The tactility of the angles
through angles and edits stimulate the audience and
demands an instantaneous response:
No contemplation is possible. The images fragment
perception into successive sequences, into stimuli
toward which there can be only instantaneous
response, yes or no - the limit of an abbreviated
reaction. Film no longer allows you to question.
It questions you and directly. It is in this
sense that the modern media call for, according to
McLuhan, a greater degree of immediate
participation, an incessant response, a total
plasticity. (Sim p.119)
What is at stake here is a transformation of the
senses and the mutation into the tactile. There are
some distinctions to be made in Baudrillard's use of
McLuhan here. McLuhan separates out `modern media'
into hot and cold forms. A cool medium, such as the
telephone or television, is low definition, it
transmits little information and requires therefore
greater participation on behalf of the participant.
Film, which Baudrillard refers to, is high definition
because it extends one sense with high intensity.
McLuhan calls it `being well filled with data'. The
medium such as film therefore, not only requires little
response but is a form of circular testing.
	 Its
circularity derives from the code which already
anticipates the response.	 Unlike his analysis in
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"Requiem for the Media", media demand and determine a
response.
At this point he understands the cinematic
technique of montage as a coding and the viewer's
activity is an encoding or a reading. In the later
Evil Demon of Images montage is less a code than the
immanent model of its own form. Here however, the
focus is on the delimited space of media. It has the
form of an integrated circuitry through which this code
circulates. In this way the tactile replaces the
visual not as a new model of sense and communication as
such, but rather as an extension of testing, prodding
and manipulating (in the non-ideological sense):
At the same time as touch loses its sensorial,
sensual value for us ('touching is an interaction
of the senses rather than a simple contact of an
object with the skin') it is possible that it
returns as the strategy of a universe of
communication - but as the field of tactile and
tactical simulation, where the message becomes
'massage' tentacular solicitation, test. (Sim
p.124)
The demise of the visual as a dominant sensory
form of contact and interaction between subject and the
world is brought about through the contraction of space
and this puts paid to the whole metaphysics of
appearance and reality. In another way it is
paradoxically the utopia of metaphysics insofar as it
eradicates all media such as representation. Though
Derrida for example points out ironically that the
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latter was only ever a medium on the quiet, only ever
supplementary.
The hyperreal, as a function of models and
testing, therefore designates an absorption of space.
The system of control no longer operates according to
the perspective space of the panopticon or the
repressive police space. There is a cold promiscuity
of information, a superficial saturation of space, not
an excess of meaning but absorption by media. It is an
environment of tactile stimulation and tactical
simulation of feedback, participation and response
programmed by the code. Context and distinction as a
function of causality are displaced by ambience,
environment and ecology. Hence to speak of a spectacle
makes no sense as there is no stage or theatre which
operates at the limit it establishes between the real
and illusion. There is no distance, perspectival
context, or as will become increasingly clear,
subjectivity for the perception of the spectacle. For
this reason the concept of the spectacle would be
considered by Baudrillard to be a ruse of ideological
thinking. It is no more than a manifestation of the
traditional Marxist account of how capital extends
itself into all areas of (non-economic) life. For
Baudrillard of course the production of the real is not
supplementary to capital or an example of its
ideological distortion of real relations. And despite
the conceptual conflation of simulation and the visual
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it is evident that the effects of the simulation of the
real will not be revealed in an examination of subject
positions with respect to an image-object.
A map of this process may be found in various
developments in recent narrative technique. He argues
that the rhetoric of realism is a guide to the
mutations and modalities of the real and its
disappearance. Once realism is constituted as a style,
he argues, the status of the real is considered
problematic. The duplication of the real is also
destructive. It is symptomatic of a nostalgic need to
duplicate something that has disappeared. Attacks on
the real also play this game. Surrealism still
maintains a correspondence with the real in that it
plays the real off against an imaginary, an
hallucinatory moment which augments and sustains the
intensity of the real. The hyperreal is a superior
form in that it does not play with the real, IRA
conjures up the real's hallucinatory resemblance to
itself. Baudrillard's analysis of recent developments
in art and literature are instructive. He sees the new
novel not as an advance or exploration of narrative
technique but as exemplary of simulation. The new
novel appears a function of the real in the manner in
which it obsessively empties out the real in the
narrative devices of de-subjectification and de-
psychologization.	 This process however is less an
attentiveness to the object than the objectification of
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the pure look. What happens when narrative takes on
the operation of the code is the abolition of relation,
distance and the time of narrative. However, if one is
to take seriously Scott Lash's account of the figural
as the mode of presentation of post-modern cinema, one
would have to say that Baudrillard's analysis at this
point does not match up to such a post-modern paradigm.
The anterior finality of the code always already
anticipates the real, instantaneously. There is
visibility but without perspective (as a function of
time) or relief, through flattening of space. McLuhan
identifies this process in cubism:
cubism, by giving the inside and outside, the top,
bottom, back, and front and the rest, in two
dimensions, drops the illusion of perspective .4.n
favor of instant sensory awareness of the whole.°
Baudrillard would acknowledge the transformation
in space identified here but the sensory 'awareness' is
in the end, for McLuhan, tied to subjectivity.
McLuhan, isolates the possibility of subjectivity from
this simultaneity and instantaneity of sense. It is
always a function of consciousness and conscious
intereaction. Despite a certain ambivalence what
ultimately commends the tactile to Baudrillard is its
undermining of subjectivity. One way of conceiving
this tactile subject, open to the incessant and
instantaneousness of information and sense, is as the
schizophrenic. All distance and future and past time
is dissolved in this information overload. His account
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of this scenario in Symbolic Exchange and Death is
without doubt less positive than it will be in his
later work. And furthermore the schizophrenic will be
regarded as the residue of a second level subject. It
will eventually be replaced by the serial and
genetically reproduced clone.
Nevertheless he suggests that despite the
dominance of the tactile there is a form of looking.
He argues that in the new novel for example there is a
'look' but it is not a look predicated on distance -
that between subject and object for instance. The
narrative technique as a pursuit of a story of time is
replaced by space exploration, and absorption, in the
form of testing:
Syntax and semantics have disappeared - there is
no longer apparition, but instead subpoena of the
object, severe interrogation of its scattered
fragments - neither metaphor or metonymy:
successive immanence under the policing structure
of the look. The "objective" minuteness arouses a
vertigo of reality, a vertigo of death on the
limits of representation-for-the-sake-of-
representation. (Sim p.143)
This vertigo of the hyperreal is therefore not
brought about through external determination, through a
beyond of representation. Representation at its limit
folds over into simulation. According to Baudrillard
what this denotes is a circular seduction given over to
a pleasure, that isn't scopic, of not been seen - a
pure operationality of the look on the surface of
things. This look is no longer tied to the object. It
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is part of a relay. As a relay it abolishes the logic
of cause and effect. It is what he calls a 'circular
seduction' or deterrence through which the subject
disappears. 9 Strictly speaking this marks the demise
of both subject and object. There is nothing to be
exchanged in a system given over to pure circulation.
Baudrillard sets up four possibilities of reading this
vertiginous simulation of the real.
Firstly, there is what he calls a deconstruction
of the real. The real is broken down and its details
appear as the declension of a grammar. Objects, as in
cubism, are flattened and partialised. This would be
similar to metonymy if the object appeared as such.
What occurs of course is simulation.
Secondly, there is the post-modern paradigm of the
reflecting mirrors, a mimesis without origin. Yet the
metaphorics of exile, nostalgia and loss still pervade
this model. Moreover Baudrillard reads this model
remaining within the paradigm of reflexivity (via the
mirror). This is why he wants to avoid the language
and perspective of vision. If there is something of
interest in this for him it is through the substitution
of the mirror by the series. The mirror is still too
romantic and sentimental a model when compared to the
systematic unfolding of the series:
From now on, though this indefinite refraction is
only another type of seriality. The real is no
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longer reflected, instead it feeds off itself till
the point of emaciation. (Sim p.144)
This is exemplary of what Baudrillard will call
the 'anorexic ruins'. The world become a useless body
given over to the frenzied production of the real. He
argues that anorexia is the response of a culture
saturated with truth and abundance.
Thirdly, the serial form is generated from the
model. In this form reflection is thoroughly abolished
precisely because of the serial duplication. The
object's emaciation is an effect of this serial
duplication, its emptying out:
Like those two twin sisters in a dirty picture:
the charnel reality of their bodies is erased by
the resemblance. How to invest your energies in
one, when her beauty is immediately duplicated by
the other?...This generation by model along an
endless chain that in effect recalls the
protozoans and is opposed to a sexual mode that we
tend, inaccurately, to confuse with life itself.
(Sim p.144)
The polarity and contact of hot sexual
reproduction is replaced by the cold contiguity of
asexual reproduction, like the code. Vision and
looking becomes a circular movement, which is in fact
only a simulation of movement, and the look is not
dialectical (subject/object, appearance/reality) but a
relay without direction or end. There is no reflection
cogitative or otherwise.
	 Finally, he suggests that
this operationality of the serial form, its machinic
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process, is only the limit of a more encompassing
system: the digital processing of the binary code:
Not pure repetition, but the minimal separation,
the least amount of inflection between the two
terms, that is to say the "very smallest common
paradigm" that the fiction of sense could possibly
support. (Sim p.145)
This process holds Baudrillard's interest because
it is not structured by relation. Neither is the relay
a function of difference, for that is only simulated,
but the minimal separation for the operation of the
code. This minimal inflection is the limit of the
real, its moment of self-recognition where it becomes
self-generating, hyperreal and is no longer tied to the
real. I would argue therefore that if one is going to
look to Baudrillard for a notion of the post-modern the
architectural analogy of pastiche and allusion
certainly breaks down here. If there is an
architectural analogy here it is with the binary code,
hence Baudrillard's citation of New York's twin towers.
Moreover the architect as a designer of space, of the
play of interiors and exteriors, would have little to
work with here.
Thus far I have attempted to demonstrate that
Baudrillard's interest in media cannot be understood in
terms of the spectacle or t.v. or the simple
proliferation of images. It is a theory about the
media concerning the destruction of media, of relation.
What I want to address here is how this is played out
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in his conception of the mass: in other words, leaving
aside the pun on the tactile, what is at stake in his
proposition that the `Medium is the Mass(age)'.
In his work on the mass, Baudrillard is concerned
with spiking the truisms surrounding information and
the global village. Information is generally
understood as informing, as providing access to
something. It is commonly held to be l a good thing'.
In this way a technological event passes over into a
moral capacity. To be informed is an essential feature
of determining the correct course of action. So
Baudrillard is not just offering an alternative theory
of information, but an account of how information
becomes a ruse of a critical and moral agenda. In
effect, concepts of, and perspectives on, information
and communications are often determined by a morality
of meaning. He presents three commonly held positions
concerning information and their effects in the
understanding of modern forms of communications;
1) The growth in information institutes an equivalent
growth in meaning. The idea here is that access to
information is necessarily Illuminating or informing.
However this essentially positive attribute of
information is qualified by the constant drainage or
waste of sense and signification. According to
Baudrillard the common response to this is the idea of
making communications technology more widely available
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thus reducing the 'alienating' effects of information
overload. This position would be similar to that of
Enzensburger.
2) Information has nothing to do with meaning. It is
of an entirely different order and is purely
instrumental. If this is the case there is no
relationship between the inflation of information and
the reduction of sense. This is information as a code
or grammar and Baudrillard equates it with the
information theory of Claude Shannon. Information is a
coding of various data and is therefore entirely
neutral.
3) There is a direct relationship in which information
disseminated by the media essentially destroys or
neutralises meaning.
The issue here is what is at stake in the
attempted production of meaning. The third option is
the one favoured by Baudrillard. This runs counter to
the conventional view that current technology allows
wider and instant circulation of meaning as
information, McLuhan's Global Village would be an
example of this. The conceptual series here assumes a
natural direction and order to modern communications,
finally underwritten by the subject as decoder and
user:
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information - communication - meaning
And even if there is a proliferation of
information which might appear to run the risk of
oversaturation, it is argued that a necessary residue
(surplus) of meaning remains distributing itself,
'among the interstices of the social fabric' (SSM
p.97). There is in this way no remainder, nothing that
cannot be consumed. Baudrillard proposes that the
increased socialisation which is supposed to obtain
from this is a myth and that there is desocialisation
in direct proportion to the increase in more
sophisticated institutions. He writes:
Thus for all the institutions which have marked
the social (organization, centralization,
production, work, medicine, education, social
security, insurance, including capital itself,
doubtless the most powerful medium of
socialization) it could be claimed that they at
once produce and destroy the social. (SSM p.65)
Such is the case he argues with media and
information. Information is exhausted in the staging
of communication and destroys its own content and
message. He cites phone-ins, and non-directive
interviews which simulate shared communication and
debate. Communication as anti-communication:
It is useless to wonder if it is the loss of
communication which causes this escalation in the
simulacra, or if it is the simulacra which is
there first, with its dissuasive finality, since
it short-circuits in advance all possibility of
communication (precession of the model which puts
an end to the real). It is useless to wonder which
is the first term.	 There is none, it is a
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circular process - that of simulation, that of the
hyperreal; a hyperreality of communication and of
meaning, more real than the real. Hence the real
is abolished (SSM p.99)
This is exemplary of the precession of the model.
This circular process, or simulation, is an implosion
of poles. It short-circuits communication. Implosion,
as I showed with respect to the camera and the
audience, signifies the abolition of distance, and I
will develop this in a moment.
One further point concerning the derivation of the
term implosion. Baudrillard draws partly from quantum
physics and partly from McLuhan. In a passage from
Understanding Media, McLuhan writes:
The stepping up of speed from the mechanical to
the instant electric form reverses explosion to
implosion. In our present electric age the
imploding or contracting energies of our world now
clash with the old expansionist and traditional
patterns of organization. Until recently our
institutions and arrangements, social, political,
and economic, had shared a one-way pattern. We
still think of it as "explosive" or expansive."
Baudrillard, while being continually tempted by
theoretical possibilities of a first principle of
symbolic exchange, also refuses the naturalisation of
explosive, accumulative cultures. One might note
however that the concept of reversibility invoked by
McLuhan against the linear 'one-way' pattern of
previous organisation is apparently an original event.
For McLuhan the motor of change is technological
progress which impose different forms of space and time
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on experience. Spatial implosion is a function of the
speed up in time due to developments in communication:
Our speed-up today is not a slow explosion outward
from centre to margins but an instant iFplosion
and an interfusion of space and functions."
Hence the Global Village. The new forms of
communication institute new forms of perception. This
process can be understood as a technological prosthesis
of modern communications. Benjamin in his account of
the camera recognises the new perception imposed
through the diminution and abolition of distance. In
Benjamin's terms, if the image has lost its aura
through mechanical reproduction so has the natural
object. Just as the object of representation loses tte
semblance of distance, both from the perceiver and the
'real' world, so the natural object is brought closer.
Baudrillard, extending this argument, suggests that the
real disappears under the weight of its omnipresence,
replaced by a pornography of the real. This overcoming
of distance is also an overcoming of time. Paul
Virilio describes this metaphysics of disappearance
which he understands to be the guiding principle of
cinema:
"Film what doesn't exist," the Anglo-Saxon special
effects masters still say, which is basically
inexact: what they are filming certainly does
exist in one manner or another. It's the speed at
which they film that doesn't exist, and is the
pure invention of the cinematographic motor.
About these special effects - or "trick
photography", hardly an academic phrase - Melies
liked to joke, "the trick intelligently applied,
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today allows us to make visible the gupernatural,
the imaginary, even the impossible."14
The issue here is modifying the reality effect
through cinema technique. This is not to say that
reality is preceded by the image. The point is that in
the final instance there is no difference or unique
determination. There is no epistemological or
ontological difference between image and reality.
Moreover to say that reality is a special effect is not
a moral judgement or an epistemological regret.
Baudrillard argues that it is the experience and
awareness of speed that is fundamental to our era. It
eliminates what Benjamin recognises as that which is
essential to an authentic object, its substantive
duration and the historical testament of that duration.
Baudrillard argues that this speed cancels out the
categories of time essential to history, the perception
of depth, and rational connections based on the logic
of cause and effect:
Speed creates pure objects. It is itself a pure
object, since it cancels out the ground and
territorial reference-points, since it runs ahead
of time to annul itself, since it moves more
quickly than its own cause and obliterates that
cause by outstripping it. Speed is the triumph of
effect over cause, the triumph of instantaneity
over time as depth, the triumph of the surface and
pure objectality...(A. p.6)
What `exists' is already superseded by the speed
of its appearance. As in Benjamin's account the time
of the cause or determination of an object disappears.
So if there is an imaginary to the modern media it is a
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simulated one. Baudrillard recognises the imaginary of
the myth-making component of cinema and distinguishes
it from television's complete lack of an imaginary,
simulated or otherwise:
The cold light of television is inoffensive to the
imagination (even that of children) since it no
longer carries any imaginary, for the simple
reason that it is no longer an image. (EDI p.25)
Borrowing the title from a 60's sci-fi television
series, it could be said that the imagination of the
current simulacrum is Lost in Space, a digital and
televisual space. This is crucial to an understanding
of Baudrillard's concept of media and information.
Commentators such as Richard Kearney, who reflect the
instrumental view of modern technology, see in
Baudrillard the nihilism of a putative post-modern
imaginary. For Kearney, who makes a distinction
between 'good' post-modernism and 'bad' post-modernism,
modern technology is neither good nor bad in itself.
Simulation is in effect the 'civilization of the
image', an image which has its determination elsewhere,
in ideology for example. Resonant with Baudrillard's
sceptical description of optimistic and instrumental
views of information, Kearney cites Live Aid as an
example of a good use of technology. According to
Kearney this was an event in which t.v. was able to
alert the ethical responsibility for the other through
a face-to-face with the starving. It establishes an
ethical relation. Television becomes an instrument of
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empathy. Baudrillard suggests that a more accurate
description of mediatized events might be found through
the inversion of a basic principle of cybernetics -
that information is negentropic, organised and
meaningful. Conversely what if:
the information or knowledge about a system or an
event that can be obtained is already a form of
neutralization and entropy of this system...The
information in which an event is reflected is
already a degraded form of the event. (SSM pp.
109-110)
This though is a weak claim to make. In effect it
is the idea that the media distorts the 'real'. For
Baudrillard the fundamental flaws of instrumental views
of technology are elsewhere. Specifically in its
incapacity to recognise the essential indifference of
modern technology as;
1) a (short) circuit of non-communication.
2) as destructive of all relation.
3) as a function of the general operating principles of
the simulacrum.
Furthermore, Kearney is by no means alone in this
conception, and faith, in technology as instrumental.
Eco and Enzensburger adopt a similar faith. However
his particular example of Live Aid would be for
Baudrillard, a phenomenon of post coitum historicum, a
180
post-orgy sensibility. The orgy is the excess of
values, ends, absolutes of the hyperreal. Live Aid is
an instance of the excess of soft ideology which has
superseded the hard ideologies of revolution, of
history, of politics in general and Religion. For a
post-ideological and a post-revolutionary generation
which has had everything, Live Aid contains the soft
solidarity commensurate with its own ambition:
[Anti-racism, anti-nuclear, third worldism etc,]
are the ideology of a neo-romantic and politically
neosentimental generation that is rediscovering
love, selflessness, togetherness, international
compassion, and the individual tremolo. Effusion,
solidarity, cosmopolitan emotivity and multimedia
chaos...Transcendental and publicly marketable
idealism [a generation] that practices solidarity
with the greatest of ease, that bears neither the
stigma of class misfortune nor the stigma of
capital...They are European yuppies. (AR pp.43-
44)
Such a description would also characterise the
project, elucidated in the first chapter, of Richard
Rorty. Rorty's fundamental and only principle or
foundation is the 'soft ambition' to avoid cruelty.
Rorty however recognises this for what it is, 'post-
modern bourgeois liberalism'. The tremolo of the
individual inspired by Live Aid for example is a soft
solidarity of a weak, quivering subjectivity with its
romantic other. It is not governed by a meta-
narrative, or the hard ideologies of class solidarity
or the politics of exploitation.
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However this account is but one scenario of
response. There is also the non-response of the mass.
The mass refuses this blackmail of values. The
attempts to moralise and resignify the mass either
through information (polling, multimedia solidarity
etc,) or through its theorisation as victim of psychic
and social distantiation and difference (alienation,
lack, etc,), have an opposite effect. Information
instead of liberating the mass transforming it in to
energy, produces more mass. The mass is subjected to
testings, polls, surveys, equations, probings,
solicitations, the politics of special effects,
somewhat akin to microbiological warfare. This is the
media as massage.
As I have shown, the response of the mass to this
is one of hyperconformity. Baudrillard refuses
manipulation theories of politics for two essential
reasons. Firstly, such theories are organised around
causal narrative. They are rooted in the logic of
critical thought of the second order of simulacrum.
This perspective is in fact a violence equivalent to
the violence of the state. It supports the myth of the
reality principle, of the true.	 It imputes to the
mass, alienation, a lack and an imaginary. 	 It is
critical and judges, and produces difference.
Baudrillard gives an example of the introduction of
perspective by attempting to limit simulation, or the
precession of the model. A terrorist bombing has many
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models (of truth) in orbital circulation around it. Is
it the work of left terrorists, of right wing
extremists trying to provoke, or centrists trying to
bring all terrorists into disrepute and shore up
failing power, or the police who want more funds for
public security. What is at stake here for the system
of control is the truth of the event which is
maintained by attempting to put a check on the vertigo
of interpretations, and the metamorphosis of models, in
order to render it purposive and meaningful, from any
generated perspective no matter which. Commenting on
the events at Stammheim he writes:
Principle of meaning as principle of truth: there
you have the real life blood of state terrorism.
(SSM p.118)
This forms the basis of the second objection to
critical thought. The terrorism of meaning it attempts
to impose on the mass is at least of equal ferocity to
the disenchanted simulation of the system. It is the
blackmail of value.
Baudrillard argues that the implosion of the
social and information by the mass is the macroscopic
equivalent of the involution of McLuhan's
epistemological axiom - the medium is the message.
This is the problem of media which is posed to any
project which dreams of re-directing media to its own
ends. As I have shown, there is no direction for the
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media, it is a circular process absorbing the poles of
senders/receivers etc.
However what makes modern media a practice of
simulation is not simply the implosion of the message
in the medium. The implosion of the message into the
medium is not a distinct event that leaves all else
untouched. At the limit of this axiom, once the idea
of the message disappears so does the medium. Rather
it is the implosion of the medium in the real which
confers the status of 'simulation model' on modern
media. Not only is there no message but there is no
medium in the sense of mediating between two states of
reality. Modern media are characterized by not being
vehicles of communication. 	 For this reason
metamorphosis replaces metaphor. The transport of
meaning from one figure to another is replaced in
modern media with tactile immediacy and metamorphosis
of models. The speed of metamorphosis as instantaneous
transformation is not structured or organised by a
temporal narrative or movement. Unlike metaphor it is
without origin. Virilio describes something similar in
the development of the cinematic process. The
significance of cinema lies not in its capacity to
produce images as such, but through the destabilising
speed whereby it transforms sense:
...with the cinematic accelerator, itself
conceived as an active prosthesis, the measure of
the world becomes that of the vector of movement,
of the means of locomotion that de-synchronize
184
time. When Marey reduces the movement of life to
certain photogenic signs, he makes us penetrate
into an unseen universe, where no form is given
since all forms fill a different time, stripped of
mnemonic traces, already."
In this way metamorphosis, unlike metaphor, is not
a medium. Furthermore, simulation models abolish the
narrative perspective of metaphor - the point of view.
According to Baudrillard it is this feature which
distinguishes the current era of simulation:
Without a message, the medium also falls into that
indefinite state characteristic of all our great
systems of judgement and value. A single model,
whose efficacy is immediacy, simultaneously
generates the message, the medium, and the "real".
(SSM p.102)
Because of his avowal, at some level, of the
destruction of media and this tactile immediacy
Baudrillard would claim that he is a materialist. As
simulation and like the mass, media neutralises all
perspective and meaning. It undermines all conscious
perception. All distinct oppositions, differences and
distance implode. Modern media such as Jakobsen's
model of communication:
Meaning in the sense of a unilateral vector
leading from one pole to another, becomes
impossible. (SSM p.142)
This proposition increasingly finds its way into
Baudrillard's understanding of his own writing. Theory
ought no longer communicate. It becomes a problem of
how not to communicate, how to communicate nothing and
how to render meaningless the communication of nothing.
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Unless one understands Baudrillard's appreciation of
this state of affairs one misses what is essential to
his work. An illuminating example of this is the
question posed by Brian Seitz:
As others have asked, is Baudrillard nostalgic for
some myth4.9a1 time when signs "really meant
something"."
This formulation is instructive as one only needs
to invert the proposition to arrive at the central
issue. If Baudrillard is guilty of nostalgia it is for
a time in which signs `really meant nothing'. For
example in symbolic exchange. The danger of elevating
symbolic exchange to a principle is that it obviously
profits meaning.	 It cannot be a foundatLom or am
agenda. As he remarks in Cool Memories:
You can't theorize something as the `accursed
share" without yourself being part of that curse.
(CM p.78)
For this reason the catastrophe of meaning brought
about by the mass and the media cannot be understood as
meaningful. It is not in the service of any project,
symbolic or otherwise.
Baudrillard argues that to view this impossibility
of meaning as catastrophic or nihilistic is to be
governed by a misplaced idealism of meaning and
communication. Catastrophe itself is etymologically
the `horizon of the event' (in terms of physics, a
Black Hole). He argues that catastrophe has only the
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sense of an end when it is governed by the logic of
production and the linear finalities it imposes.
Catastrophe is instead a limit to meaning beyond which
nothing occurs which has meaning for us. It is
therefore outside the conceptual order of meaning and
the nihilistic sense of catastrophe is unfoundable.
What is beyond this is:
fascination: the result of the neutralization and
implosion of meaning. Beyond the horizon of the
social there are masses which result from the
neutralization and implosion of the social. Is
not the opposition of fascination and meaning what
is at stake in information. (SSM p.142)
This is the core of the argument concerning why
the mass is not the victim of capital's 'spectacle'.
Baudrillard uses the word spectacle without any
ideological sub-text. Fascination is not equivalent to
the Debordian spectacle. That spectacle is an
epistemological principle that is deformed by ideology.
Fascination is not of the order of knowledge. What is
crucial in the production and circulation of meaning,
whether it is cultural, political or pedagogical he
argues, is the impulse to moralise, to inform, to
enlighten the masses. Whereas the masses remain
fascinated impervious to messages, preferring the
interplay of signs. The masses receive meaning while
what they want is entertainment. The Mass:
scent the simplifying terror which is beyond the
ideal hegemony of meaning, and they react in their
own way by reducing all articulate discourse to a
single irrational and baseless dimension, where
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signs lose their meaning and peter out in
fascination; the spectacular. (SSM pp.10-11)
Suggestions that this is a form of mystification
is self-interested hypocrisy providing, 'intellectual
comfort...[for]... the producers of meaning'. If one
were to entertain the thought of ideology it could be
argued that these 'producers of meaning' are the dupes
of the system rather than the mass. There is no depth
or interplay of public and private whereby hidden
meaning, alienation or ideological manipulation can be
revealed. He cites the example of an extradition of a
criminal on a night in which France were playing in the
World Cup. While a few people demonstrated outside the
prison, twenty million were tuned into the football.
Offence was taken by this indifference, Le Monde
ironically reporting:
9 o'clock. The German lawyer has already been
removed from La Sante prison. In a few minutes
Rocheteau will score the first goal. (SSM p.144)
The reasons for this indifference is alleged to be
the mystification or manipulation of the masses. Not
only are they stupid but their apathy is denied them.
Baudrillard points out that at all costs one must not
analyse this indifference as a disturbance of current
theories of manipulation (and modern communications)
but instead it acts as confirmation despite consistent
evidence to the contrary. The mass with its predicates
is the necessary extension of Baudrillard's attempt to
circumvent familiar philosophemes and philosophical
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manoeuvres. As the absorber of meaning and information
it neutralises the operations of ideology. The thought
of ideology, critical thought, is structured by the
metaphysics of value. In the following description one
can recognise how closely the mass mirrors Plato's
nightmare of simulation:
Critical thought judges and chooses, it produces
differences, it is by selection that it presides
over meaning. the masses, on the other hand, do
not choose, they do not produce differences but a
lack of differentiation - they retain a
fascination for the medium which they prefer to
the critical exigencies of the message. (SSM p.35)
Critical thought works on the terrain of
legitimation and this serves the system, attempting to
re-invest the energy of the real. Baudrillard suggests
that meaning is outraged by fascination and sets up an
analogy between the requirements demanded of children
and those of the masses. Children are caught in a
double-bind. On the one hand they are asked to be
autonomous, rational, responsible and free, while on
the other hand obedience, submission and conformism is
required. To the latter demand to be an object the
response is revolt and disobedience and to the former
it is infantilism, passivity and idiocy. One could
say, amalgamating McLuhan and Baudrillard, that this
heralds the reign of the global village idiot. However
there is a serious point to be made here. Baudrillard
is not valorising 'ignorance' over intelligence as such
an opposition is determined by the perspective of
meaning. This is crucial to understanding what is at
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stake in the development of his writing. And I will
show in the next chapter how Baudrillard attends more
closely to the possibility of a strategy of the object.
Despite the fact that neither strategy (autonomous
rationality vs. infantilism) is of more objective value
than the other, Baudrillard suggests that at the level
of the masses one strategy is valorised over the other.
That of the resistance of the subject and in the realm
of the political, emancipation and free expression are
held to be valuable. What is ignored is the strategy
of the object as a response to a demand that we be
subjects who vote, produce and participate. The
conformity he is talking about is not the obedient
conformity to social convention. It is, as I will
show, a diabolic conformity whose principle is not
reconciliation but paradoxically irreconcilability. He
advocates the latter strategy of hyper-conformist
simulation of the system whose very mechanisms are
refusal and non-reception.	 This would be a
pataphysical solution:
The secret is to oppose to the order of the real
an absolutely imaginary realm, absolutely
ineffectual at the level of reality, but whose
implosive energy absorbs everything real and all
the violence of real power which founders there.
(SSM p.118)
This is the key to Baudrillard's own conception of
his theorising. His early work on use-value and the
metaphysics of political economy and its critique have
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CHAPTER SEVEN: YOU ONLY LIVE TWICE.
Let not the reader be scandalized by this gravity
among the frivolous; let him rather recall that
there is a grandeur in all follies, an energy in
all excess. (Baudelaire)
In these last two chapters I will be addressing
the concepts of seduction and fatal strategy. With
these concepts Baudrillard most explicitly shifts the
economic problem of production onto the terrain of
theory and its presentation. I would also argue that
these concepts are developed as a means to avoid the
easy essentialism of symbolic exchange as a beyond of
exchange value. The latter manoeuvre he describes as
the utopian dream of political economy. With the
concepts of seduction and fatal strategy he is firmly
committed to the question of the nature and status of
theory.
In the previous chapters I drew attention to the
moments in his work which link the question of theory
and interpretation to the economic dynamics of meaning
and use-value. However the concept of seduction is not
just the result of a meditation on the ratio and
violence of theory upon its object. It is not a
question of hermeneutic efficacy for Baudrillard, as he
is committed to what he understands as the seduction of
appearances and consequent seduction and disappearance
of meaning. His theorization of seduction is also an
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attempt to offer a different context for the genealogy
of signs to that offered in the Orders of Simulacra.
Until Seduction Baudrillard's consideration of
simulation had largely been conceived as homogenous and
indifferent. Baudrillard's response to the system of
simulation has been either the possibility of symbolic
exchange or hyperconformity, simulating the
indifference of the system and thereby absorbing all
the energy of production and the real. I would argue
that Baudrillard is more theoretically innovative when
he embraces this dystopia of simulation. However
Seduction offers an alternative genealogy whereby
seduction becomes, if not the condition of possibility
of production, then at least the void at its centre.
An implosive space into which all the forms, and the
world, of production and the real are sent spinning in
a vertigo of pure appearances. Baudrillard accounts
for three phases of seduction which also display
different features.
1) Seduction as Ritual: The trompe l'oeil and its
elaboration in painting, architecture and the ritual of
politics.
2) Seduction as aesthetic form: a nineteenth
century form exemplified by Laclos and Kierkegaard.
Baudrillard would qualify the notion of aesthetics by
virtue that seduction absorbs subjectivity. 	 The
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concept of aesthetics is too tied to the hierarchy of
values imposed by the idea of Art.
3) Seduction as the Political Destiny of the sign:
the simulacrum of modernity.
It is enough to note here that seduction has a
genealogy of forms or manifestations, and each form
poses itself as a challenge to the governing logic of
production and its reality principle.
But what exactly is seduction? A common
definition of seduction understands it as a subtle
deployment of strategies and techniques in order to
achieve one's (sexual) ends. It can also mean a kind
of charm. Baudrillard is interested primarily in the
second sense. Baudrillard in fact gives it a variety
of designations; a ritual; a secret circulation of
seductive signs at the heart of discourse; an esoteric
form; a challenge; the enchantment of illusion.
Ultimately, Baudrillard would want to argue that it has
no meaning and cannot be defined or classified.
One problem with the term seduction and its
relation to theory is the ease whereby it could become
either another hermeneutic device or the stylistic
conceit of an aesthete. This possibility is a
consequence of the fact that whatever else seduction is
concerned with, it is primarily a function of
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'appearances'. Hence the possibility of its being
equated with something like Susan Sontag's erotics of
art (as opposed to interpretation) or even Rorty's
ironics. At one point Baudrillard approvingly
describes Kierkegaard's seducer as 'playing with
himself f (SED p.108). However what he describes as the
'objective irony' of seduction is not a function of
subjectivity, not even the 'weak' subjectivity of
Rorty. It is not a hermeneutic device or instrument.
It will become clear that seduction for Baudrillard is
that which seduces the identity and time of the subject
as self-presence.
However a question still remains concerning the
status of 'appearance' for Baudrillard. As I recounted
in an earlier chapter on the simulacrum in both
Derrida's and Deleuze's description of the simulacrum a
gesture is made towards reinstituting the empirical as
an effect by which core philosophical values are
threatened. In Dialogues Deleuze points out that
empiricism is not the establishment of a first
principle which would invert opposition of the
intelligible over the sensible. It is not the basis
for a new epistemology. It is rather the
exteriorisation of relations between terms and the true
empiricist produces an experimental construction of
this geography. The latter is worth bearing in mind as
Baudrillard rejects the value or criteria of
truthfulness as a measure of his work.
195
For Derrida also the empirical does not denote
just the realm of sense and appearance present for a
subject but is a material force bearing the mark of
difference and repetition. This problematising of the
empirical must also be taken into account with respect
to Baudrillard's analysis of appearance. For although
the issue of empiricism is not expressly addressed by
Baudrillard, his work only makes sense insofar as his
treatment of the simulacrum is not framed by the
opposition of the intelligible and the sensible. This
refusal of the traditional axiomatics of metaphysics
must be born in mind in this discussion of the concept
of seduction.
Baudrillard's 'seduction of appearances' is a
formula in which seduction is both active and passive.
A useful touchstone from recent french philosophy can
be provided by Derrida's analogy of differance and
empiricism:
...a strategy without finality, what might be
called blind tactics, or empirical wandering if
the value of empiricism did not itself acquire its
entire meaning in opposition to philosophical
responsibility.1
Seduction is that which abolishes the ends of
production in all its forms of use-value, meaning and
direction. It is a diversion internal to the linear
logic of production.	 Hence what is fundamental to
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seduction is its deviation from all forms of
interpretation designed to reveal/produce meaning or
depth. Baudrillard invokes the etymology of
production, to make visible, as the focus for the
operations of seduction. Seduction is the seduction of
appearances but it is not wedded to the visible as
true.	 Seduction is a diversion but one that is
immanent to any discursive revelation. Paradoxically
the most self-sufficient, self-motivating and
rigorously systematic discourse is a model of
seduction:
Any system that is totally complicit in its own
absorption, such that signs no longer make sense,
will exercise a remarkable power of fascination.
Systems fascinated by the esotericism which
preserves them from their external logics. The
absorption of anything real by something self-
sufficient and self-destructive, proves
fascinating. (SED p.77)
A certain reading might abstract a theory of
language from this. With the concept of seduction
Baudrillard seems to be committing himself to
establishing certain fundamental features of language.
In this instance, that language always diverts and
absorbs the profoundity of the true. Yet it must be
born in mind that language is but one terrain of
seduction. It can convey seductive effects.
The previous passage is an important clue to the
direction of Baudrillard's work. It brings together
the attack on production in his early writing with the
197
analysis of the simulacrum as the sign of a real given
over to its own transparent, obscene reproduction.
However it is also clear that all discourse, no matter
how well founded it is, or how cogently and coherently
it masters its arguments and concepts, is prey to the
non-sense of seduction. In fact the quotation would
suggest that the more self-contained and self
sufficient the theory or discourse is, the less
`flawed' it is, the more likely it is that it will
display the effects of seduction. This is essentially
the absorption of the sense of the discourse by its own
signs. Hence seduction occurs at the level of
appearances. However appearance is not a function of a
look or a gaze:
Seduction does not consist of a simple appearance,
nor a pure absence, but the eclipse of a presence.
Its sole strategy is to be there/not-there, and
thereby produce a sort of flickering, a hypnotic
mechanism that crystallizes attention outside all
concern with meaning. Absence here seduces
presence. (SED p.85)
It is not a function of a subject. It is not
presence as meaning or project but its seduction. The
pomit at which sense disappears giving way to
appearance.	 It is this hypnotic mechanism which
seduces Narcissus. Seduction is not a psychological
event. It is not that he falls in love with his
reflection but that he is seduced by the absence of
depth which is the superficial abyss.
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Seduction is neither side of this there/not-there.
It is not an absence or a presence but the play of the
two. Nevertheless, seduction is the creation of an
implosive space - an initiation - which allows this
'flickering' to take place. Paul Virilio describes
seduction as follows:
...seduction is a rite-of-passage from one world
to another that implies a major departure for
humanity, the beginning of a navigation of body
and sense from something immovable toward another
category of Time, a space time essentially
different because it is sensed as instable,
mobile, conductive, transformable, like the
creation of a second universe gepending entirely
on this initial rite-of-passage.'
The flickering as described by Baudrillard
flickering is in effect the implosion of perspective
and the entry into a world ungoverned by the time of
meaning. An example of how this works may be found in
the contrasts Baudrillard makes between the seductive
space of trompe l'oeil with the obscene space of
hardcore pornography. Pornography is obscene not
because it is an ideological device or because it is a
corruption of sexuality but because it abolishes (as a
simulacrum) the scene of the real. In this respect it
is an extension of his analysis of the reduction of
space by media which I recounted in the last chapter.
It is the model of the current simulacrum. Baudrillard
contrasts it with trompe l'oeil. The latter subtracts
a dimension, depth, from the real, while pornography
adds a dimension, it makes the real more real. 	 He
suggests that in hard-core there is an excessive over-
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signification of the real. Sex becomes a burlesque and
parody. The anatomical exactitude of the camera
abolishes the space and perspective of sex. Therefore
what is at stake in the viewing of hardcore pornography
does not take place at the level of phantasy. It is
not symptomatic of any particular psychic arrangement:
Pornographic voyeurism is not a sexual voyeurism,
but a voyeurism of representation and its
perdition...the dimension of the real is
abolished, the distance implied by the gaze gives
way to an instantaneous, exacerbated
representation, that of sex in its pure state,
stripped not just of all seduction , but of its
image's very potentiality. Sex so close that it
merges with its own representation: the end of
perspectival space and therefore, that of the
imaginary and of phantasy - end of the scene, end
of an illusion. (SED p.29)
Now there are two senses of scene that Baudrillard
attempts to account for. There is the scene of history
and narrative which is the scene, or stage, of meaning.
The other scene that Baudrillard attempts to account
for is the scene of initiation as described by Virilio.
This is not the scene of representation, or of the
subject but of seduction. Precisely a scene of entry
to another world:
The scene is about the possibility of creating a
space where things have the capacity to transform
themselves, to perform in a different way and not
in terms of their objective purpose. It all comes
down to this: altering space so as to turn it, as
opposed to that other space without limits, into a
space with limits, with a rule of play, an
arbitrariness. (ROC p.29)
This is a useful way of conceiving Baudrillard's
writing. The limit has no objective rationale other
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than the dismantling of the limits of representation.
This is not the case with the obscene. Yet given that
it is destructive of the real and the imaginary why is
this viewed so negatively by Baudrillard? Basically
because even though it is ultimately destructive of
representation its impetus is still grounded in the
logic of representation. As he said earlier concerning
the new novel, it is the death of representation, at
the limits of representation for the sake of
representation. Obscenity rather than being the
transgression of reason or morality (which is its old
sense) gives too many reasons. It is through seduction
that obscenity can be challenged.
What Baudrillard means by 'sex stripped of all
seduction' I will return to in a moment. However what
is at stake in the trompe l'oeil according to
Baudrillard is a questioning of the real by its
imitation. It is an imitation of effects which
attempted to undermine the reality principle as the
dominant principle of Renaissance perspectivism. Hence
seduction is another process which is engaged in the
destruction of the reality principle though not on the
basis of the perfection of representational technique.
For this reason he regards trompe l'oeil, like
surrealism, not as an aesthetic style but as a
metaphysical question directed at the gaze or eye of
representation for it is the latter that simulates
reality effects. By a curious reversal the deception
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and deviation of seduction returns the objects and
processes of production to their originary illusion.
According to Baudrillard what trompe l'oeil and
surrealism reveal is reality as a principle.
Furthermore, trompe l'oeil provides for Baudrillard a
model of the abolition of perspective which is also in
fact a model for the fundamental implosive process of
his theory as seduction:
While the Renaissance organized all space in
accord with a distant vanishing point, perspective
in the trompe l'oeil is, in a sense, projected
forward.. Instead of fleeing before the panoramic
sweep of the eye (the privilege of panoptic
vision), the objects "fool" the eye ("trompent
l'oeil") by a sort of internal depth - not by
causing one to believe in a world that does not
exist, but by undermining the privileged position
of the gaze. The eye, instead of generating a
space that spreads out, is but the internal
vanishing point for a convergence of objects. [My
emphasis] (SED p.63)
The effect of trompe l'oeil cannot be measured in
terms of the aesthetic pleasure it provides. Its most
important effect for Baudrillard is that of the
uncanny.	 It disturbs the reality effects of
perspective. One could compare Baudrillard's
description of the effects of trompe l'oeil with
Freud's conception of the uncanny. He cites the tale
of the Sandman to support his argument that the
experience of the uncanny is not an intellectual
experience. In the story it is understood to be the
thought of losing one's eyes, which is what is at stake
in the absorption of perspective. There is a second
comparison to be made in terms of the sense of
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architecture that Freud also attributes to the `remote
province' of the uncanny. Trompe l'oeil operates as a
seductive space because its subtraction of a dimension
opens a vacuum into which the signs of the real are
absorbed. However, Baudrillard wants to argue that
this seduction is not after the event, but is in some
way the condition of perspective and the reality
principle which it attempts to found. Or, more
correctly, is its condition of possibility and
impossibility, the `play of presence and absence'.
With respect to architecture, it is space turned inside
out:
...the studiolos of the Duke of Urbino and
Federigo da Montefeltre in the ducal palace of
Urbino and Gubbio: tiny sanctuaries entirely in
trompe l'oeil at the heart of the immense space of
the palace. The latter exemplifies the triumph of
an architectural perspective, of a space deployed
according to the rules, while the studiolo appears
as an inverted microcosm. Cut off from the rest
of the structure, without windows, literally
without space - here space is, actualized by
simulation. (SED p.65)
In this secreted space Baudrillard finds an
allegory of power and politics. If the palace is the
architectural manifestation of power what it conceals
is the fact of its own simulation. Politics would be
merely an effect of the simulation model of
perspective. This is the secret by which power is
maintained. The simulated space of the studiolo is a
perspectiveless space. This is not to say that the
`interior' space (the secret, the studiolo) determines
the political space. It has no relation with the space
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of architecture or the political. It is rather that
this simulated space is an internal reversal the rules
of the political order. Hence if Baudrillard is
committed to a form of architecture, it would be that
of the baroque and trompe l'oeil in general rather than
a putative post-modern architecture. It is the
artifice of trompe l'oeil, the power of the false,
that commends it to Baudrillard:
The strategy of seduction is one of deception. It
lies in wait for all that tends to confuse itself
with reality. And it is potentially a source of
fabulous strength. For if production can only
produce objects or real signs, and thereby obtain
some power, seduction, by producing only
illusions, obtains all powers, including the power
to return production and reality to their
fundamental illusion. (SED p.70)
Production is fatally constrained and limited by
being a function of the real. For this reason
Baudrillard can argue that the seduction of the world
through appearances is prior to the production of the
world as value, meaningful, real or true. Hence the
distinction between the disenchanted simulacrum of
pornography and the enchanted one of seduction.
Pornography is exemplary of the culture of monstrosity,
the visible, or more correctly, the obscene. He calls
it the 'truer than true'. It is the saturation of a
space and the abolition of the dimension of depth:
Many things are obscene because they have too much
meaning, because they take up too much space.
They thus attain an exorbitant representation of
the truth, that is to say, the apogee of the
simulacrum. (FS p.57)
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This over-extension of representation inaugurates
a self-generating (like the DNA and protozoa)
spiralling of effects. The resultant inertia and
neutralisation of difference effects an ever increasing
hysterical overproduction of reference and the real in
order to compensate for this metastatic, cancerous
indifference.
What is characteristic of this form of the 'real'
is its hypervisibility. This is the transparency of
the obscene in which the scene or context of value -
the real - has been absorbed and gives way to the more
visible than visible. The obscene supersedes the stage
or the scene. It is a kind of inverted doubling of the
scene whereby the (mis-en) scene is emptied of all
content. The medium (context as pure index) becomes
the message. The scene requires a stage, actors and
the minimal distance from itself and the real so that
it can represent. The obscene is the dissolution of
image, representation, spectacle and the notion of
subjectivity underwriting it (underpinned by the space
and architecture of interiority and exteriority):
We no longer partake of the drama of alienation,
but are in the ecstasy of communication. And this
ecstasy is obscene. Obscene is that which
eliminates the gaze, the image and every
representation. (JDOC p.22)
There is a doubling in obscenity, the truer than
true. But it is not therefore the classical double of
an other for an alienated subject.
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In the obscene, representation is eliminated by
over-representation rather than by its destruction.
This is what distinguishes Baudrillard's notion of
obscenity from the traditional one in which the obscene
was repressed, unrepresented and unrepresentable. It
is an exacerbation of representation. For that reason
it was still capable of transgression and a certain
violence. Baudrillard suggests the following genealogy
out of which the current notion of obscenity is
produced:
In the beginning was the secret, and this was the
rule of the game of appearance. Then there was
the repressed, and this was the rule of the game
of depth. Finally comes the obscene, and this is
the rule of the game of a world without appearance
or depth - a transparent universe. White
obscenity. (FS p.65)
This transparence can be represented by the
television screen, a surface without depth, and this is
why Baudrillard argues that the television, like the
general system, has no imaginary because it harbours
neither secrets, scene nor images.
Hardcore pornography is exemplary of this degree
zero, the neutralisation of appearances in the name of
the real, or more correctly the hyperreal. Sex in
pornography is a function of the liberation of
productive forces. Seduction on the other hand is a
counterpoint
	
to	 this	 apparent	 microscopic
materialization of the labour of sex.
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For this reason Baudrillard uses the concept of
seduction to settle accounts with the disenchanted form
of sex elucidated by psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is
the perfect model of interpretation for Baudrillard, as
it explicitly renounces the act of seduction. In fact
this is obviously more than an after the fact
rejection. The entire edifice of psychoanalysis
depends on the constituting disavowal of seduction. In
this way it is the model of all interpretation which
depends on the restriction of the play of appearances.
Psychoanalytic interpretation moves along the
familiar axes of latent and manifest meaning by which
the errant but revealing symptom may be returned to its
true source. The appearance, manifest discourse, only
has truth insofar as it can be returned to its origin
or cause. Seduction on the other hand is a diversion
of truth, in which the sense of the discourse is
absorbed in its own signs.	 Moreover there is no
subject of seduction. There is no true subject
revealed in seduction. No past history wedded to the
revelatory and representational function of language.
A seduction is not a moment of recognition of
repression, or prohibited desire:
To be seduced is to be turned from one's truth.
To seduce is to lead the other from his/her truth.
This triAth then becomes a secret that escapes
him/her.'
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Baudrillard, in a manoeuvre similar to the moves
made by Derrida in his reading of psychoanalysis in
"Speculer sur Freud", 4 situates the exclusion and
denial of seduction as fantasy as the motor of
repetition which spectrally guides the entire edifice.
But whereas Derrida's reading is directed by, among
other things, a desire to show the particular economic
network of restrictions and supplements at work in
Freud's text, Baudrillard sees the accumulation of
meaning in psychoanalysis as the movement of economy
itself. Freud's attempt to establish a coherent and
objective machinery of interpretation by virtue of an
originary denegation returns as a debased form in the
theory itself - in transference and counter-
transference - and in its institutional internecine
challenges and duels.
With respect to psychoanalysis, Baudrillard
rightly recognises the temptation of making too easy a
division of a theory and its institutional practice
born of the same event and mirroring the inside/outside
logic of the latent and manifest. Baudrillard cites
Lacan's identification of the signifier as seductive
force as a limited re-opening of the seductive space,
the superficial abyss into which truth is absorbed:
That the most beautiful construction of meaning
and interpretation ever erected thus collapses
under the weight of its own signs, which were once
terms heavy with meaning, but have once again
become devices in an unrestrained seduction, terms
in an untrammelled exchange that is both complicit
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with and empty of meaning (including the cure) -
this should exalt and comfort us. It is a sign
that the truth at least (that for which imposters
reign) will be spared us. (SED p.58)
This eruption of the primitive seduction of
language is limited in the work of Lacan because it is
harnessed to a law and a master who exercises it as a
function of that law. Freud's imposture as denial
returns as Lacan's imposture in re-opening the space of
seduction only to bury it under the weight of the Law.
Furthermore it is a restriction of seduction to the
parameters of a particular linguistic theory.
Seduction is not a principle of language but a
process of circulation without an object. It is a form
of circulation moving through and beyond what he calls
the static nudity of the truth of signs. It does not
stop to accumulate meaning. This circulation opens up
the space of the superficial abyss by which the depth
of the subject is absorbed in the ritual of seduction:
To seduce is to die as reality and reconstitute
oneself as illusion. It is to be taken in by
one's own illusion and move in an enchanted world.
(SED p.69)
This movement forecloses the logic of production
and seduces its accumulative momentum. Seduction
absorbs the reality principle - the truth of the sign,
its meaning and its referent.	 With respect to
psychoanalysis Baudrillard suggests that the productive
impulse appears as the unconscious. 	 In an obscene
universe devoid of secrets, psychoanalysis produces the
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hidden depths of the unconscious while at the same time
furnishing itself the matrix by which to decode and
liberate the subject from its repression. It makes it
speak its truth. Moreover the unconscious is a
psychological trait. Seduction on the other hand is a
function of the secret and involves no psychology. It
precludes subjectivity. The secret, in a way the
unrepresentable, is that which allows the simulated
space of seduction to appear, like the missing
dimension of the Trompe l'oeil. It is the initiatory
element of the play and challenge of seduction:
...Everything that can be revealed lies outside
the secret. For the latter is not a hidden
signified, nor the key to something, but
circulates through and traverses everything that
can be said, just as seduction flows beneath the
obscenity of speech.	 It is the opposite of
communication yet can be shared. The secret
retains its power only at the price of being
unspoken...(SED p.79)
The implosive effect of seduction is provided by
the secret. There are however two forms of secrecy.
The obscene secret which is the series of origins and
causes attributed to and saturating the event while
Baudrillard's conception of the secret is that it is
not hidden - and in fact does not exist. So for
example the secret of the real, of power, of sex, and
most fundamentally, of the subject, is that they do not
exist. Another example of this obscenity is the
testing of the Mass, made to divulge their secret by
polling and surveying despite the fact that they have
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no secret. And there is the quintessentially modern
form of the obscene secret - the unconscious.
In the game or the challenge the secret
establishes a meaningless relation in the form of an
initiatory rite. The duel and agonistics of the
challenge is not bound by the Law but the rules of the
game. Baudrillard's account of seduction is bound up
with a response to the Law and the space and time it
constitutes. In general, the Law represents for
Baudrillard the contract with the real . There is a
formal, abstract equality or equivalence before the
Law. It produces the space of depth, of inside and
outside the law. In particular with respect to the
subject, the interiorisation of law and vice versa -
the law of interiorisation:
Because the Law - whether that of the signifier,
castration, or a social interdiction - claims to
be the discursive sign of a legal instance and
hidden truth, it results in repression and hidden
truth, it results in repression and prohibitions,
and thus the division into a manifest and a latent
discourse. (SED p.132)
Unlike the duel agonistic process of seduction the
law is an instance of individuation. One is not only
equal under the Law but one is responsible before it.
It constitutes the irreversible space of meaning which
is not bound by the line of transgression, but
traverses it. The Law as universal functions on both
sides of the constraints and prohibitions it imposes.
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Seduction however abolishes 	 all relations
contractual or economic:
....seduction's enchantment puts an end to all
libidinal economies, and every sexual or
psychological contract, replacing them with a
dizzying spiral of responses and counter-
responses. It is never an investment but a risk;
never a contract but a pact; never individual but
duel; never psychological but ritual; never
natural but artificial. It is no one's strategy
but a destiny. (SED pp.82-83)
This passage reveals a series of concerns
determining Baudrillard's conceptualization of
seduction. Seduction replaces the aura of meaning with
the enchantment of illusion and pure appearances
unfounded by sense or meaning. Hence the challenge as
the undetermined event of seduction. The challenge
puts into abeyance all forms of law. It is this which
establishes the pact immanent to the game. It provokes
a vertiginous escalation of response and counter-
response and one might describe it as raising the
stakes if it were not the case that stake as investment
is excluded from seduction. In that sense it is akin
to the bluff. In this way it is a form of circulation
that is not tethered by any extraneous principle. It
is without relation.
If the subject is constituted in conformity with
specific laws of value, natural, commercial or
structural it is the duel and the challenge which
seduces the space of representation of the subject.
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One can see this being played out in his analysis
of transgression in the game through the psycho-economy
of the cheater. Transgression is only possible under
the law. One either observes or doesn't observe a
rule. Transgression brings the player back within the
ambit of the law for it is the law itself which
establishes the line of transgression. And the player
is no longer a player as such but a subject, having
injected a psychological investment into the winning of
the game. The cheater, he argues, becomes autonomous
and subjects himself to his own law and moreover he is
free. He treats the rules as truths, as ends in
themselves, and no longer has any stake in the game but
rather an investment. In this way value, transformed
in and by the game through the challenge of the stake,
returns as surplus-value. The stake in gambling is no
longer an investment, for money no longer circulates
according to an economy of representation. The cheater
introduces the time of investment into the time of the
game, which has no future.
For Baudrillard, what opposes the Law is not its
transgression or its absence, but the Rule. The Rule
is in fact a simulation of Law, or its parody. It
demands obligation without credibility. No matter how
arbitrary the rule is, once one is in the game it must
be observed. Baudrillard counterposes the observance
of the rule, in the game and the ceremony or ritual, to
the constraints of the Law.
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Seduction functions according to the rule of a
game. It opens the space of a challenge bound by
obligation to the rule. The challenge, the game and
the duel all require an obligation to the rules.
However because the rules are mere conventions they are
neither transcendent nor universal. The rule has no
exteriority, nor makes no claims outside the immanent
functioning of the game. The recurrence of the rule is
a revolution (in the sense of cycle) without meaning.
Because it is arbitrary it has no reason and it occurs
as a cycle rather than as a function of the linear
finality of the Lam. The obligation to the mule
however is different to that implied by the law. One
cannot choose not to abide by the rules, one either
plays or one doesn't.	 While the law is universal,
linear, transcendent, and irreversible. It confers
responsibility, choice, freedom, and equality before
the Law. The rule on the other hand is immanent and
functions in the finite space of the game.
And contrary to the referential imperatives of the
Law, rules contain only conventional, arbitrary signs.
Conventional or ritual signs have no autonomous
reference or sense and only appear and circulate
without sense or foundation in the real. In contrast
with the Law ceremonial signs circulate within
themselves. This according to Baudrillard provides the
pleasure of the game or ritual. Through conformity to
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the arbitrary and conventional signs of ceremony we are
delivered from the terrorism of meaning imposed by the
law:
The Law is part of the world of representation,
and is therefore subject to interpretation or
decipherment. It involves decrees or statements,
and is not indifferent to the subject. It is a
text, and falls under the influence of meaning and
ref erentiality. By contrast, the rule has no
subject, and the form of its utterance is of
little consequence; one does not decipher the
rules, nor derive pleasure from their
comprehension - only their observance matters, and
the resultant giddiness. (SED p.132)
Baudrillard contrasts the obedience to the rule in
Seduction with that of perversion. Seduction is close
to perversion by virtue of the replacement of Law with
the rule. The referent of sex is absorbed in
perversion not through the transgression of morality
but through adherence to an arbitrary Rule. Therefore
the seducer and the pervert is not abandoned in sex but
in the observance of the senseless signs of the ritual
or game. However perversion, unlike seduction, can
become a psychological (not pathological) event. This
occurs when the rule becomes fetishized, as law,
becoming an end in itself. It no longer retains its
seductive necessity replacing it with the logic of
cause and effect.
The ritual and ceremony constituted as play in
seduction are fixed and frozen in perversion. The
agonistic, dual relation of seduction becomes a polar
relation in perverse seduction. The element of play is
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no longer pleasure in itself but made meaningful
symptomatic and linear, revalued in the fetish.
Baudrillard is therefore suspicious of any philosophy
or theoretical enterprise that puts the concept of play
in general at the service of a theoretical agenda.
For this reason any psychology or strategy
prohibits seduction. It introduces a narrative and
causality. It has an origin and an end. Seduction is
an event without history or future. It is an event of
the rule and not of the law. It has no determinations.
It is an initiation. For this reason Baudrillard
contrasts our second birth in seduction with our first
genital, psycho-analytic birth;
What psychoanalysis has not seen is that what
happens to us is without precedent that
inaugurates not a history but a destiny, and
which, because it is without precedent, liberates
us from this genesis and this history. This event
without precedent is seduction; it is also without
origin, coming from somewhere else and arriving
always unexpectedly - a pure event that erases in
one fell swoop all conscious and unconscious
determination. (FS p.138)
Daedelus awakes from the nightmare of history.
This event without precedence, this pure event, I would
argue also refers to Baudrillard's conception of his
own writing and I will address this in my last chapter.
One point worth mentioning here is this liberation from
history. Seduction is an attempt to save us from the
determinations of history, narrative and linear time in
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any forms that they appear. It could be said that it
delivers us from the necessity of liberation.
With the concept of seduction Baudrillard
therefore attempts to exorcise the spirit and
irreversibility of history and its projects. After his
elaboration of seduction his writing can no longer be
said to have any historical purchase. Baudrillard by
his own terms will have succeeded in that his writing
no longer has the context of history or the real as a
validation. If the mass, despite the precision and
precautions of his account, could be understood to have
some resonance with the historical failure of the
political and rational project of the social his
elaboration of the pure event of seduction forecloses
this interpretation. Criticisms such as those
proferred by Kellner that he is not dialectical enough,
validate Baudrillard's theoretical manouevre.5
For Baudrillard seduction is an attempt to save us
from the accumulation of memory and the determinations
of causality. It is a destiny without a future or a
past. With this in mind one can begin to consider
Baudrillard's conception of his own theory.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE VANISHING
When you succeed not in destroying something but
in obliterating its origins and its end, it
disappears (the solution to the problem of the
illusionist?). It is not, however, physically
dead. It remains resplendent in a sort of state
of grace which is that of disappearance. It
inaugurates a second, pure and empty form of the
event or person, which is the form of fate. (CM
pp.91-92)
In his later work it is clear that Baudrillard is
not pursuing a commentary or analysis, or engaging in
the sociology of distinctions which sometimes frames
his early work. He is, as I will show, proposing a
different conception of theory linked to what he
conceives as the destiny of the object. The subject
can no longer be reconciled with his own ends, having
surpassed them. Baudrillard accounts for this in a
series of figures; more body than body (the obese);
more social than social (the mass). This traversal of
limits is not trangression. It is not the breaking of
a law but the deepening of a logic, the movement
towards extremes, whereby the essence of things exceed
their necessary structural incompletion. It is an
absolute and excessive efficieny. For this reason he
can announce the arrival of utopia.
However it is also worth noting a mythic element
at work in Baudrillard's writing, specifically in
relation to this utopia. It is not simply a fabular
discourse opposed to a rational schematization.
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Neither is it the citation of mythic or primitive
practices which would be the model of a new project.
While he often cites mythic practices of ceremony and
sacrifice they are ultimately analogies. This is why I
would argue that any appeal to symbolic exchange as a
principle,or referent, is a moment of theoretical
weakness. It is a recourse to a concept outside his
own writing.
It is important to recognise the mythologising
function that sometimes frame his simulations and fatal
strategies for the rationalist and humanist utopias can
only ever be understood at the level of myth (the real
world become myth). In other respects McLuhan's
definition of myth seems acutely pertinent in
accounting for the process of simulation. It is almost
synonomous with the process that Baudrillard describes
and the manner of his description:
myth is the instant vision of a complex process
that ordinarily extends over a long period. Myth
is contraction or implosion of any process, and
the instant speed of electricity confers the
mythic dimensi.on on ordinary industrial and social
action today.'
Myth has its own internal necessity and is not
constrained by the demands of the true or the real. It
absorbs and condenses the time of history and reason
into its own framework. Hence it could be argued that
when addressing the fatal strategy of the object what
is being delivered is a challenge to the real in the
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form of a myth. This mythic quality does not mean it
is any less effective than critical theory or
commentary which assumes a relation to the real. The
latter requires distance and the time of reflection and
in this way, by its own criteria, does not bear witness
to the current dynamic.
Moreover unlike objective analysis, Baudrillard
would argue that the theory he elucidates is an event
in the world, without presupposing the world. Or put
another way it has no relation to the world conceived
as true or real. Rather than being a specular
reflection of the world it takes the form of a
challenge:
At a certain point I felt - if we suppose that the
real, and social practices, are indeed there -
that I was launched on a trajectory that was
increasingly diverging, becoming asymptotic. It
would be an error to constantly try to catch hold
of that zig-zagging line of reality. The only
thing you can do is let it run all the way to the
end. At that point they can raise any objection
they like about the relation to reality: we are in
a totally arbitrary situation, but there is an
undeniable internal necessity. From that point
on, theory maintains absolutely no relation with
anything at all; it becomes an event in and of
itself. (FB p.127)
This issue of theory as event is bound up with his
conception of seduction as a fatal strategy. In the
previous chapter I attempted to outline the spatial
features of seduction, of appearances, as trompe
l'oeil, and as obedience to the empty forms of the Rule
and ritual rather than transgression of the line of the
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Law. I will address here that feature of seduction
which operates on time, the fatal.
Baudrillard's concept of the fatal can be
understood as the terminus of his ruminations on the
object. The object is no longer the other of a subject
or the modern object of the commodity. It is no longer
useful at any level. 	 In this we can recognise a
reflection of the mass. 	 It is the object, not the
subject, which seduces. 	 The fatal strategy of the
object opens up a pataphysical, manicheistic,
irreconcilable universe in which Baudrillard aspires to
his own disappearance as theorist and subject. This
strange universe is, as 1 shall shov, the substitutiom
of a fatal order for the banal order of the current
simulacrum.
Like his work on seduction, Baudrillard is at
pains to emphasise the fact that the fatal is a mode of
disappearance (as opposed to production) of the
subject. For this reason he contrasts the banal to the
fatal. Though as will become clear the fatal is a
particular vision of the banal. The banal strategy is
a strategy conceived of and governed by the subject.
It is an attempt to master a set of events, to provide
them with a narrative, in order to achieve one's goals.
The fatal on the other hand is governed by the object.
One may recall here the difference between banal or
vulgar seduction - which is seduction as a
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psychological strategy of the subject - and the
seduction of subjectivity. In the seduction of the
game or challenge, for example, a condition of
seduction is that the seducer is necessarily open to
seduction by the object.
There is one other factor involved in the fatal
which is fundamental to understanding Baudrillard's
work. In the last chapter I attempted to show what was
at stake in the distinction between the obscene and
seduction. With the concept of the fatal there is a
clear commitment to a form of pessimism. 2 This is to
say that all is happening for the best in the best of
all possible worlds. We are no longer in the time of
crisis. We are no longer in a critical logic. We have
passed the point in which the time existed for a
narrative of failure, where the cause of crisis could
be re-traced in time:
We are living in a brilliant epoch; no one knows
what might happen. That is our chance, which at
the same time is our chance to pick up on radical
pessimism again, the basis of which is the fact
that everything is continually improving, and on
the hidden charm of provocative analysis. In
dealing with the epidemic of visibility menacing
our entire culture today, we must, as Nietzsche
quite correctly said, cultivate mendacious and
deceptive clear-sightedness. (AR p.45)
For this reason seduction is not opposed to the
paradoxical movement towards extremes (of forms), and
polar inertia, in the hyperreal. Seduction, as I will
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show,	 is	 the	 cultivation	 of	 extremes,	 of
irreconcilability, in the fatal strategy.
In this way the concept of the fatal can be
considered an embracing of the dystopic world of
simulation. Though this of course is not quite correct
as Baudrillard understands the hyperreal to be the
arrival of utopia. Every truth and essence achieves
its absolute, abstract and empty universality. This
situation marks the end of the political and the
beginning of the transpolitical. The political would
be a function of the linear time of history. Politics
has a stake in the future. The transpolitical is a
parody of politics at the end of time. The
transpolitical is the generation of politics from
models, and is a politics without consequences or
finality. Though it does not have political effects,
because it is without consequences it has ecstatic
effects. Ecstasy is the sublime pleasure of an
undirected escalation of forms. It is the experience
of the supercession of limits to which I previously
referred. I will return to the ecstatic later on. For
the moment it is enough to note that the figures of the
transpolitical are auto-parodic expressions.
Baudrillard would hold that they are not his own
theoretical products. Rather they appear as a result
of the supercession of critical concepts of the
political.	 However parody might not be quite the
correct trope. Parody is still too instrumental. The
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transpolitical is instead conceived as the ironic
produce of the system:
The transpolitical is...the malicious curvature
that puts an end to the horizon of meaning...the
passage from growth to hypertely, from organic
equilibrium to cancerous metastases. This is the
site of a catastrophe and no longer of a crisis.
(FS p.25)
A crisis can be understood as the failure to
achieve certain goals. It is a matter of causality.
By changing the arrangement of causes the desired ends
may be achieved. However according to Baudrillard we
are in a situation of hypertely - an excess of ends
without the means to service them. The digital
simulacrum of polar generation from the same model
gravitates around its own inertia. Hence the
metastatic redundancy of these ends. When everthing
has been achieved what is there to do? Or as
Baudrillard puts it, What are you doing after the orgy?
Baudrillard's response is a deepening of this process
through seduction as a fatal strategy.
At the level of process, a good example of this is
the current cinematic process. Commonly understood,
cinematic and media images are measured and judged
according to their fidelity to a real and a resemblance
to the world. In a logic we can recognise in his
analysis of the mass he argues that if there is a
conformity to the world, it is a diabolic conformity.
This is the conformity of absorption but also
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seduction, which deviates and misdirects the illusory
reference of that towards which the image conforms. He
cites the central character in the Woody Allen film
Zelig. The character renounces the banal subjective
imperatives of difference and originality. Zelig
pursues the fatal strategy of seduction, taking on the
resemblance of those surrounding him. This conformity
is not the conformity of a subject to his/her
individuality nor the conformity to context. Hence it
is not a question of the functional adaptation to the
context.	 It is the seduction of 'the play of
resemblances'. He suggests that the film itself
seduces interpretations by its montage of various
commentators and analysts which ironically conforms to
the criteria and values of criticism and analysis:
More generally, the image is interesting not only
in its role as reflection, mirror, representation
of, or counterpart to, the real, but also when it
begins to contaminate reality and to model it,
when it only conforms to reality the better to
distort it, or better still: when it appropriates
reality for its own ends, when it anticipates it
to the point that the real no longer has time to
be produced as such. (EDI p.16)
His analysis begins here by depending on almost
conventional accounts of the simulacrum as an image.
It is semi-ideological. The image distorts a pre-
existing reality. There is a gap in time between the
real and the distorted image which represents it. The
real is prior to the image. However this logic is
superseded by the removal of this temporal difference.
There is no longer competing claims between a real and
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its image. In fact it can no longer be properly called
an image, as it is not an image of anything. It is its
own simulacrum.3
Baudrillard's analysis of time in the anticipation
of the real by the model introduces the dynamic of
speed and inertia. Speed, the distance travelled over
time becomes a dominant characteristic of the hyperreal
as the difference and distance between the model and
the real collapses. The possible space and time of
representation thus disappears.
How has this happened? He cites Canetti's
observation that systems and history have surpassed a
point beyond which events occur which are no longer
real. Canetti argues that until we return to and
recover this point we are engaged in a process of
destruction. There is a sense of loss in Canetti's
account and this marks the point of departure for
Baudrillard from Cannetti.
This point, to use an economic metaphor, of
diminishing return may be called the Vanishing Point.
It is the place of the disappearance of value. The
idea of the vanishing point has in this instance some
historical or temporal resonance.
	
It is also the
geographical figure of the desert form.	 It is the
curvature on the horizon of meaning beyond which there
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is no future and no return. It is, above all, the void
into which all things are absorbed.
While agreeing with Canetti's diagnosis of the
event Baudrillard does not share its nostalgic
sensibility and sense of loss. Cannetti's analysis is
melancholic and sentimental. In this way he is
curiously post-modern. He maintains linear time as the
basis for this turning back. It is precisely because
of the dispersal (into simulations) and therefore
disappearance of time and history that Cannetti's
would-be project makes no sense:
History can no longer surpass itself, it can no
longer envisage its own finality, dream its own
end: it wraps itself in its own immediate effect,
it exhausts itself in its own special effects, it
falls back on itself, it implodes in actuality.
Finally we cannot even speak of the end of
history, for it will not have time to rejoin its
own end. Its effects accelerate, but its sense
slackens ineluctably. It will end by stopping and
by extinguishing itself, like light and time at
the outskirts of a mass infinitely dense. (Year
2000 p.38)
For this reason Baudrillard cannot even propose an
end of history thesis. Besides being too sentimental
it does not follow logically. We can never understand
what history was before this vanishing point.
Canneti's analysis is still organised by a causal
analysis. He wants to retrace the sequence back to its
origin. For Baudrillard history can no longer be
considered as anything other than an empty referent.
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For this reason rather than being a narrative of
progress and liberation it too is liberated from
meaning. Each event in history is now a pure event.
It becomes a satellite with its own trajectory. In
this way the vanishing of history is also a pure event.
There is no longer a causal logic or a narrative which
holds sway over things or provides a linkage between
events. The crucial point of such an event is that it
marks the disappearance of causality (its dispersal
into the appearance of the event):
When time is captured and swallowed by its own
source, there is thus a brutal involution of time
into the event itself. Catastrophe in the literal
sense: the inflection or curve that has its origin
and end coincide in one, that makes the end return
to the origin and annul it yielding to an event
without precedent and without consequences - pure
event. (FS p.17)
History, for example, is still preserved, but
cryogenized, as simulation. Nevertheless it still
functions but no longer under its own motor and no
longer as a hot medium, as context which provides
meaning. Instead history is the soft seduction of an
ambience. It takes the form of retro-effect. In this
way it is like all concepts borrowed from the second
order of simulation - representation - lacking any
functionality and empty of meaning but artificially
kept alive. This inertia is an effect of the general
acceleration, and disappearance, of things through
their diffusion and circulation in media networks.
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The gravity of the real and the referent has been
overtaken by the speed of their appearance.
Baudrillard uses the image of bodies, detached from the
real, no longer held in an orbit of circulation,
propelled into hyperspace, never to return to the
ground of meaning:
It is thus not necessary to write science-fiction;
we have as now, here and now, in our societies,
with the media, the computers, the circuits the
networks, the acceleration of particles which has
definitively broken the referential orbit of
things. (Year 2000 p.36)
With the demise of this referential gravity we can
begin to consider what is at stake in the appearance
and disappearance of things. This process comes down
to the removal of things from the order of time. Using
Walter Benjamin's description of the aura it is a
removal from objects of their historical testament and
duration. Hence the process of appearance and
disappearance can only occur as a pure event, without
memory or future hope. This is in effect the loss of
the work of the negative as the provider of sense,
continuity and meaning	 which heralds the time of
catastrophe.
The notion of catastrophe is a function of the
process of reversibility. Reversibility is that aspect
of seduction which sets in motion the implosion of the
linear, accumulative logic of production and meaning.
Reversibility is the operation of an object rather than
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the subject.	 Furthermore it is internal to every
irreversible process, it occurs at their limit, and is
what constitutes their fascination. In metaphysical
terms it is as if the realisation of the idea or
essence of things is their point of reversal and
collapse. This is, in effect, a deconstructive event
without the schematization of logocentrism that Derrida
provides.
Reversibility at its primary level reverses the
relation of cause and effect. It inaugurates the
precession of the effect or model. It is an instance
of the always already but without the determination of
the Law. It is the very definition of destiny. The
temporal manifestation of reversibility is catastrophe
through which there is an implosion of the real.
Baudrillard defines the real as the coincidence in time
of an event and its causes. The speed of catastrophe
produces a delay of meaning, unlike reason and its
product of meaning which produces a delay of things:
It is the eternal delay to which things are
condemned by meaning: always invent causes so as
to exorcise the illusion of their appearance,
always invent meaning to exorcise appearances to
delay their too rapid concatenation. (RI p.291)
This is also in effect an account of the
precession of the model as simulacrum. The simulacrum
in a reversal of causality is thought of as anterior
finality.
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When this occurs there is what Baudrillard calls
the pure event. The pure event is one without
beginning or end and has no meaning or causality. It
is excessive of the latter order and is free of
particular determinations and interconnections. It has
no history and no future. This is also the definition
of the fatal which is hopeless and therefore beyond
crisis. Because it is predestined it has no future:
It is so much more fun to see our universe
destined to fatality, which is not transcendent
but immanent in our very processes, in their
superfusion, in their overdrive, in their
supermultiplication, immanent in our banality,
which is also the indifference of things towards
their own meaning, the indifference of effects
towards their own causes. (EOC p.83)
As we have seen in the analysis of simulation,
events without consequence, without a history and
therefore a meaningful direction, lend themselves to a
vertigo of causalities without the ground or criterion
of real or true for choosing between them. Read
through the perspective of the real, such events
inaugurate a process of absorption of causality and
meaning, producing the metastasis of equiprobability.
Alternately, understood from the manichean perspective
it is no longer a question of the cool statistic of
equiprobability but a possibility for the acceleration
and precipitation of a catastrophic logic of
simulation. This precipitation is objective irony. It
is the object's indifference to the meaningful world of
the subject. Such events are inaugural in that they
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have no cause or origin and no direction or end. For
this reason they do not communicate anything and it is
also why they are seductive. The object and the pure
event are synonymous for Baudrillard. The appearance
and disappearance of the object is the pure event:
Things make events all by themselves, without any
mediation, by a sort of instant commutation.
There is no longer any metaphor, rather
metamorphosis. Metamorphosis abolishes metaphor,
which is the mode of language, the possibility of
communicating meaning. Metamorphosis is at the
radical point of the system, the point where there
is no longer any law or symbolic order. It is a
process without any subject, without death, beyond
any desire, in which only the rules of the game of
forms are involved. (FB p.74)
There is no transport of meaning in metamorphosis.
It is not a function of communication.	 Again it is
clear that despite	 Baudrillard's	 reputation as a
theorist	 of media	 and	 modern	 communications, he is
describing a process whereby communication is rendered
impossible. Furthermore Baudrillard again valorises a
concept on the basis of its lack of any relation to a
subject. In fact metamorphosis is only possible - like
the difference between vulgar seduction and seduction -
on its seduction and dissolution of subjectivity. In
this way the space of this metamorphosis is a seductive
implosive space (as opposed to the explosive space of
production).
Baudrillard counterposes the escalation of obscene
forms with that of metamorphosis. The metamorphosis of
forms occur separately from the system of meaning
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implied in the obscene secrecy of the hypervisible and
hyper-representation. Metamorphosis of forms in
seduction marks the passage of the subject world and
all its metaphysical baggage, such as truth and
reality, into the world of objects. This takes place
in seduction through the escalation of stakes and the
non-dialectical transformation or metamorphosis of the
subject. There is no logic or narrative whereby the
subject metamorphosises into object or seducer into
seduced.
This metamorphosis is not a critical event. It
does not displace the grounds of subjectivity.
Returning to the inconsequential event we may recall
the notion of reversible imminence which introduces
into the system, the time of catastrophe. The
contraction of causality and origin does not leave time
for the longevity and meditation of crisis:
Interstitial collapse - that is the seismic effect
(mental too) that waits in ambush for us. The
dehiscence of the things most firmly attached, the
trembling of things tightening and contracting
over their emptiness.	 For at bottom (!) the
ground never existed. (FS p.21)
It is catastrophe rather than crisis which is
endemic to the third order of simulation and the model
of this shifting ground, is the generalized fault-line
of the earthquake. The earthquake itself becomes a
pre-programmed event in the scenario Baudrillard cites,
in which experts predicted that the evacuation
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precipitated by an earthquake would cause more damage
in the ensuing panic than the earthquake itself! This
earthquake effect can be understood as panic. Panic
is:
...the other form of the ecstatic, its
catastrophic form, in the almost neutral sense of
the term, in its mathematical extension. It is a
completely alien response of the object world to
the subject world, of a completely external
destiny which occurs with an absolute surprise and
whose symbolic wave strikes the human world. (FB
p.99)
Therefore all the ecstatic figures that
Baudrillard uses must be seen as panic concepts. We
see in the figure of the earthquake that catastrophe is
not an aberration of causality like chance or accident.
It is the pre-programming in nuclear strategy which
organises the system of deterrence and the politics of
blackmail in what he terms the horizontal era of events
that have no consequence. What replaces the
consequence is the inflation and saturation of truth.
There is only the disenchanted modulation of the
series as cool statistical morphologies. At the same
time Baudrillard is not bemoaning the quantification of
existence from any tragic perspective. In fact for
Baudrillard this statistical disenchanted simulation is
superior to the second order, because it empties the
second order's simulations such as meaning of all their
conceptual value, reducing things to quantifiable
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phenomena. There is no alienation here. Alienation on
his terms is ultimately a concept of history.
For this reason the figures of the transpolitical
are effects of a system of anomaly. They have no
historical or political context. They are statistical
effects. Anomaly is an excess of finality. It is
therefore the indifference of things to their causes.
This is a consequence of their generation as model.
Baudrillard's project of the fatal strategy is not to
leave these models to their statistical indifference
but bring them to extremes - from metastasis to
metamorphosis. The figures of the transpolitical are a
function of a manicheistic perspective. This is the
complete irreconcilability of subject and object. The
figures of the transpolitical designate the revenge of
the object (or what he calls the crystal revenge).
This is the complete indifference of the object to the
subject and to value in general. Its features are
displayed in the absolute object of the commodity of
modernity as described by Baudelaire:
...here's the whole strategy of modernity, which
constitutes for Baudelaire the entire perverse and
adventurous seduction of the modern world - push
to the absolute its division of value. No
dialectic between the two; synthesis is a soft
solution, dialectics a nostalgic. 	 The only
radical and modern answer: potentiate what is new
original, unexpected in the commodity - for
example, its formal indifference to utility and
value, the pre-eminence given to circulation. (FS
p.117)
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This is the object not as static value but as a
principle of circulation. In this way Baudrillard
poses the irreconcilability of the pure object to the
logics which attempt to provide it with a relation or
value. One way of understanding this irreconcilability
is to refer back to his analysis of simulation and the
strategy of the masses. Baudrillard's fatal strategy
is to simulate the givens of the system, draw them out,
exacerbate them:
The world is not dialectical - it is sworn to
extremes, not to equilibrium, sworn to radical
antagonism, not to reconciliation or synthesis.
This is also the principle of Evil, as expressed
in the "evil genie" of the object, in the ecstatic
form of the pure object and in its strategy,
victorious over that of the subject. (FS p.7)
The evil demon of the object is its silent, abject
and meaningless compliance with the demands of the
subject, like the mass and its response to pollsters.
It is the object which seduces. In this way the mass
for example becomes a pure object, which through its
hyperconformity disappears from the horizon of meaning
and utility of the subject. This silence constitutes a
challenge to all the mechanisms of subjectivity and
value like law, alienation etc. The pure object is
essentially useless and indifferent to the world of the
subject. For this reason its hyperconformity is
ironic.
The evil demon that Baudrillard invokes is that of
Manicheism.	 Manicheism sees God as the necessary
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corrective to the evil demon who had created the world
and reality. The world of Manicheism is a world of
signs and illusion and the world as reality was
understood to be heresy. Their guiding principle is
therefore the unreality and irrationality of the world.
The world is fundamentally an illusion and their
theology operates as the negation of the real. This
differs from the negation of the real common to
philosophy in the belief that the world as solely made
of signs:
This idea of the world as being constituted only
by signs is, if you like, some sort of magic
thinking - and indeed it was condemned as such.
For it does entail that the 'real' and any sort of
'reality' - that one sees in the world is quite
simply a absolute utopia. The rationality that
one has to invoke in order to make the world
'real' is really just a product of the power of
thought itself, which is itself totally anti-
rational and anti-materialist (EDI p.44).
What is at stake for Baudrillard is the
fundamental irreconcilability and antagonism between
the 'illusion' and 'reality' of the world. He cites
Freud's analysis of the principles of Thanatos and Eros
as a model of this irreconcilability, for Freud's
failure to integrate the two principles and the
realisation of their irreconcilability clearly
demonstrates the principle of Thanatos itself.
What has happened according to Baudrillard is that
negation is no longer a function of the philosopher -
subject or of critical thought, but of the things
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themselves. It is not a moment in any dialectic. Now
the object negates the reality principle refusing the
demands and laws of the subject and its fellow
traveller, meaning. This announces the end of
philosophy, certainly as a privileged moment of
negation and inaugurates the principle of hyperreality.
This negation on the part of objects is described by
Baudrillard as 'objective irony' (as opposed to
commonly understood subjective irony).
Because the evil genie of the object is a function
of a manicheistic principle it will only be conjured up
through acceding to the antagonistic forces at work:
We will be looking for something faster than
communication: challenge, the duel. Communication
is too slow; it is an effect of slowness, working
through contact and speech. Looking is much
faster; it is the medium of the media, the most
rapid one.	 Everything must come into play
instantaneously. We never communicate. In the
to-and-fro of communication, the instanteneity of
looking, light and seduction is already lost. (FS
p.8)
By the same token the inertia, indifference and
auto-absorption of the system warrants a certain
immobility and silence in the refusal of a dialogue,
like the strategy of the Mass. This operation has as
its dynamic the redoubling of a form. The accelerating
hyperteleological finality absorbs its own limit in the
inertia of its own emptying out. To return to the
example of the mass, it is the point in which the banal
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obedience of the Mass (as object) to the demands of the
system becomes fatal to the system.
Baudrillard's commitment to seduction, to invite
the spiralling of charmed sequences of events is a
response to the inertia and indifferent simulacrum of
the current order. As I have shown, the modulation and
mutation of DNA provides the matrix for all series. It
produces neutral signs. It is the simple repetition of
pre-programmed combinations. He calls this the cold
seduction of digitality. Cold seduction, following
McLuhan's definition of cold media, is a low intensity
medium. The Ludic play of digital models replaces the
hot passionate play of aesthetic seduction. However
cold seduction also absorbs the polarities of law,
transgression and representation. As I recounted in a
previous chapter the current simulacrum neutralises all
difference and opposition through the genetic
generation of models. All distance and difference is
reduced to the terminals of a network. The world of
the disenchanted simulacrum is characterised by
dissuasion and deterrence of opposition:
the 0/1 of binary or digital systems is no longer
a distinctive opposition or established
difference. It is a "bit", the smallest unit of
electronic impulse - no longer a unit of meaning,
but an identificatory pulse.	 It is no longer
language but its radical dissuasion. (SED p.165)
Metaphor is replaced at this degree zero of
language and meaning by metastasis.
	 No longer
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generation by reproduction but through the simple
repetition of the genetic matrix. DNA is a modern
prosthesis in that it allows the body to reproduce
itself indefinitely. The clone replaces the double,
the other, the imago or the reflection in the autotelic
code. It is the absolute realization of the imaginary
double. There is no longer the psychological or
historical scene by which the subject can be reflected
and alienated, and therefore justified. The body is
absorbed by its own prosthesis rather than being
seduced by its appearance. 	 Baudrillard calls it a
digital Narcissus. He remarks that the Biblical
imperative "Love thy neighbour as yourself" is no
longer a problem as your neighbour is yourself. Self
seduction as auto-tele.
If there is a body for the clone it is that of the
obese. It is the transpolitical figure of the
saturation of systems and information overload. The
obese is the exacerbation of the body. It is a
register of the body's superfluousness and redundancy.
The latter awaits all productive systems. The obese
also denotes the contraction of space by the obscenity
of the hypervisible, the adding of an extra dimension.
The body disappears through conformity to the empty
space of the obscene. It abolishes all limits and the
transcendence of all that the model of the body has
latterly come to signify such as the point of
refraction of the mirror for a subject or as a grid for
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various psycho-political forces. Recalling
Baudrillard's analysis of information In the Shadow of
Silent Majorities the body's disappearance as the site
and metaphor for subjectivity inaugurates its
metastatic re-appearance as the bloated redundancy of
information overload. This overload is another example
of the overpotentiality of forms and systems for which
no-representation is possible. According to
Baudrillard it evokes the distended stomach of Pere Ubu
without any of cruel irony or acidity unattainable in a
cool universe of over-managed and over-invested systems
given over to the smooth operationality and incessant
reformulation of its own process:
Pataphysics or metaphysics, this pregnancy
hysteria is one of the strangest signs of American
culture, of this spectral environment where each
cell (each function, each structure), is left with
the possibility, as in cancer, of ramifying, of
multiplying indefinitely, of occupying virtually
all the space by itself, of occupying all the
information unto itself (feedback is already an
obese structure, the matrix of all structural
obesities), of settling down into a contented
genetic redundancy. Each molecule happy in the
paradise of its own formula. (FS p.28)
The obese, as a function of a digital universe is
a statistical anomaly rather than an anomic infraction
of the law. Baudrillard perceives this anomie as an
excess of finality. It is metastatic in its cell-like
cancerous proliferation. It is due to the absence of a
rule (as in ceremony) or scene (as in psychoanalysis
for example) the body deregulates and neutralises the
internal difference of its antibodies. The obscene is
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an exteriorisation of this mono-cellular repetition
which is the perfection and (hyper) realisation of the
truth of all things. The obese is the body of the
obscene - 'the fatter than fat'. It is an
overpotentialisation and redundancy, and excrescence of
things.	 It designates the essential waste and
uselessness of things. No more dialectic of
oppositions but the senseless wandering of pure forms,
absolved of all negativity:
A form shoots off in a kind of relentless logic
uncalculated, without any history, without any
memory, the way cancer cells go off in an organic
direction. (FB p.101)
Nevertheless there is an internal necessity to the
meaningless concatenation of forms. Forms appear and
disappear without traversing the system of meaning.
The forms surpass their own causes absorbing their own
origin. This rigorous movement to extremes is what
commends it to Baudrillard.
The escalation of forms he describes as ecstasy.
The ecstatic is the pure and empty form of objects and
processes:
...ecstasy is the quality proper to any body that
spins until all sense is lost, and then shines
forth in its pure and empty form. Fashion is the
ecstasy of the beautiful; pure and empty form of
an aesthetic spinning about itself. Simulation is
the ecstasy of the real. (FS p.9)
It is the perfection of systems to the extent in
which they fold over, redoubling themselves in a
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process whereby they are emptied of their content, like
the media or information. This state of affairs
therefore is not a dystopia but the realization of
utopia. Everything has realized its own truth its own
perfect form. No more negativity, no more difference
or otherness in a universe without interiority. In a
culture of monstrosity everything is extraverted and
exteriorised into pure forms without negativity:
Something escapes us; we escape ourselves in a
process of no return, we have missed a certain
point for turning back, a certain point of the
contradiction in things, and have entered a
universe of non-contradiction alive, of blind
rapture, of ecstasy, of amazement about the
irreversible processes that nevertheless have no
direction at all. (AR p.32)
This is not to be deplored.	 The time of
contradiction and alienation for the subject has
passed. I will presently show how this state of
affairs can be understood as the fatal, ironic,
strategy of the object but there is one more
transpolitical figure of that marks the passage from
the world of the subject to that of the object. The
hostage.
The hostage is the subject held prisoner by the
terrorism of having to have an identity, or personality
or desire and having to realize the self or actualise
desire.	 It is also the terror of being held
responsible.
	 At another level populations are held
hostage by the strategy of nuclear deterrence and
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dissuasion.	 The balance of terror is based on the
indifference of equivalent values. It is a form of
soft extermination. It is the result of the parcelling
out of a certain moral responsibility producing the
subject as final underwriter, taking out cover for
risks, catastrophes and "acts of God" and for his/her
own anomalous acts. This generalized responsibility is
in fact the logic of terrorism which doesn't stand over
and against the state and threatening it but is the
very limit of its own logic. At any moment, despite
our anonymity we may be held responsible for anything
whatsoever:
It only carries to its extreme consequences the
essential proposition of liberal and Christian
humanism: all men are in solidarity; you, here are
in solidarity with and responsible for the
wretched poverty of the pariah of Calcutta. While
asking ourselves about the monstrosity of
terrorism, we should perhaps ask ourselves if it
does not derive from a proposition of universal
responsibility itself monstrous and terrorist in
its essence. (FS p.36)
There is a terrorism of responsibility and the
truth. Responsibility can only be imputed on the basis
of establishing causality. The disappearance of
causality only compels and heightens the need for
attribution. The terrorist demands the revelation of
the truth of the system while generating a network of
responsibility. Previously, with regard to the events
at Stammheim, 4 Baudrillard had suggested that the lack
of a meaningful logic insofar as any ideological
content is concerned, is swept away by the brutal
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spectacle of violence terrorism provides. As an event
it contains no political message.	 This is the
ambivalence of it as simulation. It has a certain
charm in its ritual challenge: the taking of the plane
with the hostages, the release of certain hostages; the
negotiations; the storming of the plane.
In Fatal Strategies Baudrillard understands the
terrorist act not as a spectacular challenge but as
the medium of circulation of responsibility. Terrorism
no longer as a scene of violence but a global space of
the circulation of control. Dissuasion and deterrence
rather than conflict. The hostage is less a ceremonial
undertaking than the paradoxical model of the
impossible exchange. The terrorist wishes to make of
the hostage a commodity of inestimable value through
the	 withdrawal of the subject from circulation -
thereby producing a 'scarcity'. However the
paradoxical condition of the hostage is that it is this
withdrawal which also makes the hostage worthless.
This is because of the annulment of the subject through
becoming a hostage:
The hostage is himself obscene. He is obscene
because he no longer represents anything (this is
the very definition of obscenity). He is in a
state of pure and simple exhibition.	 A pure
object, without an image, deceased before being
dead.	 Frozen in a state of decease. Cryogenized
in his own way. (FS p.43)
Taken out of the reality an circuit of exchange
value and raised to the stakes of the priceless, the
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hostage is a non-convertible currency - non-negotiable.
However, Baudrillard argues that if there is any
efficacy to hostage taking it is the realization of
non-negotiability. At bottom it still harbours the
dream of use-value and therefore its necessary failure
marks the illusion of this now 'impossible exchange'.
It is now not just a question of the absence of use-
value at the core of production but also the lack of a
stage, or scene, whereby this impossible act might take
place. The inexchangeability of the hostage marks the
disappearance of rules of exchange, of an economic
scene by which a rational exchange takes place. The
situation is analogous to the orbital circulation of
capital which bears no relation to a 'real' economy.
In a system given over to generalized exchange the
hostage is a model of the object not reducible to the
process of exchange:
It all yields to a state of exception, a mad
speculation which is more like a duel or a
provocation. Hostage taking is a speculation of
this order - ephemeral, senseless, instantaneous.
It is not essentially political, but insists on
identifying itself from the very first as the
dream of a fantastic deal, the dream of an
impossible exchange, and also as a denunciation of
the impossibility of this exchange. (FS p.50)
For these reasons, and in spite of the interests
of all concerned, the hostage comes to designate the
pure object - beyond representation and therefore
beyond equivalence and exchange.
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The consequence of this ecstasy of the real is not
the wholesale abandonment of all its traditional
categories	 and	 values	 of	 determination	 (and
indetermination), reference and causality. There is
instead an escalation, a hysteria of causality and
finality - a kind of generalised footnoting - with too
many ends and not enough means, or in fact any means.
The simple definition of ecstasy is that which proceeds
(or appears) from a form or model and orbits around
this model without being tied to its existence as a
real or existing referent and therefore it moves
towards complete de-referentialization. Hence there
occurs an overpotentiality, one example of which would
be nuclear weapons in their essentially excessive
dissuasive redundance.
The fascination that ecstasy exerts is a cool
seduction. It offers the pleasure of the aleatory and
the neutral. For this reason Baudrillard opposes the
ecstatic to the aesthetic. The aesthetic requires a
scene. The aesthetic pertains to appearance, the image
and imagination. Furthermore the aesthetic contains a
moral distinction between the beautiful and the ugly
(and a reality principle in the difference between the
true and the fake) whereas the ecstatic contains no
value judgements and operates at the level of
fascination and pure transparency. The ecstatic is an
immoral form.	 It is the space of indifference.
	 It
absorbs judgement and distinction.
	 Nevertheless the
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transparency due to lack of depth or meaning is not a
mere absence. When the feature is magnified it has an
implosive force absorbing all meaning and reference:
Every trait thus raised to the superlative power,
caught up in a spiral of redoubling - the truer
than true, the more beautiful than beautiful, the
realer than real - is assured of having an effect
of vertigo independent of any context or quality
of its own...Ecstasy is the quality proper to any
body that spins until all sense is lost, and then
shines forth in its pure and empty form. (FS p.9)
Nevertheless though the ecstatic is not related to
the aesthetic it is a sublime experience. It is an
indifferent sublime. Baudrillard gives the example of
the definition of fashion - beauty that has absorbed
all the energy of the ugly. Baudrillard understands
this sublime to be any effect that appears without
cause or origin. Another way of describing this is as
special effects. One can regard all the retro-forms
resurrected by the system such as reality, the social,
history or the political as the appearance and
disappearance into the special effect.	 This is the
fatal.	 It is the undetermined but not accidental
concatenation and metamorphosis of effects.
A useful model for understanding Baudrillardfs
conception of the fatal is through his analysis of the
game. The player involved in the game is engaged in a
seduction of chance. This does not involve covering
all possibilities through the placement of bets. This
would be a stake against chance and the attempted
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restoration of equivalent values, of money and
statistics.	 The player as seducer challenges fate,
provokes chance in the game. Chance as neutral
probability or statistic disappears in the game.
Baudrillard argues that in this way chance becomes
another player in the agonistics of the game:
Games of chance deny that the world is arranged
contingently; on the contrary they seek to
override any such neutral order and create a
ritual order of obligations...They question the
reality of chance as an objective law and replace
it with an inter-connected, propitious, duel,
agonistic and non-contingent universe - a charmed
universe (charmed, in the strong sense of the
term), a universe of seduction. (SED pp.143-144)
For this reason the arbitrariness of the rule and
chance in the game are not objective determinants of
seduction. The player seeks to seduce chance.
Baudrillard sees it in terms of a challenge to the gods
(of chance) to respond. In this way a sequence of
numbers can be read as charmed signs or elective signs.
This charmed sequence therefore is not a function of a
rational sequence or equiprobabilities. Chance as
necessary contingency or probability are abolished in
the cycle of the game. In this way it affords the
pleasure in the giddiness of vertiginous connections.
Chance and necessity occur in the game according
to the cycle of the eternal return. This cycle of
chance and necessity is not naturalistic in the game
but fatal. This cyclical operation banishes causality
and establishes reversibility as its rule. 	 The
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intensity of the game is not due to the statistical
operation of chance. Chance as objective statistic or
as law of change becomes destiny or fate in the game
through the challenge. The eternal return is the rule
of the game and it is that which excludes the line of
causality and Law. It is a:
willed recurrence, as in games, of an arbitrary
and non-causal configuration of signs, where each
sign seeks out the next relentlessly, as in the
course of a ceremonial. It is the eternal return
demanded by rules - as in a mandatory succession
of throws and wagers. (Sed p.147)
It is in this analysis that Baudrillard distances
himself from Deleuze's	 formulations of chance and
desire. For Deleuze the simulacrum produces a
divergent and heterogeneous series in simultaneous play
driven by pure chance. Baudrillard argues that in the
duel of the game chance does not exist as a neutral
factor.	 Baudrillard opposes the dynamics of change
with the notions of fatality and destiny. It is
fatality which provides interconnections not the
causality of reason or the random indeterminacy of a
chance sequence.	 He considers two hypotheses
concerning chance. There is a natural order where
everything is connected and has a cause but chance
disrupts this order. Or secondly that everything is
indifferent to everything else but chance produces
connections and sequences from time to time.
Baudrillard suggests that as chance has replaced
determinism in the twentieth century as the
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conventional or received wisdom concerning the
underlying principle of things. On this reading desire
is the law at the level of the molecular. In this way
the worlds of chaos and reason describe a disenchanted
universe.
Yet the conception of chance has also opened up a
world (as in dreams for example) of non-causal
sequences.	 For this reason we should not look to
chance to provide us with the neutral world of
determinism. Rather than understanding chance as
aleatory with everything wandering aimlessly isolated
from everything else, chance should be understood in
terms of fatal sequences. Everything is in fact
interconnected but not on the basis of a sequential,
linear, rational causality:
Everything, on the contrary, is fatally, admirably
connected - not at all according to rational
relations (which are neither fatal nor admirable),
but according to an incessant cycle of
metamorphoses, according to the seductive rapports
of form and appearance. Seen as substance in need
of energy, the world lives in the inert terror of
the random, it is shattered by chance. Seen as
the order of appearances and their senseless
unravelling, seen as pure event, the world is on
the contrary, ruled by absolute necessity. From
this angle, everything bursts with connection,
seduction; nothing is isolated, nothing happens by
chance - there is total correlation. (FS p.150)
The problem here is to put a break on the
vertiginous interconnections of seduction. This, he
says, is the world of magic and poetry. It is the work
of reason to check this vertigo and supply the play of
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signifiers with signifieds and reference. Reason
therefore is not put to work in establishing inter-
connections and meaning but to check the cycle of
seduction. The purpose of reason is:
...to manufacture the neutered, to create the
indifferent, to demagnetize inseparable
constellations and configurations, to make them
erratic elements sworn finally to finding their
cause or to wandering at random. (FS p.152)
He asserts that fatality and destiny disappeared
in the 17th century at the very moment that Pascal and
Torricelli produced the notions of chance and vacuum.
In this way modernity announces itself as the world.
The world understood as the universe of indifference
and neutrality. It may appear odd that Baudrillard
would want to provide a historical time-frame for
fatality, for it is the latter which renders
inoperative the time of history. However he
understands modernity as less of an historial event and
as more of a logic:
Modernity is neither a sociological concept, nor a
political concept, nor exactly a historical
concept...modernity is not an analytic concept,
there can be no laws of modernity: there are only
traits of modernity. (M p.57)
Nevertheless, to return to the paradigm of the
game it is here through the play of chance in the game
that it is no longer statistical probability. The
gambler is not interested in calculated, contingent
chance but in chance as luck to be cultivated. The
activity of the player consists in de-escalating
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rational interconnections and seducing the destiny of
the game.
It is these fatal interconnections that
Baudrillard invokes as his model for writing - how to
seduce what may be unexpected but, nevertheless,
necessary. Seduction, as I have shown is not just a
matter of seducing the fatal. It is a destiny in the
sense that it is not grounded on a rational sequences
of causes.	 To seduce is to be seduced, to be led
astray and diverted from one's strategy and illusory
presence as subject. It is a pure event without
(memory) traces of a past and without hope in a future.
Hence when Baudrillard aspires to his disappearance as
theorist and commends us to `forget Baudrillard' 5 , he
wants his writing to stand as a pure event or sign, to
have effects but without consequences:
...what are the writings of Barthes, Lacan,
Foucault (and even Althusser) but a philosophy of
disappearance? the obliteration of the human, of
ideology. The absent structure, the death of the
subject, lack, aphanisis. They have died of these
things and their deaths bear the characteristics
of this inhuman configuration...A whole
generation...will have disappeared in a manner
wholly coherent with what it described, and what
it sensed of the inhuman. (CM p.161)
For Baudrillard it is the work of `disciples' to
provide for these figures a memorial, a static project
with a future. Yet what is admirable about these
writers is the power they achieve through their
disappearance, through their refusal of legacy. They
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seduce others into occupying the space of truth of
their writing.	 The art of disappearance that
Baudrillard invokes is not simply the extermination of
the subject that occurs in the hyperreal of modernity,
in the clone for example. Though Baudrillard as I have
shown appreciates this death it is either merely a
mechanical effect or the `body's abject disappearance
into carnal non-existence.' The latter is still a
question of the linear time and mortality of the
subject. Disappearance is, as I have attempted to
show, a strategy of the object and is completely
inhuman. Disappearance is the abolition of origin and
end.
In my introduction I referred to Paul Virilio's
account of disappearance as that which ultimately lead
to the unleashing of unforeseen forces. In The
Aesthetics of Disappearance he describes the two senses
of desert in the Hebraic tradition. The Shemama is the
tragic city-desert of laws, order and ideology. The
Midbar is the desert of wandering and uncertainty. It
is ultimately destroyed by the former. He cites the
wanderings of Simeon of Emesis, a figure whom I think
characterises in a certain way Baudrillard's modality
of disappearance:
According to the chronicle, the desert had so
tired him that he had attained apatheia, which may
be translated as impassibility, and which will
allow him to make a mockery of the city and its
laws, by acting in it like an idiot. Always
dressed in his monastic habit, he doesn't hesitate
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to lift his skirts in public: he's a regular at
the brothel, he goes to church to disturb the
liturgy. Multiplying reprehensible acts, he puts
his autism to the test by acting in the city as if
it were a desert and no one could see him.°
If the space of architecture is often invoked as a
model of the principles of post-modernity I would hold
geological form of the desert to be a model of
Baudrillard's disappearance. In America, the desert
is the locus of disappearance of humanity, culture and
civilization. He describes the experience of driving
in the desert as an absorption of distance and the
horizon of meaning. If the so-called death of the
subject in post-modernity is registered in construction
and the language of architecture so Baudrillard's
desert space of disappearance is signless and silent,
and empty of any human production, like the pure object
in its disappearance from the real:
The desert is a natural extension of the inner
silence of the body. If humanity's language,
technology, and buildings are an extension of it's
constructive facilities, the desert alone is an
extension of its capacity for absence, the ideal
schema of humanity's disappearance...But the
desert is more than merely a space from which all
substance has been removed. Just as silence is
not what remains when all noise has been
suppressed. There is no need to close your eyes
to hear it. For it is also the silence of time.
(A pp.68-69)
Like the ritual or the game, in the desert, time
has the time to disappear. The time of history,
representation and of the sign is immobilised in the
desert.	 It is impossible to focus on anything less
than fifteen miles in front of you, and space is
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thereby reduced by the proximity of distance. Natural
deserts:
...induce in me an exalting vision of the
desertification of signs and men. They form the
mental frontier where the projects of civilization
run into the ground. They are outside the sphere
and circumference of desire. We should always
appeal to the deserts against the excess of
signification, of intention and pretention in
culture. They are our mythic operator. (A p.64)
It is the transparency and emptiness of the desert
form that appeals to Baudrillard. A vast absence of
origin, depth, meaning and profundity. The desert is
not just the absence of these signs of culture. It is
a pure form of the fascination of indifference, it is
an ecstatic form. Fascination itself is the gaze
without an object of reflection or negativity for a
subject. The desert is therefore the perfect object of
fascination. We have already seen with respect to
indifference how it functions as an ironic strategy of
the object at the level of the mass. Its indifference
to the time of culture constitutes a challenge to
meaning. Travelling through the desert describes
Baudrillard's theoretical journey. The anonymity and
barrenness of the desert, without cultural referents,
and its brutal geology save us from the time, meaning
and history of the subject. In this way the desert
form for Baudrillard is a sublime form. It is not
aesthetic as it is not an object of beauty and is not
predicated on its difference from the subject but its
indifference as pure object.
	 It does not mark the
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limit of the subject but its complete dissolution.
Frederic Jameson gives a definition that resonates
somewhat with Baudrillard's - minus the 'hysteria' and
'the exhilarating of the gleaming surface':
It is a reduction of time to an instant in a most
final punctual experience of all these things, but
is no longer subjective in the older sense that a
personality is standing in front of the Alps and
knowing the lipits of the individual subject and
the human ego.'
The desert is without value. It is that which
annihilates the possibility of judgements. In this way
the desert is the vanishing point of all value, meaning
and humanity. There is however yet another model of
the desert form which has a certain affinity with that
of Baudrillard's. That is Bataille's image of the
desert as the place in which all human value and all
sense founders:
Today, neither morsel, nor flavor. Nothing but
non-sense, truth deserted, creating a desert,
glimpsed as heart-breaking in the pale blue of the
sky through the foliage of the trees (which is the
absence of man and of all sense).8
It is not difficult to locate Baudrillard's
conception in this - the place of the inhuman and the
barrenness of sense. It is the place of complete
silence. For Baudrillard the desert as the model of a
theoretical journey therefore contests and challenges
the values of the real. Baudrillard understands his
theoretical journey, his disappearance, as a trip into
the desert of time:
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The only question in this journey is: how far can
we go in the extermination of meaning, how far can
we go in the non-referential desert form without
cracking up, and of course, still keep alive the
esoteric form of disappearance. A theoretical
question here materialized in the objective
conditions of a journey and therefore carries with
it a fundamental rule: aim for the point of no
return. This is the key. (A p.10)
Is there a lesson in any of this? Has Baudrillard
got anything to offer? In the sense of a project or
program clearly not.	 Or if he does, by his own
criteria he has failed. In any case whether it is
appropriate for philosophy to be offering lessons or
programs is questionable. Is it simply a provocation
as Kellner suggests? It is too elaborate for a simple
provocation. Baudrillard has attempted a sustained
working through of the problem of production that is
more than a gesture. Yet it is precisely the latter
which is in some ways problematic. In some respects
contrary to Kellner's conception of Baudrillard's later
writing as a work of indulgent 'aristocratic
Nietzscheanism', it is almost too calculating, too
methodical. 9 In the final analysis Baudrillard's
resilient anti-humanism precludes such a reading. A
project is an instrument of the subject and he is
thoroughly indisposed to this.
It is also clear that it is not an example of
post-modern parody and pathos. There is no
disappointment or nostalgia in his work. There is no
bitterness at the historically or empirically perceived
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failure of the 'grand narratives'. It is because of
this that his work can begin to be conceived as
philosophy rather than cultural studies or sociology.
Baudrillard clearly rejects a particular vision of
philosophy - philosophy as reflection or critical
inquiry. That vision, of Platonism and metaphysics in
general, which in a parodic and exacerbated form has
come to pass.	 It is instead a philosophy of the
impossible, of non-sense.	 It is not a simple
valorisation of nonsense over rationality.
Baudrillard's conception of the mass and his
pataphysics are exemplary of this. It is not a simple
embracing of irrationality. In some ways rather
perversely, Foucault's account of thought at its limit
provides a possible model for understanding Baudrillard
as a philosopher. Thought is that which:
...confronts stupidity, and it is the philosopher
who observes it. Their private conversation is a
lengthy one, as the philosopher's sight plunges
into this candleless skull. It is his death mask,
his temptation, perhaps his desire, his catatonic
theater. At the limit, thought would be the
intense contemplation from close up - to tti point
of losing one self in it - of stupidity..."
This is the model of the philosopher as Simeon.
For Baudrillard his writing is in the end an
elaboration and elucidation of the useless without
recourse to a principle of symbolic exchange. His work
becomes increasingly like the chess game in Beckett's
Murphy. All attempts at resolution or an end succumb
to ultimate reversal.	 If there is a model for
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Baudrillard's work it is that of the schizophrenic's
endgame. It is a rigourous and exacting exercise in
futility. Baudrillard is frustrating precisely because
his work frustrates any attempt to extract a critical,
rational or humanist project. Only in this way might
it be a chronicle of insignificance, of that which
refuses any attempt at integration or reconciliation.
It is not an act of imagination. It is rather an
attempt to seduce the impossible which lies beyond the
projects of the subject or the prejudice and
accumulation of a project. In this sense it is truly
experimental rather than a provocation. For this
reason, if for no other, Baudrillard merits our
attention.
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APPENDIX: THE ' MAKING DO' OF MICHEL DE
CERTEAU
Michel de Certeau is cited by many who have
written on Baudrillard (Mark Poster, Douglas Kellner
and David Harvey) as a giving more convincing and
differentiated analysis of certain features of what
they conceive of as post-modernity. All the former
critics regard Baudrillard's work on the 'political' to
be deficient in some degree. For critics of
Baudrillard, de Certeau seems to offer a more sensible
account of how people act and offer resistance to
systems of control. De Certeau focusses on the way
such control is organised around the rational and
technical effiency of spatial and temporal
organization. De Certeau's work is also motivated by
the problem of production but, unlike Baudrillard, he
will seek to resolve it through an alternative model of
language - that of poeisis.
De Certeau's book The Practice of Everyday Life,
is dedicated to 'the ordinary man' and seems to stake
out a similar position to Baudrillard in his work In
the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, towards the
philosopher and expert, both in terms of authority and
in terms of moraliser/ informer. Though where
Baudrillard sets up the response of the mass in terms
of duplicating and absorbing the functioning logic of
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the system (as opposed to the political logic which is
its nostalgic referent) de Certeau maps out a different
trajectory. He is concerned with the nature of
knowledge - both the objects of knowledge and what
would constitute its practice. De Certeau wants to
challenge received notions of what knowledge consists.
His guiding imperative is provided by a double refusal.
Firstly he rejects the conception of knowledge as as an
exercise in pure rationality. Secondly he refuses the
idea of the practice of knowledge as an exercise in
technique.
He attempts to map out what he calls a 'science of
the singular', by which particular local practices
'poach and rent' from strategically organized space.
Hence de Certeau is interested in particular 'uses' of
knowledge. I would argue that it is this science of
the singular which situates de Certeau within the
concerns of recent french philosophy. The science of
the singular is another attempt to describe the
unmediated, different without the imposition of
relation.
De Certeau's approach has been described as
'phenomenological' (David Harvey) and it does bear
certain traits of phenomenology but what is interesting
about The Practice of Everyday Life is its eclecticism
which renders problematic the framework of one over-
arching style.	 So while he sets out his agenda as
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being directed towards the examination of the practices
of consumers, he maintains that;
1.	 Consumption is not a purely passive activity, a
mere function of production
and
2. He rejects the atomistic conception of the
subject. The subject he is attempting to schematise is
not reducible to a simple rational agent:
...the question at hand concerns modes of
operations or schemata of action, and not directly
the subjects (or persons) who are their authors or
vehicles. It concerns an operational logic whose
models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of
fishes and insects that disguise or transform
themselves in order to survive, and which has in
any cases been concealed by the form of
rationality currently dominant in Western Culture.
(PEL p.xi)
Recalling Baudrillard's suspicions concerning
science and theory, there is the trace of ethnology in
this, or at least the metaphorics of it. The
operations of the 'culture' he is interested in
correspond more to that of a bacteria rather than the
expressions of a particular set of social or
historically conditioned values. It is also worth
noting that de Certeau does not account for these
practices in terms of traditional subjectivity.
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Without wanting to collapse the difference between
Baudrillard and de Certeau, for they ultimately
maintain analyses incommensurable with each other,
there are points of convergence.
De Certeau's basic model is as I have noted the
distinction between production and consumption. And
though he characterizes consumption as at one level a
combinatory set of procedures for survival he also
designates the process of `making do' as a form of
I poeisis l . This is one example of the tension in de
Certeau's work between a traditional phenomenological
subjective oriented approach and the description he
gives of the user's operations as a set of
opportunistic tactical deterritorializations:
To a rationalized, expensive and at the same time
centralized, clamorous, and spectacular production
corresponds	 another	 production,	 called
"consumption". The latter is devious, it is
dispersed, but it insinuates itself everywhere,
silently and almost invisibly, because it does not
manifest itself through its own products, but
rather through its ways of using the products
imposed by dominant economic order. (PEL p.xiii)
At first look one may say that in Baudrillard's
view, de Certeau's analysis conforms to the logic of
production and its myth of use-value. Yet it is also
clear that what is intimated here is an alternative use
than one which is tied to its exchange value, though
this for Baudrillard would be nothing more than a
sleight of hand. It is here that one can glimpse the
possibly limited aims within de Certeau's larger
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ambitious schematization. This is to say that what is
at stake is not an activity threatening the stability
of the dominant economic order (though there is the
spectre of •symbolic exchange haunting this) but an
operation of resistance. De Certeau like Baudrillard,
refuses to accept the analysis of `ideology' as an
encompassing process duping the ill-informed populace.
What this resistance to ideology amounts to de Certeau
states, is a microbe like series of anti-disciplinary
operations and tactics of makeshift groups:
If it is true that the grid of `discipline' is
everywhere becoming clearer and more extensive, it
is all the more urgent to discover how an entire
society resists being reduced to it, what popular
procedures (also `minuscule' and quotidian)
manipulates the mechanisms of discipline and
conform to them only in order to evade them. [My
emphasis] (PEL p.xiv)
What is interesting to note here is the concept of
conformity. This relates to his distinction between
strategy and tactics which conforms to a polemological
model. A strategy can only be constructed from what he
calls a `proper place'. It is a space separated from
an environment. From this place a calculus of forces
can be directed to what is exterior. One can say it is
governed by a natural teleology.
The tactic on the other hand has to make its own
space within that delimited by the actions and
engagements of strategy. Moreover it functions
according to an entirely different economy and is a
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momentary seizure of an opportunity. It is the result
of a decisive act rather than a calculated rationale.
The tactic:
...has as its disposal no base where it can
capitalize on its advantages, prepare its
expansions, and secure independence with respect
to circumstances. The `proper' is a victory of
space over time. On the contrary, because it does
not have a place, a tactic depends on time - it is
always on the watch for opportunities that must be
seized `on the wing'. Whatever it wins, it does
not keep. (PEL p.XIX)
The tactic is therefore a function of time in
conformity to the objective and strategic calculation
of spatial operation. The examples that de Certeau
gives of this opportunism to seem to resonate with
Baudrillard's conception of seduction, with, diversion,
`polymorphic simulations', and seduction itself.	 He
also cites Sun Tzu on The Art of War as a manual for
the operations of the `weak' over the strong. 	 He
recognises the `cancerous growth of vision' inherent in
modern media. The consequence of which is the
extension of visibility as the measure of the real.
This however seems less an acknowledgment of the
obscene than the analysis of the spectacle. One may
also want to ask in what respects, if any, this
phenomenon would be different to empiricism or indeed
any metaphorics of vision employed in the history of
philosophy. It is worth noting however the move
whereby the tactic doesn't capitalize time. In this
respect it contrasts with the accelerated turnover time
that capital demands in increasing profitability.
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One such practice of 'going with the flow', not
capitalizing time, is the reader. The model he
suggests for the operation of reading is that of the
poacher or the renter of space.	 The reader cannot
protect him/herself against the erosion of memory
through time. The reader both forgets himself and,
later, what he has read. This process is a logic of
situations, dependent on circumstance as opposed to the
logic of science and technocratic rationality which
delimits the autonomous space of its practice. It is
flexible and is subject to constant mutation.
The distinction he makes between the tactic and
strategy is reflected in the difference between the
place and space. De Certeau's schema of place/strategy
and space/tactic carries through to his analysis of
theoretical dscourse and various practices, and even
more fundamentally, the difference between theory and
its object and the operations of power encoded in this
relation. This division can be seen in the difference
firstly between two types of discursive method: one
based on scientific method, the other theory or one
could say by virtue of de Certeau's descriptions, a
hermeneutics. Science:
...grants itself a priori the conditions that
allow it to encounter things only in its own
limited field where it can "verbalize" them. It
lies in wait for them in the gridwork of models
and hypotheses where it can 'make them talk', and
this interrogatory apparatus, like a hunter's
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trap, transforms there wordless silence into
'answers', and hence into language. (PEL p.61)
One may note here the procedure which accurately
reflects Baudrillard's description of the testings of
the mass through polling and statistical analysis.
What is at stake here is a kind of generalized
ethnology in which a specific set of practices,
exterior to theory and irreducibly different, is
corralled into the status of legitimation for this
theory. This operation can be understood as isolation
and inversion. The theorist first isolates and acts
out a procedure or practice for analysis which is then
inverted to become that which sustains the theoretical
discourse. He cites Foucault's analysis of the
panopticon as exemplary of this manouevre whereby
Foucault's theoretical enterprise is panoptical itself,
allowing hims to see everything. The same procedure
occurs in Pierre Bourdieu's analysis of the habitus
whereby various singular strategies of the inhabitants
of Beamn and Kabylia become a model for the theory
which sees the same order reproducing itself
everywhere. Is this what Baudrillard calls the
obscenity of the object being made to give up its
secret?:
Reduced to the habitus which exteriorizes itself
in these strategies which do not know what it is
they know provide Bourdieu with the means of
explaining everything and of being conscious of
everything...they [Foucault and Bourdieu]
transform practices isolated as aphasic and secret
into the keystone of their theory, when they make
of that nocturnal population the mirror in which
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the decisive element of their discourse shines
forth. (PEL p.63)
One may describe what occurs here as ideology
slipping in through the back door. Even though both
Foucault and Bourdieu reject ideology as any basis for
their respective projects they give themselves
knowledge of something which their objects do not have.
Ethnological studies operate on the distinction
between two clearly defined fields. 	 Studies of
practices and studies of discourse. And whereas the
first is apparently given over to description and takes
its object at its face value, the analysis of discourse
starts from the assumption that the discourse in effect
tells lies, masks truths to be decoded by theory.
Freudian psychoanalysis would be an example of the
latter. Yet we can observe the collapse of this
distinction in the work of Bourdieu and Foucault who
maintain the descriptive perspective in analysis of
practice while silently palming the card which allows
them to tell the truth and obtain the knowledge of
which the agents whose practices they describe are
unaware of.
De Certeau invokes symbolic exchange as a
diversionary tactic which can be found in the practice
of la perruque - 'the wig'. It is a form of disguise
in which the worker uses time on the job to do
something else, like writing letters.	 Or borrowing
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materials from work to make something at home.
According to de Certeau it is a rejection of the
competition which management try to instill in workers.
This rejection is manifested and sustained by the
communal complicity of the workers in la perruque.
Competition is replaced by reciprocity. The market
economy which operates at the level of the atomized
individual (wage units) in the code of the generalized
equivalence of money is diverted in the collective
complicity in the borrowing of la perruque:
Because of this, the politics of the 'gift' also
becomes a diversionary tactic. In the same way,
the loss that was volunteered in a gift economy is
transformed into a transgression in a profit
economy: it appears as an excess (a waste), a
challenge (a rejection of profit), or a crime (an
attack on property). (PEL p.27)
The account de Certeau gives of symbolic exchange
as 'la perruque' attempts to prevent it from becoming
an ideal form or utopian model that will replace the
system of political economy. De Certeau doesn't
isolate and invert symbolic exchange making it the
truth of la perruque and of his analysis. It is
something which already occurs and moreover is only one
tactic in the ordinary art of practice.
It is ultimately this ordinary 'art' of practice
that de Certeau is trying to engage with by dismantling
the social and epistemological (though the two overlap)
hierarchization of knowledge:
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Like that of poets and painters, the know-how of
daily practices is supposed to be known only by
the interpreter who illuminates it in his
discursive mirror though he does not possess it
either. It thus belongs to no one. It passes
from the unconsciousness of its practitioners to
the reflection of non-practitioners without
involving any individual subject. It is an
anonymous and referential knowledge, a condition
of the possibility of technical or scientific
practices. (PEL p.71)
The example de Certeau gives of this set of
relations is psychoanalysis. It is the patients who
know, or more specifically the unconscious, but it is
the analyst who provides the place of its articulation.
What is curious about the psychoanalytic schema however
is the hierarchical reversal of knowledge. The
discursive rationality of psychoanalytic theory doesn't
speak and is only an effect of the unconscious. Yet
even though the unconscious is primary, it only exists
as primitive knowledge, without its own place until
such time as it is furnished by theory. The
hierarchical schema here is the relation of
production/consumption that pertains between the
dominant system and the sheep-like populace. This
assumption is not only the guiding principle of the
system itself but also that of the expert or ideologist
who would seek to criticize it. This criticism takes
upon itself a moralizing imperative of informing the
masses. Whereas we have seen how in Baudrillard's
concept of the mass, which absorbs and neutralizes this
will to inform, de Certeau suggests that a process of
reappropriation occurs.	 Consumption not as passive
reception but as an active appropriation. One can only
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emphasise the problem that Baudrillard would have with
this. Despite the invocation of symbolic exchange via
la perrugue this practice of consumption as
appropriation must therefore at some point become part
of an accumulative logic.
Nevertheless to return to the model of reading he
suggests that it is a nomadic practice. Levi-Strauss
concept of bricolage is invoked but if it is bricolage
it functions without the attendant convergence towards
a unified set. However it is hard equate de Certeaufs
committment to the perspective of narrative without it
deriving from or converging to a `unified set'.
The system functions smoothly in proportion to the
degree of belief or investment that can be mobilized by
its various parts. De Certeau charts a process whereby
the old crumbling religious belief systems act as a
reserve for political and economic forces. He defines
belief as an investment, as a modality, separate from
any content. This reserve is a source to be tapped by
various marketing and advertising practices. However,
in an observation similar to Baudrillard (the
hyperreal: too many ends and not enough means), he
suggests that there are too many objects of belief, and
too little credibility to service them. The system
attempts to control the mobility of belief, through
various rationalizations of space:
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As the result of this labor, the powers in our
developed societies have at their disposal rather
subtle and closely-knit procedures for the control
of all social networks these are the
administrative and I panoptic , systems of the
police, the schools, health services, security
etc. But they are slowly losing all credibility,
they have more power and less authority. (PEL
p.179)
There are two positions which concern de Certeau's
elaboration of credibility firstly he suggests a
historical and social continuity between the investment
of belief in religion and politics. The developed
system of political economy attempts to retain and
recuperate the value system of religious belief:
Shell oil produces the Credo of "values" that
inspire its top administrators and that its
managers and employees must adopt as well. The
same sort of thing is found in countless other
businesses, even if they are slow in getting in
motion and still count on the fictive capital of a
earlier family house or regional "spirit". (PEL
p.180)
Secondly this manouevre is based on a
misrecognition of the functioning of belief - that it
is tied to objects. It is mobile. Furthermore the
crucial place that the system attempts to direct
credibility, is not really products per se, but the
real itself.
According to de Certeau the place of this
operation is the media. This account is more resonant
with Baudrillard's conception of the obscene than
Debord's spectacle:
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The media transform the great silence of things
into its opposite. Formerly constituting a secret
the real now talks constantly. (PEL p.185)
Previously the real was the ground of battle in
politics and theology. The real transferred from a
body of doctrine to a code. No longer restricted to a
particular place which gives it authority, authorizes
it, it expands to fill all the interstices of life
itself, motivated by its very lack of credibility.
There is a reversal in this of the traditional
place of the real. Governed by a scopic drive, of
science, the real is no longer invisible, but
visibility itself;
The contemporary `simulacrum' is in short the
latest localization of belief in vision, the
identifcation of the seen with what is to be
believed...The simulacrum is what the relationship
of the visible to the real becomes when the
assumption crumbles that an invisible immensity of
Being (or of beings) lies behind appearances. (PEL
p.187)
It is clear then that the simulacrum is opposed by
de Certeau to a real and he gives it the predicates of
visibility. It is with his conception of the
simulacrum that there is a danger of letting the notion
of the ideological sneak in through the back door. He
suggests that this simulacrum rests on two
interdependent operations. Firstly the establishment
of a simulated referent, such as public opinion via the
survey. Secondly the credibility of this refinement is
essentially a detour, the reality of the political for
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example as attained from another place. For example,
the citation of public opinion:
To cite is thus to give reality to the simulacrum
produced by a power, by making people believe that
others believe in it, but without providing any
believable object. (PEL p.189)
Of course public opinion is but one element of
simulation. The primary sustainance of simulation he
argues is need. The production of need governed by the
logic of production is the model for all discrete
elements that surround and fill in the space opened up
by it. This operation therefore is less a construction
of objects or things, than the production of a
functional space. Nevertheless the redundant ruins of
the 'revolutions of history, economic mutations,
demographic mixtures/ cannot be wholly displaced. They
are distributed as a series of palimpsests, mobile and
interactive, seeping through the inertia of the tabula
rasa which the technocratic system of production
imposes. This heterogeneity survives the homogeneising
processes of productive space. It is a model of power
as a planning department, via the organization of space
through the production of maps. This geometry can be
observed by the difference in assumptions underlying
the change from the tactile medieval map to the
objective geometrical space of post-renaissance maps.
What is at stake, according to de Certeau is the
coding, organization and colonizing of perspective
space. Medieval maps marked an itinerary or journey,
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signified for example, by the drawing of ship on
maritime maps of coastline. The story is replaced by a
formal geometry:
The map, a totalizing stage in which elements of
diverse origin are brought together to form the
tableau of a 'state' of geographical knowledge,
pushes away into its prehistory or into its
posterity, as if into the wings, the opeerations
of which it is the result or necessary condition.
It remains alone on the stage. The tour
describers have disappeared. (PEL p.121)
There is a transformation here of the seen, from a
narrative wandering, to a knowledge that is legible.
The components of the two series operating here are
strategy/place/map and tactic/space/story. De Certeau
argues that the fundamental concern of the story is the
articulation of a space and the delimitation and
displacement of boundaries. The heterogeneity of the
space he assumes is structured and differentiated.
This is because the story, unlike the grid, is a
performative, a practice. 	 The story and formal
description correspond to types of founding.
	 The
latter establishes a space of inertia, a bomb. It
designates something inert. The story is constituted
by operations of time:
Between these two determinations, there are
passages back and forth, such as the putting to
death (or putting into a landscape) of heroes into
transgress frontiers and who, guilty of an offense
against the law of the place, best provide its
restoration with their tombs; or again, on the
contrary, the awakening of inert objects (a table,
a forest, a person that plays a certain role in
the environment) which, emerging from their
stability, transform the place where they lay
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motionless into the foreigness of their own space.
(PEL p.118)
Accordingly, de Certeau argues that there is a
dialectic between the itinerary and the map. He
appears to be suggesting that they are both the
conditions of the other's possibility. The moments of
mapping punctuates the tour as limit, `it's a one-way
street', the `toilet is on the right'.	 The tour
indicates an effect, `you leave the living room and
enter the study'. The former is a tableau, an
inventory whereas the latter is an organization and
contraction of space. What appears to be at stake is a
hermeneutic formulation of identity and difference.
This structure organises the founding insofar as it is
multiform and polyvalent rather than unitary. The
story is flexible and heterogenous containing a variety
of elements and pursues a multiplicity of vectors. What
ultimately separates the flexibility of the story from
the coding of the map is what he calls casual time.
This time interrupts and connects matter rather than
being pre-programmed. It is the engagement with the
accidental and unforeseen. The latter is perceived in
the bureaucratic schema as a fault to be corrected. In
the story, it is a different path or opening to be
explored. Furthermore this exploration is not purely
aleatory, set against the knowledge of the map. It has
its own theory and tactics of practice:
These times constructed by discourse appear, in
reality, as broken and jerky. Subjected to
`servitudes' and dependencies, theoretical time is
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in fact a time linked, to the improbable, to
failures, to diversions, and thus displaced by its
other. It is the equivalent of what circulates in
language as a `temporal metaphorics'. And,
strangely, the relation of the manipulable to gaps
is precisely what constitutes symbolization, which
is a putting together of what coheres without
being coherent, of what makes connection without
being thinkable. (PEL p.202)
It is this analysis that authorises de Certeau's
attempt to valorize the practice of the sheep-like
mass. They negotiate everyday life with the
flexibility and openess to the different. Such is the
space of thinking. The accidental and the event in the
domain of technocratic scientism occupy a space of
resistance (in the electrical sense) to be overcome.
Furthermore, it maintains itself in the illusion of its
primary, founding propriety. Whereas it is in fact a
point of legible inertia, a limit, within the graffiti
of fragmented difference. Hence the `making do' of
perruque with the operation of casual time is a model
of generalized poeisis.
It is clear that though at times de Certeau's
analysis deals with similar concerns as Baudrillard,
the context for his investigation is utterly different.
De Certeau's dominant system, of technocratic
rationality and the process of production, has a beyond
in the practices of everyman. Harvey's description of
de Certeau's work as phenomenological seems correct.
Therfore Douglas Kellner's appreciation of de Certeau,
that his analysis is more plausible than Baudrillard is
troubling given Kellner's criticism of Baudrillard. On
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Kellner's reading Baudrillard's obsession with "signs"
is indicative of a residual metaphysics. However de
Certeau's valorization of the notion of poeisis demands
a commitment to a model of language as the basis for
understanding the practices of everyman.
It is clear then that despite the interesting
surface resemblances of Baudrillard and de Certeau they
have different agendas. De Certeau's account is a
hermeneutic elaboration of subjectivity against a
system of technocratic rationality. In the end I think
the reader will agree that any comparison is limited
and that Baudrillard's work has an entirely different
agenda.
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FOOTNOTES: INTRODUCTION
1. Mike Gane, Critical and Fatal Theory (Routledge,
London, 1991). In chapter 3 of this book Gane brutally
but painstakingly disposes of Kellner's schematization
•of Baudrillard as a post-modernist. Though Kellner's
commentaries are often helpful they are ultimately
hindered by his overall perspective. Kellner is also
weak on his uptake of Derrida's work, which he misuses
in an attempt to show that Baudrillard is not
'sufficiently deconstructive'.
2. Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to
Post-modernism and Beyond (Polity Press, Cambridge,
1989). Though Kellner does provide some solid
systematic accounts of some of Baudrillard's writing,
in the end this gives way to simple polemics of a
rather bizarre nature. Here is but one example among
many of Kellner's criticism of Baudrillard's lack of
critical political analysis:
This view [of politics] may be comforting to a
critical critic in his Paris apartment who no
longer wants to go out and do battle in the public
sphere, but it will not help the millions being
harmed, even killed, as a result of the domestic
and foreign policies of the Reagans, Bushes,
Thatchers, Bothas, and Pinochets of this world.
(p.215)
Kellner,
	 like Norris,	 has very demanding
expectations of theory. This commitment does detract
280
from his commentary in general. At many instances his
analysis is reduced to an appeal to worthy causes.
Moreover because Baudrillard is ultimately, and often
firstly, condemned by his failure to measure up to the
criteria of enlightened liberalism he does not examine
sufficiently key ideas. For example:
It is never clear in Baudrillard's writing what a
'pure event' would be...(p.174)
This criticism is hard to justify as it is a
central element of Baudrillard's later work. It forms
the basis of his conception of theory that does not
bear any relation to the real. Because Kellner
immediately rejects such a proposition he fails to see
what is at stake in this for Baudrillard and does not
try to account for it. I hope to show that Baudrillard
is more than forthcoming in his elaboration of this
concept of the pure event.
3.	 Christopher Norris, 'Lost in the Funhouse:
Baudrillard and the politics of post-modernism', in
Textual Practice (3, no.2, Winter '89). Norris also
uses Baudrillard as an opportunity to elaborate on his
own political projects. This is essentially an updated
enlightenment liberalism to which even Derrida is
harnessed. Given this it would be unusual if both
Norris and Kellner agreed with Baudrillard. My only
objection therefore is not that they disagree with
Baudrillard (or at least their particular picture of
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his work) but that they fail to engage with his work at
any other level than that of the 'progressive' politics
they espouse.
4. Arthur Kroker and David Cook, The Postmodern Scene:
Excremental Culture and Hyper-Aesthetics (Macmillan,
London, 1988), p.175.
5. Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance,
trans. Philip Beitchman (Semiotext(e), New York, 1991),
p.23.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER ONE
1. Donald Kuspit, `The Contradictory Character of
Postmodernism', in Postmodernism - Philosophy and the
Arts, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (Routledge, London, 1990),
p.53.
2.	 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, (The
Architectural Press, London 1927), p.12. cit. in,
Charles Jencks, What is Post-Modernism? (Academy
Editions/St. Martin's Press, London and New York,
1987), p.40.
3. Frederic Jameson, `Postmodernism, or The cultural
logic of late Capitalism', New Left Review 146 (1984),
p.78.
4. Jencks, op cit. p.28.
5. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1990), p.69. Harvey's book is one
of the most intriguing works on the general phenomenon
of post-modernism.	 As a geographer he offers a
historical account of the transformations in time and
space wrought
	 by	 economic	 and	 technological
developments.	 His perspective is, on the whole,
traditionally Marxist.
	 However the range of his
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inquiry, from geography to economics and the cultural,
is consistently challenging.
6. Harvey, op. cit. p.232.
7. Jencks, op. cit. p.16.
8. ibid. p.43.
9. Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernity: A Marxist
Critique (Polity, Cambridge, 1989). The title speaks
for itself.	 Callinicos' political commitments are
clearly spelled out	 in this work	 (in the
acknowledgements he thanks his comrades for their
patience with his 'speculative reveries').
Nevertheless some of Callinicos' polemics are incisive.
He also makes the distinction between the writings of
recent continental philosophers such as Derrida,
Deleuze and Foucault, and the various promulgations
which attempt to constitute a theory of post-modernism.
10. Jurgen Habermas, 'Modernity - An incomplete
project' in Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (Pluto
Press, London, 1987), p.14.
11. Arthur Croker and David Cook, The Postmodern
scene: excremental culture and hyper-aesthetics
(Macmillan, London, 1988), p.8.
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12. Harvey, op.cit. p. 303.
13. I am referring here to The Wake of Imagination:
Ideas of creativity in Western culture (Hutchinson,
London, 1988) and Poetics of Imagining: from Husserl to
Lyotard (Harper Collins Academic, London, 1991).
Kearney is concerned with saving the possibility of
creativity from what he ultimately sees as the
destructive anti-humanism of post-modernist impulses.
In this way the corpus of so called post-structuralist
philosophy is, through a sleight of hand, enlisted to
the terrain of post-modernity. The Wake of Imagination
in particular offers a comprehensive account of the
cultural practices of post-modernity and also a
genealogy of how it came to pass. Kearney agrees with
the attack on 'the subject of modernity'. He sees the
latter as the unified self-present subject of reason.
He argues that the dismantling of this subject was
necessary. However he is worried by what he
understands to be the uncritical anti-humanism of post-
modernity.
14. Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A
Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian
Massumi (Manchester University Press, 1987), p.5.
15. ibid. p.34
16. ibid. p.xxiii.
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17. ibid. p.46.
18. ibid. p.47.
19. ibid. p.61.
20. Richard Rorty, 'The contingency of a liberal
community' in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity
(Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.50.
21.	 Richard Rorty, 'The contingency of self' in
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity op. cit. p.78.
22.	 Richard Rorty, 'The contingency of a liberal
community', op. cit. pp.53-54.
23. 'An interview with Jean-Francois Lyotard', by
Willem van Reijen and Dick Veermman in Theory, Culture
& Society, 5, nos. 2-3, (1988), p.306.
24.	 Richard Rorty, "The Contingency of a liberal
community", op. cit. p.43.
25. Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, OD. 
cit. p.65
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER TWO
1. This is the case with both Mark Poster and Douglas
Kellner.
2. I would argue that to fail by this measure,
Baudrillard ought to fall into the category of post-
modernist.
3. Baudrillard's surrealistic impulse would not be
found in the confessional and psycho-analytic dream
sequences of Dali for example, but in the object
metamorphoses and trompe l'oeil of Magritte.
4. Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to
Postmodernism and Beyond, op. cit. p.167. Though
Kellner offers a comprehensive enough account of the
range of Baudrillard's work his analysis is limited by
his theoretical perspective. The title of his book, I
would argue, is indicative of his missing what is at
stake in Baudrillard's project. However as I have
suggested in my first chapter Kellner is not alone in
this.
5. However as soon as Baudrillard begins to dismantle
the logic of political economy through his analysis of
the simulacrum the time of the commodity-object will
give way to the implosion of time in the pure object.
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6. Baudrillard will always find fault with the concept
of production, whatever way it is presented, because he
conceives it as irresolvably teleological. The import
of this will become clearer when I look at his
conceptualization of seduction in a later chapter.
7. Kellner, OD. cit. p.38.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER THREE
1. Though in this chapter I will only be concerned
with the latter two, these points of contact will
become clear throughout the rest of the thesis.
2. Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p.255.
3. ibid. p.256.
4. In the Evil Demon of Images, which I will draw upon
in chapter 6, Baudrillard remarks that resemblance, is
seductive and immoral because it prohibits the act of
individuation. It opens up a world of metamorphosis in
which things and events appear not according to a
causal logic, determined and with a history, but as
effects which anticipate the real which it thereby
resembles.
5. Deleuze, op. cit. p.258.
6. ibid. p.258.
7. ibid. p.260.
8. In Seduction, where among other issues, Baudrillard
is concerned with an analysis of the game as a form of
initiation to the immanence of the rule and not the law
(and as challenge), he takes issue with Deleuze's
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account of the game in The Logic of Sense. He reads
this forced movement, as a function of chance in the
game through the desired simultaneous play of all
series, as the return of political economy. According
to Baudrillard this conception renders the moves in the
game as statistical events. Ultimately he argues that
Deleuze inverts the polarity of causality/contingency,
thereby maintaining the linearity and time of
causality. For this reason Baudrillard argues that
games are not models of becoming:
Their true form is cyclical or recurrent. And as
such they, and they alone, put a definite stop to
causality and its principle - not by the massive
introduction of random series (which results only
in the dispersal of causality, its reduction to
scattered fragments, and not its overcoming) - but
by the potential return (the eternal return if one
will) to an orderly, conventional situation. (SED
p.146)
I have only noted this here as a point of interest
and will deal more fully with Baudrillard's framing of
the game in chapter six.
9. Deleuze, op. cit. p.261.
10. ibid. p.262.
11. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara
Johnson (University of Chicago Press, 1981), p.63.
12. ibid. p.77.
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13. ibid. cited p.89.
14. ibid. p.13.
15. ibid. pp.98-99.
16. ibid. p.105.
17. ibid. p.94.
18. ibid. p.108.
19. ibid. p.139.
20. Jacques Derrida, 'Freud and the Scene of Writing',
in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Routledge,
London, 1981), p.196.
21. Disseminations, op. cit. p.168.
22. ibid. p.107.
23.	 Richard Kearney, The Poetics of Imagining, op. 
cit. p.170.
24. It is worth mentioning here Susan Sontag's project
in Against Interpretation (Eyre and Spottiswoode,
London, 1967). This work which can be seen in some
sense as a post-modern manifesto attempts to provide a
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ground for the re-valuation of what constitutes
aesthetic pleasure. Though the title of the book may
indicate a certain affinity with the concerns of
Derrida for example she still works within very
traditional paradigms.
	 Interpretation would be
replaced by a more sensuous appreciation. In short
aesthetic appreciation would now consist in the
abandonment of the latent in favour of the manifest:
What is important now is to recover our senses.
We must learn to see more, to hear more, to feel
more. ("Against Interpretation", op. cit. p.14.)
The beginning and end of this project is the
valorisation of artifice over content. Hence her
particular appreciation of camp. The latter has the
added bonus of having its own system of objects whose
value is not determined by the conventional aesthetic
criteria of high art:
Camp is a certain mode of aestheticism. It is one
way of seeing the world as an aesthetic
phenomenon. That way, the way of Camp, is not in
terms of beauty, but in terms of the degree of
artifice, of stylization. (`Notes on Camp', p.
277)
This kind of thought seems to me to be exemplary
of post-modernism, such as it is, as a purely aesthetic
phenomenon that leaves unasked any of the serious
questions posed by recent continental philosophy
regarding the subject and experience.
25. Milan Kundera, cited Poetics of Imagining, p.213.
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26. E.M. Cioran, `Civilization and Frivolity', in A
Short History of Decay, trans. Richard Howard,
(Quartet, London, 1990), p.8.
27. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans.
Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, (University of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989), p.280.
28. Scott Lash, `Discourse or Figure? Postmodernism as
a `Regime of Signification", Theory Culture & Society,
5, nos. 2-3 (1988), p.324.
29. ibid. p. 323
293
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER FOUR
1. My presentation of Baudrillard's account of the
simulacrum is framed by my general thesis concerning
this 'vanishing'. For an analysis which draws out the
sociological implications and influences in Symbolic
Exchange and Death (and in his other works), I would
direct the reader to Mike Gane's impressive and
comprehensive analyses in Baudrillard: Critical and
Fatal Theory and Baudrillard's Bestiary: Baudrillard
and Culture, (Routledge, London, 1991.). The latter in
particular gives an informed account of Baudrillard's
analysis in Symbolic Exchange and Death, of what is at
stake in the exclusion of Death in western society. In
general, Gane's work marks a huge leap in the
appreciation of Baudrillard in the english speaking
world.
2.	 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1982), p.6.
3. As in a recent car advert, 'The definition of an
engineer always comes from nature'.
4. Harvey notes that this space is remarkably similar
to the poetic mappings described and advocated by
Michel De Certeau. I draw the readers attention to the
appendix at the end of this thesis.
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5. Harvey, op. cit. p.244.
6. Kellner, op. cit. p.74.
7. I will examine this in the following chapters on
the mass and the media.
8. I would argue that Baudrillard's dystopic world is
in many respects the actualization of the dreams of
philosophy, of the true, meaning (senders and
receivers) and the real which produces what he calls,
'the vertigo of a flawless world.' (Sim p.60.)
9. A recent example of the debate on the veracity of
polling was the 1992 general election. Media polls
were criticised for their apparent misjudgement of
public opinion. Yet while refuting the truth of the
opinion polls the same people accepted the truth of the
final poll. In fact the apparent flaws of the media
polls only served to support the truth of the 'only
poll that matters'.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER FIVE
1.	 I would ask the reader to consider here the
valorization of Michel de Certeau over Baudrillard by
critics like Kellner and Norris. De Certeau is
mentioned in tandem with Baudrillard by Poster, Kellner
and Harvey.	 While there are similarities what is
interesting is the fundamental difference. This is
manifested in de Certeau's sophisticated and slippery
rearguard action in defence of the subject in the
service of hermeneutics.
2. Jean Baudrillard, 'When Bataille attacked the
metaphysical principle of economy' in Canadian Journal
of Political and Social Theory, 11, no.3, p.57.
3. I discuss seduction in chapters six and seven.
4. Forget Baudrillard, p.84.
5. Selected Works of Alfred Jarry, eds. Roger Shattuck
and Simon Watson Taylor (Methuen, London, 1965), p.193.
6. One could argue that Baudrillard is describing a
kind of inverted phenomenology. Rather than productive
and allowing for the play of perspective, it is
absorptive of all perspective and marks the reversal of
productive energy. 	 It is worth referring to Jarry
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again for an account of this reversion in terms of
pataphysics:
Instead of formulating the law of the fall of a
body toward a center, how far more apposite would
be the law of the ascension of a vacuum toward a
periphery, a vacuum being considered a unit of
non-density, a hypothesis far less arbitrary than
the choice of a concrete unit of positive density
such as water. (Jarry, op. cit. p.193)
7. There is a more sophisticated version in the work
of Michel de Certeau. A brief account of it will be
found in the appendix.
8. I will address in the next chapter the relationship
of media, fascination and terrorism.
9. Umberto Eco, 'Falsification and Consensus', in,
Faith in Fakes, trans. William Weaver (Secker and
Warburg, London, 1986), p.175.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER SIX
1. Cited in, Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination,
op. cit. p.324.
2. Marshall McLuhan, 'The Phonograph', in,
Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Abacus,
London, 1974), p.302.
3. Mark Poster, Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings
(Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988) p.l.
4. It is worth recalling the fact that for both
Deleuze and Derrida, the simulacrum prohibits the
communication of meaning.
5. Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle (Rebel Press
Publications, 1977), paragraph 24.
6. ibid. paragraph 34.
7. ibid. paragraph 48.
8.	 Marshall McLuhan, 'The Medium is the Message',
op.cit. p.21.
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9. This would be an example of 'cold' seduction. I
will be examining his elaboration of seduction in the
following chapters.
10. Marshall McLuhan, 'Media Hot and Cold', op. cit. 
p.35.
11. Marshall McLuhan, 'Roads and Paper Routes', OD. 
cit. p.92.
12. Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, OD. 
cit. p.17.
13. ibid. p.53.
14. Brian Seitz, 'The Televised and the Untelevised:
Keeping an Eye On/Off the Tube', in Postmodernism -
Philosophy and the Arts, ed. Hugh J. Silverman
(Routledge, London, 1990), p.205.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER SEVEN
1. Jacques Derrida, I Diff6rance l , in Margins of
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Harvester Press, Sussex,
1982), p.7.
2. Paul Virilio, Aesthetics of Disappearance, op. cit. 
p.77.
3. Vincent Descombes, cit. Seduction, p.81.
4. Jacques Derrida, 1 Speculer sur Freud', in La Carte
Postale (Flammarion, 1980).
5. Douglas Kellner, op. cit. p.131.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER EIGHT
1. Marshall McLuhan, 'Media Hot and Cold', OD. Cit. 
p.24.
2. In the essay 'On Nihilism' - On the Beach, 6
(Spring 1984) pp. 38-39 - Baudrillard suggests that his
work could be considered a form of radical nihilism.
However he qualifies this arguing that it would be a
futile gesture a she could not outbid the nihilism of
the system:
...I am a terrorist and a nihilist in theory as
others are in arms. Theoretical violence, not
truth, is the sole expedient remaining to us...it
would be admirable to be a nihilist, if radicality
still existed - as it would be admirable to be
terrorist if death, including that of the
terrorist, still had meaning...[However]...opposed
to this is the system's own, the nihilism of
neutralisation. The system is also nihilist, in
the sense that it has the power to reverse
everything in indifferentiation, including that
which denies it. (p.39)
The nihilism of the system is no longer energetic
or productive. It is indifferent. In utopia, when
everything has been fulfilled, there is nothing to hide
(except possibly the absence of the real).
	 The
nihilism of the system rests in its transparency.
3. Allowing myself the laxity of thematic criticism it
could be argued that in the film, Zelig's unpopularity
are a result of his refusal of difference.
	 In
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particular his rejection of the critical distinction
between patient and analyst. He refuses the value and
relation of being an object for a subject. Instead he
becomes a pure object that is irreconcilable to any
subjective project.
4. The interrogation and trial of members of the
Baader-Meinhof group, and the death in prison of
Andreas Baader.
5.	 Not for the first time Kellner's account is
somewhat flawed. He argues (p.132) that what
Baudrillard means by the demand to forget Foucault is
that Baudrillard believes Foulcault's theory to be
obsolete. This is true (especially with regard to the
microphysics; see Gane Critical and Fatal Theory,
p.122) as far as it goes. However it is not a simple
challenge or provocation, which is the way Kellner
largely understands seduction. Baudrillard admires the
anti-humanism and fundamentally anti-subjective impulse
of Foucault's writing and it is this that he sees as
most worthy of attention.
6. Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, op. 
cit pp.28-29.
7. Anders Stephanson, 'Regarding Postmodernism - A
conversation with Frederic Jameson', Social Text,
(1987, Fall, Vol.17), p.29.
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8. Georges Bataille, Inner Experience, trans. Leslie
Anne Boldt (State University of New York Press, 1988),
p.172.
9.	 This	 pejorative	 term	 of	 'aristocratic
Nietzscheanism' as applied by Kellner is difficult to
understand. I think it can be discounted that
Baudrillard has aspirations to the nobility or landed
gentry. Kellner seems to equate it with a new set of
'master' values. Given Baudrillard's fervent rejection
of the notion of value this is not really plausible.
10. Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory,
Practice, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon
(Cornell University Press, New York, 1986), p.190.
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